Catastrophic Event Handbook

National Emergency Management Agency
Te Rākau Whakamarumaru

New Zealand Government

Version 1.0

Foreword

Aotearoa New Zealand is one of the most exposed countries to natural hazard risk and this exposure is increasing. Recent advances in science and modelling techniques have clarified the likelihood and consequences of catastrophic events. As such, operational emergency management planning must be lifted and plan for the scale of events that are possible. We cannot assume our standard emergency systems can scale up.

We have seen devastating overseas events such as Hurricane Katrina, the 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami in Japan, and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami. One day, it will be our turn to have a catastrophic event, and we must plan and prepare. A catastrophic event here will require an all-of-government, whole of society response and recovery never seen before in New Zealand.

In 2022, NEMA began its catastrophic event planning work. We drew on experts from across the emergency management system, to develop a shared understanding on how agencies will deliver on critical tasks, and how we will coordinate activity across government. This evolved into a NEMA-led programme of work, prioritising new content for logistics, welfare (mass relief), international assistance and intelligence. These new arrangements are reflected in this Catastrophic Event Handbook.

The Handbook is the start of a journey. It is a living plan. Science is forever changing, and our system is constantly evolving and improving. This Handbook details the initial response actions, so it can be picked up on the day it is most needed. Over the next few years, we will continue to develop and refine arrangements in this Handbook. We will seek to operationalise arrangements and develop scenario specific plans with our regional partners and Māori communities.

I want to thank everyone who has contributed to this work - those who participated in workshops and working groups, others who reviewed drafts and helped steer this work. We are seeing a step change, with national and local levels thinking about how to respond to catastrophes.

In any extreme or catastrophic event, our core purpose is to reduce harm to people. To do this, we must ensure public trust and confidence remains high.

I know this Handbook will lead to better outcomes on what will be Aotearoa New Zealand's worst day. It will guide your planning, as it will continue to guide ours. It provides a structure for the biggest response and recovery we will ever see, and it will keep New Zealand and our communities safe. This Handbook will allow us to stand together when we are most needed.

John Price
Director, Civil Defence Emergency Management.

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November 2023	0.1	First iteration
February 2024	0.2	Addition of further contextual information for each workstream
July 2024	0.3	Feedback from initial round of external consultation included
October 2024	0.4	Feedback from initial round of external consultation included
November 2024	0.5	First draft finalised and approved
December 2024	0.6	Designed Handbook released

Approved by

This document has been approved by:

Name	Role	Version	Date	Signature
John Price	Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management	1.0	December 2024	

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Section 1
Introduction

The devastation caused by a catastrophic event will be difficult to foresee. It will decrease our quality of life for an extended period and disrupt the complex interconnected systems that govern our healthcare, education, infrastructure and economic stability. It will have long-lasting repercussions on social cohesion, access to resources and overall wellbeing.

Such devastation will overwhelm the emergency management system and government, and will impact commercial Business as Usual (BAU) arrangements. The required resources for the scale of response and recovery will not be available within Aotearoa New Zealand.

International experience demonstrates that during a catastrophic event, decision-makers are forced to prioritise resources to manage shortfalls.

This Catastrophic Event Handbook (Handbook) is the beginning of the journey to:

- improve emergency management system readiness

- provide a framework for nationally coordinating the response

- lead the emergency management system to address readiness gaps

- outline initial recovery actions for response.

It is expected that stakeholders will review the content and find areas to conduct further planning.

1.1
Definition of catastrophic event

A catastrophic event is either an emergency as defined in the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act 2002 (CDEM Act 2002), or a series of emergencies, that causes (or may cause):

- significant loss of life

- serious and prolonged disruption to the normal functioning of society

- widespread destruction across the built and natural environment.

The attributes of a catastrophic event are:

- requires rapid decision-making and novel solutions to manage the severity and scale of the consequences

- requires the prioritisation of critical domestic and international resources towards the most urgent needs of communities

- requires international assistance to bridge urgent capability and capacity gaps

- requires a multifaceted whole-of-society approach to economic security and the health of the nation

- requires a long-term comprehensive system approach to recovery.

A hazard is something that may cause, or contribute substantially to the cause of, an emergency (as defined in section 4 of the CDEM Act 2002).

1.2
Purpose of the Catastrophic Event Handbook

Scope of this Handbook

This Handbook is a planning product that:

- focuses on no single specific hazard (is hazard-agnostic)

- addresses the consequences and operational response and recovery impacts that a catastrophic event may cause throughout Aotearoa New Zealand.

This Handbook is intended to provide national direction and operational context for use by anyone working in emergency management.

The Handbook focuses on national coordination arrangements. It is an All of Government (AoG) document that details the arrangements to make and specific actions to undertake primarily in response to a catastrophe, before turning to recovery.

The Handbook also contains arrangements and actions for non-governmental organisations, organisations that are auxiliary to government, and partners in the private sector.

The Handbook is structured through workstreams, where complex emergency management activities are broken into groups with inter-related tasks or responsibilities.

> This Catastrophic Event Handbook is a core document that agencies should use to inform their plans to respond to and recover from a catastrophic event.

Out of scope of this Handbook

This Handbook does not apply to international crises, which are addressed through domestic security arrangements.

This Handbook does not provide detailed action planning for each agency or organisation.

Review period

This Handbook is designed to be iterative. Additions will be made as emergency management arrangements evolve and future workstreams are prioritised for development.

Once completed, it is anticipated that this Handbook will be reviewed every three years. NEMA will lead the review and consult with all agencies and organisations that have responsibilities set out in this Handbook.

1.3
Context

Catastrophic Event Handbook in the national planning framework

This Handbook outlines the coordinated national arrangements for a catastrophic event.

The actual consequences of a specific catastrophe will determine which arrangements are used. In this Handbook:

- the flexible arrangements allow for a response and recovery tailored to the emergency

- the key actions reflect the more serious end of the scale, but are easy to adapt to less severe events.

As illustrated in **Figure 1**, this Handbook is a supporting document to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 (CDEM Plan 2015). The Handbook supplements previously published actions where that Plan:

- does not fully address the consequences of a catastrophic event

- does not include updates to agency roles, responsibilities and capabilities since its publication in 2015.

As a coordinating framework:

- this Handbook sits above agency and regional plans

- detailed operational plans and arrangements specific to a hazard sit beneath the planning documents for a catastrophic event.

This Handbook covers hazard-agnostic arrangements (arrangements with no specific hazard in mind). The focus is on coordinating and undertaking national agency actions in line with existing hazard-specific plans.

Figure 1. The Catastrophic Event Handbook within the national planning framework

National CDEM Plan

The National CDEM Plan refers to:

- the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015, and any later amendments

- The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015, and any later amendments.

Audience

The two main audiences for this Handbook are:

- personnel within the National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC), especially the National Controller[1] and function managers

- agencies with responsibilities and actions in each workstream.

A catastrophic event may leave central government in Wellington unable to operate. Therefore, a national response cannot be led from Wellington. Should this happen, those undertaking roles within the alternative National Crisis Management Centre (aNCMC) as well as related emergency management roles will use this Handbook.

Cross-references and supporting material

The latest versions of all plans produced by NEMA and documents associated with this *Catastrophic Event Handbook* are available on Search publications » National Emergency Management Agency (civildefence.govt.nz)

1.4
Objectives and intent

Objectives and the National Controller's intent are established in a catastrophic event, to address the specific impacts and needs of those affected. This section gives examples of likely objectives and intent.

Objectives

The following objectives are from section 113 of the National Civil Defence Emergency Plan Order 2015. The objectives are:

- preservation of life

- prevention of escalation of the emergency

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1   In this Handbook, National Controller refers to the person who is the National Controller as set out in section 10 of the CDEM Act 2002.

- maintenance of law and order

- provision of safety and security measures for people and property

- care of sick, injured and dependent people

- provision of essential services

- preservation of governance

- protection of assets, including critical resources or response assets (such as buildings and their contents, and cultural and historic heritage assets)

- protection of natural and physical resources through maintaining biosecurity considerations and the provision of animal welfare (as far as reasonably possible in the circumstances)

- continuation or restoration of economic activity

- putting into place effective arrangements for the transition to recovery.

Intent

While the approach taken by the National Controller may vary depending on the nature of the event faced, the National Controller's intent will likely focus on the actions noted below.

The NCMC will direct the national response which provides overall coordination in supporting a whole-of-community response and transition into recovery.

All levels of the emergency management response will mobilise, establish communications and connect during the immediate response.

Emergency services and emergency management partners will take immediate life-saving actions and provide welfare support to prevent loss of life and reduce impacts on affected communities.

Organisations and agencies will assess available resources, continue their critical functions, and begin response activities. They will gain and start sharing situational awareness with partners to establish a common operating picture. This picture will help guide response actions, and inform advice and messaging to the public and elected officials.

Gaps in resources required to meet New Zealand's response objectives will be identified and sourced from across the emergency management system as efficiently as possible, to meet the needs of communities.

During a catastrophic event, finite resources will likely not meet the needs of those impacted. As a result, emergency managers across all levels will face difficult and complex decisions when prioritising various needs based on limited information.

Planning will begin to move the national effort to:

- providing a sustained response

- establishing a basis for recovery.

When this move happens, the National Controller's intent will also change to reflect the move.

1.5
Planning assumptions

The planning assumptions described in this section were made when developing this Handbook. Each workstream has specific planning assumptions.

Planning assumptions will be tested for validity and necessity and confirmed during the response.

General assumptions

Secondary and cascading hazards compound initial impacts.

A catastrophic event demands novel solutions from agencies, which this Handbook guides.

NEMA leads or supports the lead agency to activate a coordinated response.[2]

Each agency initially responds in line with their response planning arrangements. These arrangements are in line with the roles and responsibilities outlined in the National Civil Defence Emergency Plan 2015, other existing plans, frameworks and relevant legislation, to meet their legislative responsibilities. The exception is when these arrangements need replacing with the approaches in this Handbook (such as elements of the Mass Relief arrangements).

A State of National Emergency (SONE) is declared.[3]

The National Crisis Management Centre is activated.

The Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination (ODESC) system is activated.

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2   This Handbook is hazard-agnostic towards hazards that NEMA is lead agency for (geological, meteorological hazards and infrastructure failure). The arrangements and workstreams may apply to other hazards where NEMA is not the lead agency (see National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015, Appendix 1).

3   The Minister for Emergency Management and Recovery makes the decision to declare a State of National Emergency, on the advice of the Director of Emergency Management or the National Controller. If the Minister for Emergency Management and Recovery is unavailable, any Minister can exercise these duties on their behalf (see section 7 of the Constitution Act 1986).

All agencies operate with reduced workforce and activate, either in their primary or alternative locations.

All agencies and response organisations activate their required business continuity plans (BCP) to restore and sustain their critical functions and support the national response.

Significant international assistance and aid are provided and require internal coordination and support.

A significant number of displaced people and their animals need support.

Voluntary evacuations occur. Individuals and groups attempt to evacuate (and move between) impacted regions using the assets/resources they have available or can access.

Assisted evacuation occurs to the capacity of emergency services and responsible entities (such as aged-care providers).

The community-led response, including iwi, activates immediately after an impact and individuals support each other with the resources they have available.

Not enough resources are available in communities to sustain their population. People have no access to food or water, with likely life-threatening consequences.

At least one major port and one major airport (see **section B.3** in Appendix B) are functioning and will support the response effort and continued supply to the rest of New Zealand.

All lifeline utilities are significantly disrupted, including transportation, telecommunications, water, fuel, power and Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FCMG).

1.6
Governance and elected officials

Effective governance is critical to ensuring public trust and confidence in the national response and recovery. Key levels of governance in a national response and recovery include Cabinet and Parliament, the ODESC system and government agencies.

Cabinet and Parliament

The executive and legislative branches of government are required to make timely statutory and strategic decisions, allocate national resources and amend or pass new legislation. If Wellington is directly affected by the catastrophic event, the arrangements for ensuring these branches of government continue to operate are described in the *Continuity of Delivery of Executive Government and Parliament Plan*.

ODESC system

The ODESC system, led by the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPMC), is used by central government to provide strategic crisis-response governance and coordination. If Wellington is directly affected by the catastrophic event, ODESC will mobilise with alternative members in Auckland.

Public sector

Every agency has a chief executive and a supporting team of senior managers, to provide governance direction to that agency. Each agency is responsible for the arrangements that ensure continuity of governance. Those arrangements must be described in each agency's emergency management plan or BCPs.

Government agencies are responsible for their own responses, and those of the sectors they lead, ensuring they are linked to the national response.

1.7
Other considerations

Future iterations of this Handbook and any associated products will address other critical response and recovery elements and considerations. These include:

- how strategic functions will be established, including strategic communications, strategic policy and strategic planning
- funding and economic security (following engagement with Treasury and the Reserve Bank)
- public education to improve public readiness
- Māori communities (following engagement)
- the private (commercial) sector
- Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) (following engagement through specific workstreams).

1.8
Public readiness

The aim of public readiness is to empower the public (including individuals, communities, organisation and businesses) to build resilience by:

- taking risk reduction and readiness activities before a catastrophe

- taking life-saving response actions during and after a catastrophe.

Public readiness for a catastrophe

The public need to be aware of the additional challenges they may face in a catastrophic event. This helps them increase understanding and acceptance of the need for personal readiness.

Such challenges include:

- the need to act independently without official warnings

- service outages that last a long time

- ongoing communication challenges

- potentially long periods of isolation.

The public also need to recognise natural warning signs and take appropriate life safety actions.

Outcome of effective public readiness

Education and community resilience activities to improve public readiness will reduce the burden on response and recovery resources. Such activities will enable the public to:

- take life-saving actions to avoid death or injury

- be more self-sufficient in the early stages of a catastrophic event.

The desired result is to reduce suffering and empower people to take the correct action – including a focus on the people disproportionately impacted by the emergency.

Public readiness campaigns allow central and local government to reduce the gap of community expectation between what the public expects the government response to look like and what is possible immediately after a catastrophe.

How agencies and organisations support public readiness

All agencies and organisations have a role in developing public education programmes and community resilience activities to ensure public readiness related to their emergency management roles and responsibilities.

Where appropriate, agencies and organisations should work together to:

• ensure consistency of messaging

• reduce duplication of effort and resources.

The actions and understanding required from the public to be prepared for a catastrophe are greater than for 'normal' emergencies, and require investment in bespoke education and readiness activities by the emergency management system.

How this Handbook supports national readiness

This Handbook supports AoG coordinated efforts towards public readiness by providing a framework of the expected needs of communities and a consolidated view of actions by agencies, NGOs and Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Groups.

We expect agencies and organisations to use this Handbook to:

• identify gaps in current public education and readiness activities

• identify the required investment to meet the demands of a catastrophe.

Section 2

Operational phases

2

Operational phases are used to sequence actions and outcomes before and during a response, and into the recovery phase of an emergency.

A phased approach is used to:

- provide for a timely initial response

- enable a sustained response

- support recovery after a catastrophic event.

The operational phases used in the Handbook are set out in **Table 1**.

Table 1. Operational phases

0	Operational readiness
1	Elevated threat
2	Credible threat
	Event impact
3	Immediate response
4	Initiate coordinated response
5	Sustained response
6	Transition to recovery
7	Medium to long-term recovery

This Handbook will primarily focus on the actions to enable the most effective initial response (Phases 1 to 4), as this is the response phase where the need is most acute. Yet many of the arrangements in those four phases will carry through sustained response and into recovery (Phases 5 to 7).

2.1
Operational phase descriptions

0

Readiness phase 0

The purpose of this operational phase is to organise readiness activities to build capacity and capability to enable an effective response to, and recovery from, emergencies. This includes general readiness activities such as the development of arrangements, training, exercising and business continuity planning.

1 **2**

Response phases 1 and 2

Phases 1 and 2 only apply to slow onset events, such as a severe weather event, distant source tsunami, some volcanic scenarios, pandemics, and animal diseases. These phases are applied when a specific event may, or is likely to, occur. The phases include tasks which can be undertaken in relation to a specific threat, such as pre-impact planning, positioning of resources, and evacuations.

Moving from phase 1 to phase 2 occurs when the threat is highly likely to eventuate, or the warning time for the threat is short.

Many tasks in phase 2 occur in phase 3 for rapid onset events (which do not have a phase 1 or 2), such as an earthquake, large-scale infrastructure outage, major landslide or local tsunami.

3 **4** **5**

Response phases 3 to 5

Phases 3 to 5 cover the response after an event.

The phases move along a spectrum of:
- **immediate response**, where agencies are reacting to the immediate needs of the community, with limited information
- **initiate coordinated response**, where agencies are responding collectively to prioritised activities
- **sustained response**, where agencies are responding proactively to emerging issues.

Recovery planning also starts during these phases.

6

Transition to recovery phase 6

The transition to recovery phase is where focus is shifting from sustained response activities to medium and long-term recovery. Response structures are still activated, with responding agencies preparing to hand over the coordination of any outstanding tasks to an integrated National Recovery Office (NRO) or appointed government agencies for long-term administration.

It is likely that during this phase a National Transition Period (NTP) will be in place, allowing the National Recovery Manager to draw on the powers available under it.

7

Medium to long-term recovery phase 7

The medium to long-term recovery phase begins after:

- an integrated NRO is established, with the National Recovery Manager coordinating recovery activities

- agencies have arrangements in place to continue to support the integrated NRO.

The recovery phase is the longest phase of the event.

Different parts of the country may experience different phases at different times.

Phasing will not always be sequential. Secondary hazards or concurrent hazards may cause operations to return to an earlier phase.

2.2
Key actions within the Operational phase

Key actions within the operational phase are set out in **Table 2**. The content is intended to be a framework to guide a response during a State of National Emergency.

The table has four sections.

- **Key actions** describes the key actions that will occur in each phase.

- **Main effort** is the concentration of activity in a particular phase. This action will likely be the focus of the National Controller during this phase.

- **Supporting effort** is the other activities important in a particular phase.

- **Transition conditions** describes what key triggers or activities need to happen before the response moves to the next phase.

Table 2. Key actions within the operational phase

Phase	Operational readiness	Slow onset events	
		Elevated threat	**Credible threat**
Key actions	**Agencies**: undertake readiness activities, as set out in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness requirements. Examples are capability development, training, case maintenance, and exercising. Establish business continuity planning. Establish the response system and protocols (such as MOUs). Empower the resilience of communities by communication, education and managing expectations.	An event is at risk of occurring and may have widespread and severe impacts that near national declaration thresholds. **Agencies**: assess the response and recovery capabilities and requirements. Complete event-specific assessment and planning. Consider activating the ODESC system.	An event is likely to happen imminently and reach national declaration thresholds. Activate the system (including community). Activate and scale up the ODESC system, NCMC, NCCs, ECC, EOCs, and coordination groups. Pre-position or deploy resources and personnel. Action pre-emptive life-saving activities (such as evacuations).

Immediate response	Initiate coordinated response	Sustained response	Transition to recovery	Medium to long-term recovery
The event has occurred and reached national declaration thresholds.	The response structure begins to coordinate the actions of agencies.	**NCMC**: coordinate the central government response in support of regional and local delivery.	The focus is shifting from response to recovery activities. The emphasis is on restoring key infrastructure and providing necessities to individuals and communities.	**Agencies**: collaborate with each other to ensure recovery needs are met across all environments.
Emergency services are responding to the event.	Develop an event-specific action plan.	Check the basic needs of communities are being met, and individual needs assessments undertaken.	**NCMC**: draw down and continue to support the establishment of the integrated National Recovery Office (NRO) and hand over responsibility to the National Recovery Manager.	Check response agencies have returned to operational readiness activities while also supporting the integrated NRO as required.
Agencies: with limited operating capacity, implement initial response plans, and undertake actions to save lives and property as set out in this Handbook, without direction from the NCMC.	Develop initial operating capacity for response agencies and the EM system.	Continue to prioritise and procure resources, and transport and distribute them to those in need.	Provide advice on a National Transition Period.	Support ongoing coordination of recovery needs through multi-agency support.
Activate and scale up the ODESC system, NCMC, NCCs, ECC, EOCs, and coordination groups, to help meet the required response.	Establish formal structures between agencies and into regions (such as, NWCG, NRCG, and PIMCG).	Integrate international aid into the response at all levels.	**The National Controller and National Recovery Manager**: work on the transition.	Embed ongoing recovery into work programmes of agencies, including the incorporation of recovery readiness.
Deliver information to communities through formal and informal channels, although the flow of information is limited.	Integrate the arriving international support into the response structures.	Check the official response is supporting community response efforts.	Ensure an integrated NRO is established to begin leading and coordinating the medium to long-term recovery under the authority of a National Recovery Manager.	
Community members: provide spontaneous assistance to each other based on visible priorities.	Provide coordinated community support, including community-led centres and support from family, friends and neighbours.	Maintain and strengthen existing relationships at the regional and local levels, to ensure recovery needs are identified.		
	Manage ongoing challenges with the flow of information to communities. Use formal and informal channels to do this.	Scope the recovery needs based on identified impacts and consequences.		

	Readiness		Response		
	0		1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**		**Slow onset events**		**Event**
			Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Main effort	Carry out readiness activities.		Carry out an event-specific risk assessment.	Activate response structures (including public messaging).	
Supporting effort	Carry out exercises and business continuity planning.		Carry out event-specific planning. An event assessment and coordinating science advice.	Support efforts about evacuation and the pre-positioning of resources. Assess credibility – the nature, size and scale extent of any threat and its likely impacts.	
Transition conditions	Event occurs (transition to response) **or** Notification of potentially hazardous event.		Hazard is assessed as a 'credible threat'. **or** Threat of event passes hazard-specific threshold.	Event occurs.	

	Recovery			
	3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
impact	**Immediate response**	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**
	Save lives.	Life sustainment, mass relief, restore lifelines.	Restore lifeline utilities.	Transition from the NCMC to the integrated NRO.	Focus on medium to long-term recovery.
	Obtain, maintain and share situational awareness. Initiate interagency functions. Mobilise the AoG response.	Coordinate the response. Support continuity of government. Transform information into intelligence. Manage any deceased.	Assess individual welfare requirements.		
	Immediate life-saving operations are under way. Wide-area impact assessment is under way. The NCMC is now stood up and beginning to coordinate. NCCs, ECCs, EOCs are activating as far as possible.	Coordination centres are established. Situational awareness is developing. Life-sustaining tasks are under way. Damage assessments are under way. The ODESC system, NCMC, NCCs, ECC, EOCs and coordination groups (NWCG, NRCG, PIMCG) are operating sustainably. The ODESC is providing strategic guidance to the National Controller. The National Action Plan is issued.	Damage assessments are complete. Lifeline utilities are stabilised. Supply chains are functional. Basic needs of the community and population are met. The Integrated NRO is active and additional resourcing is being brought in. Most of the sick and injured are receiving care. Extent of powers under a National State of Emergency may no longer be needed, however powers available under a National Transition Period are likely required.	Powers available under a National Transition Period are no longer required. The integrated NRO is established and operational. Response objectives are achieved, with medium to long-term recovery objectives underway.	Central government coordination of recovery efforts is no longer required. Recovery activities are managed as business as usual (BAU).

Workstreams

3

This section of the Handbook is structured around workstreams. Workstreams break complex emergency management response activities into groups with inter-related tasks or responsibilities.

The 11 workstreams are:

	Command, Control, Coordination and Communication (C4)	See page 39
	Intelligence	See page 48
	Life Safety	See page 55
	Mass Relief	See page 66
	Logistics	See page 78
	International Assistance	See page 88
	Lifeline Utilities and the Built Environment	See page 97
	Management of Deceased	See page 108
	Public Information	See page 118
	Critical Resources and Capabilities	See page 125
	Recovery	See page 136

Workstreams do not replace CIMS functions during a response. Instead, they are a way to coordinate multi-agency effort and collate information to enable efficient decision-making. Wherever possible, the workstreams have been aligned with CIMS, for efficient integration into a national response.

Development of operational supporting arrangements within relevant agencies and organisations, alongside exercising of the Handbook, will continue to feed into the iterative workstreams.

Each workstream contains these sections:

- **Overview** – a summary of the workstream and context, for readers
- **Problem statement** – a summary of the problem this workstream is intended to solve in response
- **Desired end state** – the desired objective of the workstream, or situation that indicates a successful response
- **Planning factors** – a list of assumptions, facts and considerations for each workstream
- **Actions by phase** – a table that sets out key actions for each operational phase of the response
- **Actions by agency** – actions published in existing plans
- **Supporting information** – a summary of additional material to give context or background to the workstream.

Section 3.1 in this Handbook describes actions that the National Controller can initiate to help with the immediate response phase.

3.1
Controller's initial actions

Table 3 informs the National Controller of key actions that need to occur, with a focus on the immediate response phase. The actions may apply in the elevated and credible threat phases. The list of actions is not entire. Also, not all actions need to occur in every event.

Table 3. Controller's initial actions by workstream, with a focus on the immediate response phase

Controller's initial actions by workstream

Workstream	Response (Immediate response)
Command, Control, Coordination and Communication	• Seek advice on the State of a National Emergency declaration, if not already in place. • Activate and staff NCMC. • Establish communications between National Coordination. Centres (NCC), CDEM Groups and other national agencies. • Consider forward deployment of control, resources and personnel. • Direct agencies on priorities for relocating personnel (deconflict any tasks for relocating government and rescue services, if required).

Controller's initial actions by workstream

Workstream	Response (Immediate response)
Intelligence	• Provide assessments of event impacts to support establishing shared situational awareness and to inform effective decision-making. • Direct the establishment of a NCMC Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) (see **Appendix A**). • Develop an Intelligence Support Plan (including an event-specific Information Collection Plan (ICP)), to ensure timely and effective information flow. • Produce hazard forecasts (including follow-on and secondary hazards), to inform planning and public information.
Life Safety	• Convene a NCMC Life Safety Coordination Group. • Consider any immediate request for life saving international support, including from Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), SAR, and level 3 emergency medical care. • If warning time permits, request that NZ Police, RCCNZ, MoH and FENZ deploy, and that they pre-position USAR, SAR, NZMAT, HAZMAT and other critical resources and services to areas of likely impact. • Confirm with Health NZ about activating the Ambulance National Major Incident and Emergency Plan.

Controller's initial actions by workstream

Workstream	Response (Immediate response)
Mass Relief	• Confirm the decision to implement mass relief provisions. Push resources into impacted areas on a 'no regrets' basis (see **section 3.5** for a definition of 'no regrets').
	• Direct the convening of the National Welfare Coordination Group (NWCG) (or alternative NWCG) through the National Welfare Manager.
	• Commission a Population-based Needs Assessment (PBNA) for impacted areas.
	• Establish planning cells to plan for and coordinate the provision of all mass relief services.
	• Identify and establish strategic staging locations to receive the mass relief resource push.
	• Where necessary, requisition domestic mass relief resources from domestic pools to meet the needs indicated by the PBNA.
	• Activate MOUs with partners, to start receiving international mass relief resources (through the International Function).
	• Direct production of an initial action plan for Mass Relief Service provision.
Logistics	• Direct the establishment of the NCMC Logistics Coordination Group.
	• Direct the establishment of the National Air Coordination Group.

Controller's initial actions by workstream

Workstream	Response (Immediate response)
International Assistance	• Immediately approve any International Assistance (specifically medical and USAR resources). • Consider any immediate offers of international assistance related to life safety, in the context of geo-strategic considerations (may require discussion at an ODESC system meeting). • Decide if assistance from United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) is required, and seek approval from Cabinet through ODESC. • Seek information on the status of key airports (such as international airports, and RNZAF Base Ohakea) to ensure any assistance can arrive into New Zealand. • Confirm sites and establish Reception and Departure Centres (RDC) for receiving assistance at functional air or seaport sites. • Ensure arrangements are in place to fast-track approval for assistance for life safety activities. Such as visa waivers arrangements, and expedited clearance of incoming tools or machinery

Controller's initial actions by workstream

Workstream	Response (Immediate response)
Lifeline Utilities and the Built Environment	• Activate the lifelines utility coordinator role and initiate the Inter-Infrastructure Coordination Group. • Request Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) to activate the **National Fuel Plan**. • Direct the survey of affected ports and airports, in line with wide-area-impact assessment and in conjunction with Intelligence.
Management of Deceased	• Confirm with Coroners Court that a Mass Fatality Incident is declared. • Direct NCMC Intelligence to provide scientific modelling on the number and location of any likely deceased to the Chief Coroner and NZ Police to support planning. • Request the Mass Fatality Coordination Group sends prioritised requests for resources and international support to NCMC Operations. • Request CDEM Group Controllers identify suitable burial areas in their region (see section 85 of the **CDEM Act 2002** (if required).
Public Information	• Establish and support the NCMC media centre to prepare for an influx of international media requests. • Request DPMC to activate the AoG Strategic Communications network.

Controller's initial actions by workstream

Workstream	Response (Immediate response)
Critical Resources and Capabilities	• Request procurement specialists from Public Service Commission Workforce Mobility Hub to support NCMC Logistics Coordination Group to make the acquisition of domestic and international resources effective, efficient and coordinated. • Ensure a register of critical resources and capabilities and how they will be managed is communicated to the response.
Recovery	• Support the National Recovery Manager to establish the National Recovery Coordination Group (NRCG). • Support the National Recovery Manager and NCMC Policy to scope and submit a Cabinet paper requesting the funding and establishment of an integrated National Recovery Office (NRO).

3.2
Command, Control, Coordination and Communication (C4)

Overview

This workstream describes the various arrangements for achieving an effective response to a catastrophic event. It includes:

• descriptions of coordination mechanisms that NEMA uses when leading a national response

• warnings and alternative communications arrangements.

Problem statement

A catastrophic event will considerably impact standard Command, Control, Coordination and Communication (C4) arrangements. The capacity of command, control and coordination mechanisms will be overwhelmed, and New Zealand does not have robust contingency or failover arrangements. Damage to communication systems will require the use of alternative communication channels that have lower capacity.

Desired end state

Response structures are embedded, staffed and operating to achieve the National Controller's objectives. Communications between all levels of response are stable and returned to primary communication channels.

Planning factors

Facts

CIMS is the primary doctrine for coordinating the emergency response.

The National Controller manages control of the response.

Agency responsibilities do not fundamentally change when a SONE reaches catastrophe thresholds.

Assumptions

Communications between coordination centres and other parts of the response are limited.

Agencies undertake the tasks within this Handbook, and supporting response doctrine, in the absence of direction from the NCMC if communication lines are down.

Agencies activate and follow the BCPs and operational response plans specific to them.

National, regional, and local coordination centres operate at a significantly reduced level, including of staff. Their emergency managers may lack significant knowledge and experience.

Alternative communications arrangements are required.

Severely impacted CDEM Groups require capability support from the national response to manage the response in their areas.

Other considerations

System continuity arrangements and the BCPs of agencies are both central to ensuring the establishment of an effective response through C4.

Responding agencies may not be able to work from their primary coordination centres and may need to activate in alternative locations.

Operational response priorities and the Government's strategic priorities need to align in the response, particularly during the immediate response, to ensure efficient use of scarce resources and capabilities.

If normal emergency roles and responsibilities are not scalable to the level of a catastrophe, they may be adjusted with additional support from other agencies, Māori communities, international assistance, NGOs and commercial partners.

Sharing of operational response plans and requirements is critical in readiness, to ensure a common understanding of the various agencies' actions during the immediate response phase.

Some staff in national agencies may be physically and electronically isolated, meaning that the functions and capacity used to support national response arrangements (such as logistical, administrative, and executive) may not be available in the first weeks of the response. This potential lack of availability will be worse if an event impacts Wellington. Alternative solutions may be needed, such as bringing people in from another region, or having people work remotely if the technology allows).

Two ways to support a coordinated whole-of-society response are to:
- identify commercial and private sector expertise
- integrate this expertise as partners into the response, such as by sharing the objectives and direction of a controller.

Actions by phase

Table 4 lists actions by phase for the Command, Control, Coordination and Communication (C4) workstream.

Table 4. Key command, control, coordination and communication actions by phase

Phase	Operational readiness	Slow onset events	
		Elevated threat	**Credible threat**
Key actions	**Agencies**: undertake readiness activities as set out in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness requirements. **Agencies**: plan for both system and business continuity.	**Scientific and other technical experts**: identify the threat. Analyse the Analysis of threat and potential impacts. Action taken at agency and AoG levels (such as Watch Groups). Identify the National Controller and the Response Manager. Undertake planning for pre-positioning of resources, capabilities, or both. Notify National Coordination Groups. Engage the Public Information Management function. Activate the ODESC system.	Disseminate any warnings. Activate the NCMC and other coordination centres. Pre-position resources, including command elements. Implement the Alternative Communications Plan for likely impacted regions. Activate the ODESC System. Activate the National Coordination Groups. Advise elected officials of the impending situation.

Immediate response	Initiate coordinated response	Sustained response	Transition to recovery	Medium to long-term recovery
Activate and establish effective C4 to effectively deliver emergency management. **Agencies**: activate BCPs, catastrophic contingency arrangements and plans. Activate the ODESC system (if not done in the Elevated Threat phase). Activate the established coordination networks, to support the operational response. Relocate critical government personnel (if required). Activate and establish communications (or alternative communications). **Agencies**: activate BCPs, to ensure continued provision of critical functions. **Agencies**: assess ability to support their frontline operations and the wider government response.	Establish National Controller's meeting (with CDEM Controllers and multi-agency partners). Make the NCMC fully staffed and operational. Stabilise communications arrangements. Activate continuity of delivery of the Executive Government and Parliament Plan and resources. Continue to deploy national surge support to regions as required. Continue to develop and disseminate national action plans and other coordination arrangements (such as situation reports, meetings, and briefings). **Agencies**: advise the NCMC, ODESC and Ministers of ability to deliver critical functions, and the timeframes for recovery of these.	Fully integrate and coordinate the National and Regional responses. Check the response is operating to achieve the National Controller's objectives. Ensure the NCMC and all coordination centres are staffed with appropriately skilled personnel. Return to primary communication channels. Support full functioning of government. Scope integrated National Recovery Office needs based on impacts and support its establishment. Identify the National Recovery Manager if not already identified. **Agencies**: deliver all critical functions, even if at low levels in some instances.	Prepare and formally hand over authority to the National Recovery Manager and the integrated NRO. **Agencies**: support the transition to recovery and engage in short-term recovery responsibilities as required.	**Integrated National Recovery Office**: coordinate the medium and long-term, multi-agency recovery at the national level. **Agencies**: collaborate to ensure recovery needs are met across all environments.

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency

Seek advice on the State of a National Emergency declaration, if not already in place.

Activate and staff the NCMC.

Establish communications with National Coordination Centres (NCC), CDEM Groups and other national agencies.

Consider forward deployment of control, resources, and personnel.

Direct agencies on priorities for relocating personnel (deconflict any tasks for relocating government and rescue services, if required).

Disseminate warnings through the National Warning System.

Issue Emergency Mobile Alerts to the public.

Advise the Minister for Emergency Management and Recovery before a SONE is declared, and support the declaration process.

Initiate a science desk or science advisors to enable coordination of scientific input to the response.

Establish communications with National Coordination Centres (NCC), CDEM Groups and other national agencies.

Use the National Warning System to send details confirming the location of the NCMC and confirming that Handbook arrangements are activated.

Advise Minister for Emergency Management and Recovery on whether a National Transition Period is required, and support the notice process.

All agencies

Activate BCPs as required.

Activate agency National Coordination Centres as per own plans and procedures.

Establish contact with the NCMC using any communication channel available.

Carry out initial actions in line with this Handbook and agency operating procedures.

Provide liaison officers, specialist staff, and surge workforce to the NCMC and AoG coordination groups.

Advise the NCMC of the agency's ability to support the national response.

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (Impacted or limited impact)

Activate coordination centres (and local structures as required) in response to the event, or to enable support to the national response.

Establish contact with the NCMC using any communication method available (such as radio or satellite).

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (Not impacted)

Identify experienced emergency managers who can deploy into impacted areas.

Department of Internal Affairs

Prepare to activate the *Incident Management Response Plan: To support the continuity and delivery of Executive Government following a major event disrupting Wellington* or equivalent arrangements.

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Advise the Prime Minister about the relocation of Executive Government.

Activate ODESC or ODESC Alternative arrangements.

New Zealand Defence Force

Activate contingency plans to support the domestic response. Depending on the event and its location, examples are Contingency Plan Awhina and Contingency Plan Capital Continuity.

Public Service Commission

Activate the Workforce Mobility Hub to provide surge support to the response and recovery.

Supporting information

Coordination mechanisms

This section sets out the various coordination groups or forums during readiness, response or recovery across the system.

- National Welfare Coordination Group (NWCG)

- National Controller's hui

- Sector Coordinating Entities (SCE)

- National Recovery Coordination Group (NRCG)

- National PIM Coordination Group (NPCG)

- AoG groups (such as Policy Network, Data Network, and Government Legal Network)

Regional and local coordination

CDEM Groups are responsible for responding to and managing the adverse effects of emergencies in their own areas. During a SONE, a range of emergency powers become available to CDEM Groups and Group Controllers. Group Controllers must exercise their powers in a way that is consistent with the priorities for the use of resources and services determined by the Director of Civil Defence Emergency Management (Director) or National Controller. CDEM Groups must not act inconsistently with any directions given by the Minister or the Director.

CDEM Groups severely impacted during a catastrophic event will likely not be able to manage the response in their areas, and will require capability support from the national response.

Communications

The standard communication methods (internet, email and mobile) used in the response will be the primary mechanisms used in a catastrophic event. However, significant impacts to the telecommunications network are likely, which will probably make such communication methods ineffective across the response in the early phases

Alternative communications

Alternative communications will be required to establish effective communications with impacted regions. The National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) and partner agencies hold capabilities to deploy mobile communication units (such as satellite connections) to enable connectivity with the NCMC and response structure (are agency specific). Deployment of NEMA's capabilities will be prioritised based on the needs of CDEM Groups.

Alternative communication systems have become much more available, and will continue to develop. Alternative communication planning needs updating regularly to ensure the processes are suitable for the technology available.

Alternative NCMC

The NCMC will activate in Auckland if a significant event impacts Wellington and either or both of these happen:

- Staff cannot be contacted.

- Staff cannot confirm their ability to activate and operate the NCMC from Wellington.

Sector and system surge staff

Emergency managers and other critical specialists will be scarce in an emergency of this scale. CDEM sector surge staff will be managed centrally and prioritised to ensure effective response structures can deliver relief at the regional and local levels.

National warnings

NEMA is responsible for providing national warnings and alerts about natural hazards to CDEM Groups, central government agencies, local authorities, emergency services, lifeline utilities, broadcasters and the public (through Emergency Mobile Alerts).

The method and content of warnings are adjusted to ensure as many people as possible receive the information they need. Warning channels may include mobile phones, radio and television, websites, social media and apps. A catastrophic event will likely damage these channels and the public may not receive adequate warning. More work is needed to plug this gap.

> Emergency Mobile Alert (EMA) are messages about emergencies sent by authorised emergency agencies to capable mobile phones of the public. The alerts are designed to keep people safe and are broadcast to all capable phones from targeted mobile phone towers.

The NCMC will send high-level national information using every channel available to communicate critical information to communities. If local impacts to the primary telecommunication infrastructure (such as mobile phone towers) negate the ability for national warnings to be distributed, regional and local emergency alerting authorities will need to distribute information using whatever alternative means are available.

3.3
Intelligence

Overview

This workstream describes the national intelligence requirements. The role of intelligence is to provide timely, accurate, tailored and actionable intelligence to inform decision-making and planning. This is achieved by collecting, processing and analysing multiple data sources, to assist with anticipating and forecasting hazards and risks across all phases of a catastrophic event.

The NCMC Intelligence function will lead the coordination of intelligence requirements to ensure decision-makers are informed, intelligence needs are synchronised with Operations, and Planning is delivering an Intelligence-led national response.

Problem statement

A catastrophic event will create a range of barriers to information flow for both people and technology-based factors. These barriers may worsen an information vacuum as well as outcomes for communities. Breaking down these barriers will require intelligence systems and processes that are capable of ensuring accurate and timely intelligence. The outcome will enable coordination and decision-making.

Desired end state

Information flow has enabled shared situational awareness across the response, and is enabling the National Controller and other agency decision-makers to achieve response objectives. A monitoring and forecast reporting framework is established and communicated to all partners.

Planning factors

Facts

Information flow relies on communications (including telecommunication infrastructure) and expertise to enable shared situational awareness.

The Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code 2020 is enabled in a SONE.

Reporting early in a response will likely be based on low-confidence sources, likely making such information incomplete or incorrect. Establishing confidence in sources early on is imperative to establishing what is known and what is not known within the response.

Assumptions

The response will need to operate with assumptions and estimative intelligence. For example, if communication is lost with a region, then the assumption is that the region has been severely impacted.

Agencies understand the information-sharing legislation and how this is enabled in a SONE and NTP. As such, agencies allow the free sharing of information to enable the response and recovery.

Key considerations

Multiple layers of response (different levels and agencies) mean that intelligence functions and teams are supporting the different needs of the National Controller and agencies. A multi-layered response requires direction from the National Controller to ensure an aligned reporting environment is developed.

New Zealand lacks sufficient Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets to answer all information requirements. As a result, a 'best effort' approach and prioritisation are needed to task national assets such as satellite imagery and aerial reconnaissance assets.

Interdependencies

Information flow relies on communications (telecommunication infrastructure) to enable shared situational awareness.

Actions by phase

Table 5 lists actions by phase for the Intelligence workstream.

Table 5. Key actions by phase for the Intelligence workstream

	Readiness		Response		
	0		1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**		**Slow onset events**		**Event**
			Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Key actions	**Agencies**: undertake readiness activities as set out in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness. Establish a National Information Collection Plan (ICP) (with agency support for baseline requests). Identify government agencies intelligence functions and capabilities for different phases of response.		Identify threat areas, risk areas, or both. Revise the Collection Plan to suit the identified areas and agencies, to support information collection as requested. Analyse the threat to determine its risk to New Zealand, and whether the threat is credible.	Produce forecasts of likely hazard impacts. Sequence the detailed Collection Plan to hazard specifics, to enable impact assessment effectively and efficiently. **Sources and agencies (SandA)**: collect information in support of the National ICP. Plan for the tasking of ISR assets to gain intelligence.	

	Recovery				
	3	4	5	6	7
impact	**Immediate response**	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**
	Agencies: collect information in support of the National ICP. Establish the NCMC JIG. Establish shared situational awareness, if not already under way. Ensure the planning of a nationally-led wide-area impact assessment is under way. Activate the International Charter for Space and Major Disasters. Update all hazard impact forecasts, to accommodate secondary and follow-on hazards.	Revise the National Collection Plan to reflect event specifics. Develop the event specific wide-area impact assessment plan (as required). Establish defined reporting flow across the response. Establish shared situational awareness, including projections and forecasts aligned with event-specific issues and secondary issues.	Review the collection priorities, to support the transition to recovery. Implement strategic intelligence to support the response leadership and governance beyond the initial understanding of the situation. Carry out routine monitoring, and respond to secondary hazards, aftershock forecasts, and research. Collect and analyse intelligence about the detailed impacts to the social, built, natural and economic environments.	Support the transfer of intelligence management to an integrated National Recovery Office.	Monitor, report and evaluate recovery efforts. Data is regularly collected and a system is in place to monitor progress of recovery outcomes to ensure programmes are adapted to reflect emerging needs. Develop and use a process for capturing lessons.

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency

Provide assessments of event impacts to support establishing shared situational awareness and to inform effective decision-making.

Direct the establishment of a NCMC Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) (see Appendix A).

Develop an Intelligence Support Plan (including an event-specific Information Collection Plan (ICP)) to ensure timely and effective information flow.

Produce hazard forecasts (including follow-on and secondary hazards), to inform planning and public information.

Confirm CCIR and Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR), and define the reporting environment for the response.

Activate the International Charter for Space and Major Disasters, to enable the collection of satellite imagery.

All agencies

Source the critical information requirements as detailed in the Information Collection Plan in **Appendix A**, and communicate this information to the NCMC.

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (All)

Source the critical information requirements as detailed in the Information Collection Plan in **Appendix A**, and communicate this information to the NCMC.

Advise the NCMC of individual response plans and priority of effort.

Advise the NCMC of support requirements to maintain or enable the response.

Fire and Emergency New Zealand

Source the critical information requirements as detailed in the Information Collection Plan in **Appendix A**, and communicate this information to the NCMC.

Health New Zealand and Ministry of Health (Health)

Source the critical information requirements as detailed in the Information Collection Plan in **Appendix A**, and communicate this information to the NCMC.

Land Information New Zealand

Coordinate areas of interest, user requirements and satellite imagery products, including LiDAR and bathymetry, to enable wide area assessment.

Provide datasets to establish a pre-event baseline for a wide area impact assessment.

Fulfil the role of International Charter for Space and Major Disasters Project Manager, once NEMA has activated the Charter.

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Support the NCMC JIG with an Intelligence Liaison Officer and surge capacity, if and when possible.

Ministry for Primary Industries

Support the NCMC JIG with an Intelligence Liaison Officer and surge capacity, if and when possible.

New Zealand Defence Force

Support the NCMC JIG with specialist staff, as possible.

Lead aerial reconnaissance as part of a wide-area impact assessment.

New Zealand Police

Support the NCMC JIG with an Intelligence Liaison Officer and surge capacity, if and when possible.

New Zealand Transport Agency Waka Kotahi (NZTA)

Source the critical information requirements as detailed in the Information Collection Plan in **Appendix A**, and communicate this information to the NCMC.

Statistics NZ

Be prepared to support the NCMC JIG, including specialist surge staff such as data analysts.

Provide critical datasets to support initial response actions such as PBNA (with Census and demographic data for impacted areas).

Supporting information

National Information Collection

A National Information Collection Plan is in **Appendix A** of this Handbook. This Collection Plan sets out the anticipated baseline information needs for agencies to carry out when a Catastrophic Event occurs. The Plan includes baseline dataset requirements that need to be communicated before the event or as soon as the event occurs.

The Priority Information Requirements (PIR) are:

1. What are the impacts on the population?

2. What are the impacts on lifeline utilities and essential services infrastructure?

3. What is the status of any response actions?

4. What future hazards or risks will impact the population, the response or both?

Legislation that enables information sharing

- **Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002**

  Section 76 of the CDEM Act 2002 gives the Director of Emergency Management the power to require any information provision reasonably necessary to exercise CDEM.

- **Privacy Act 2020**

  Principle 11 of the Privacy Act 2020 provides that an organisation may generally only disclose personal information for the purpose for which it was originally collected or obtained. Sometimes other reasons for disclosure are allowed, such as disclosure for a related purpose, or if the person in question gives their permission for the disclosure.

- **Information Sharing Code 2020**

  The Civil Defence National Emergencies (Information Sharing) Code 2020 enables the sharing of personal information during a national emergency, so long as the sharing meets the criteria of being involved in the emergency, the disclosure is in relation to the emergency, and the disclosure is to a public sector agency or an agency involved in managing the emergency.

- **Protective Security Requirements (PSR)** These Requirements state that all systems and processes established must meet the standards and classifications within the PSR.

3.4
Life Safety

Overview

This workstream describes arrangements to protect life from a catastrophic event. It includes information and arrangements relating to search and rescue, pre-hospital emergency care and management of hazards posing risks to life safety.

The aim of this workstream is to prevent further casualties from related hazards. Life-safety activities are largely concentrated in the early stages of response, particularly by emergency services in the immediate response phase.

Problem statement

A catastrophic event will result in a large number of missing people, some of whom will require rescue and medical care because they are trapped, isolated or injured. Effective life safety response activities are time critical.

A catastrophe will worsen the current lack of integration across agencies that have roles in life safety response, and compromise the effectiveness of life-saving activities.

The capacity of emergency services will be overwhelmed and unable to cope without domestic and international support.

Desired end state

Life-saving measures are successfully employed, and operations have shifted to life-sustaining efforts.

Search and rescue operations from the initial hazard are completed, immediate medical care has been provided, cordons are in place and further casualties from related hazards are prevented.

Planning factors

Facts

The impacted community will carry out most search and rescue activities in an uncoordinated way before emergency services can respond.

Minimal processes are in place for coordination centres to communicate with communities and advise them about supporting life-saving activities.

Search and rescue activities include overlapping roles.

Assumptions

Life-saving activities are limited by the ability to communicate and move people and resources in and out of impacted areas.

Not enough skilled staff are available to carry out life safety operations. Local communities and spontaneous volunteers mobilise and are relied on.

Rapid international assistance is required:

- for search and rescue

- to bolster domestic capacity to manage the number of casualties.

Actions by phase

Table 6 lists actions by phase for the Life Safety workstream.

Table 6. Key actions by phase for the Life Safety workstream

	Readiness		Response		
	0		**1**	**2**	
Phase	**Operational readiness**		**Slow onset events**		**Event**
			Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Key actions	**Agencies**: undertake readiness activities as set out in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness. Test existing plans against catastrophic scenarios. Arrange education for the public, to manage expectations and advise on community-led activities (rescue and first aid).		Seek scientific and technical advice on expected risks to life safety, as well as possible mitigations. Confirm availability of life safety response capabilities such as USAR, EMT, NZRT and HAZMAT. Undertake planning for potential life-safety activities, including evacuation.	Seek scientific and technical advice on expected risks to life safety, as well as possible mitigations. Support NCMC activation, including the provision of Liaison Officers. Communicate life-safety risks and advice to the public. Consider and action the pre-positioning of life-safety response teams, resources, or both. Consider and, if decided, action evacuation before the event. Support the International Assistance function by advising on the needs and priorities for specialist support teams such as USAR and EMT.	

		Recovery			
	3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
impact	**Immediate response**	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**
	Advise on and support immediate evacuations.	Convene a Life Safety Coordination Group.	Continue to identify, manage and contingency plan for hazards that risk life safety.	Transition recovery activities to appropriate BAU agency.	Work with affected communities to organise memorial events.
	Deploy life-saving capabilities and teams.	Advise on and support evacuations.	Oversee the management of cordons.		
	Carry out search and rescue and pre-hospital emergency care operations.	Establish the coordination of significant search and rescue operations.	Coordinate search and rescue operations.		
	Carry out triage and initial stabilisation of any casualties.	Establish the coordination of pre-hospital emergency care operations.	Coordinate pre-hospital emergency care operations.		
	Provide advice for community-led activities, including rescue and first aid.	Carry out triage and initial stabilisation of casualties.	Coordinate the deployment of local, national and international teams to reinforce ongoing efforts.		
	Support NCMC activation, including the provision of Liaison Officers.	Oversee the establishment of cordons.	Coordinate the provision of information for the public about search and rescue progress and safety advice to the NCMC.		
	Support the International Assistance function by advising on the needs and priorities for specialist support teams such as USAR and EMT.	Provide information for the public on search and rescue progress and safety advice.	Shift life safety operations to life-sustaining efforts when the search and rescue and acute medical care operations end.		
		Support the International Assistance function by advising on the needs and priorities for specialist teams such as USAR and EMT.			

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency

Convene a NCMC Life Safety Coordination Group.

Consider any immediate request for life saving international support, including from Urban Search and Rescue (USAR), SAR, and level 3 emergency medical care.

If warning time permits, request that NZ Police, RCCNZ, MoH and FENZ deploy, and that they pre-position USAR, SAR, NZMAT, HAZMAT and other critical resources and services to areas of likely impact.

Confirm with Health NZ about the activation of the Ambulance Major Incident and Emergency Plan.

Support patient evacuation from impacted areas, in conjunction with the National Health Coordination Centre (NHCC).

Support the provision of a public health response as well as disease surveillance and monitoring in impacted areas, in conjunction with Health NZ and Ministry of Health.

All search and rescue agencies

Use available resources to undertake search and rescue as well as wider reconnaissance on facilities that the agency is responsible for, in conjunction with local emergency services where possible.

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (Impacted)

Support initial search and rescue, medical response, patient and other urgent evacuations, and immediate welfare support. Provide such support in line with the response plans of existing group, local and partner agencies, as well as the needs from the event.

Act as the Local Emergency Management Authority (LEMA) for Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) and other resources assigned to any respective CDEM Group areas, consistent with the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) guidelines and the National CDEM Plan and Guide, under the coordination of the NCMC. (Note: LEMA is a UNOCHA term).

Work with territorial authorities to identify and prioritise locations for cordons, and communicate any support requirements to the NCMC.

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (Limited or Not impacted)

Support triage and pre-hospital emergency medical care for evacuees upon arrival in region.

Department of Conservation

Coordinate evacuation of visitors from DoC land (including tracks and huts) in conjunction with New Zealand Police and/or RCCNZ if search and rescue related.

Department of Corrections

Coordinate support to and, if necessary, evacuation of Corrections facilities in conjunction with CDEM.

Fire and Emergency New Zealand

Coordinate the provision of additional FENZ personnel to any impacted areas.

Initiate and lead the USAR response in affected areas.

Coordinate international USAR support, on request from the National Controller.

Coordinate deployment and management of all FENZ personnel as well as international USAR and firefighting teams.

Lead and coordinate the provision of the firefighting and hazardous substance response, and rescue persons who are trapped due to any incident.

Health New Zealand and Ministry of Health (Health)

Support the provision of a public health response as well as disease surveillance and monitoring in impacted areas, in conjunction with NEMA.

Activate the Health NZ Mass Casualty plans, including national coordination of casualties and evacuations requirements, in conjunction with the NCMC.

Control the medical transport priorities for inter-facility transport and aero-medical evacuations, in coordination with the Ambulance National Crisis Coordination Centre.

Continue to provide and maintain health care services across New Zealand, and to impacted areas as far as possible.

Provide public health messages, public health measures, or both, to prevent communicable disease outbreaks in impacted areas

Land and air ambulances

Respond in line with the Provisions of the *Ambulance National Major Incident and Emergency Plan*.

Triage, treat and transport casualties as resources become available.

Manage pre-hospital triage and life-saving efforts, and coordinate with Health NZ and other health providers

Ambulance National Crisis Coordination Centre to coordinate with Health NZ to control medical transport priorities for inter-facility transport and aero-medical evacuations.

Maritime NZ (Rescue Coordination Centre)

Lead and Coordinate Category Two search and rescue operations.

Ministry of Transport

Authorise civilian non-scheduled flights into and out of New Zealand, including relief and aid flights.

New Zealand Police

Lead and coordinate Category One search and rescue operations.

Coordinate deployment and management of LandSAR teams.

Conduct any initial evacuations to ensure protection of life.

Coordinate movement control over land, including communications and traffic control.

Assist with moving rescue, medical, fire and other essential services.

Be prepared to secure specific locations, and secure movement into impacted areas as tasked.

New Zealand Response Teams

Be prepared to be tasked by FENZ, NEMA or local CDEM to carry out tasks in the immediate response phase.

Supporting information

Search and rescue

The operational coordination of search and rescue falls under two categories. NZ Police is responsible for Category One. The Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand (RCCNZ) is responsible for Category Two.

Category One operations include land, inland waterways, subterranean and close-to-shore searches. Category Two operations usually require national or international resources and include aircraft, activated emergency locator beacons and off-shore marine searches.

NZ Police and RCCNZ can task organisations such as Coastguard, LandSAR, or Surf Life Saving New Zealand.

Urban Search and Rescue

Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) is a specialist capability that provides assessment, search, rescue, and humanitarian support during emergencies beyond the scope of standard capabilities across the first response system. FENZ has the legislative mandate to provide USAR services in New Zealand.

USAR teams are classified as light, medium or heavy based on their technical capability and operational capacity. This is detailed in section 3.4 of the INSARAG Guidelines 2020. Volume II: Preparedness and Response. Manual A: Capacity Building.

FENZ has a heavy USAR capability and the ability to coordinate international USAR teams within New Zealand. New Zealand's USAR capability includes management, technician, logistician, medical, engineering and canine functions. In response, USAR is tasked by the lead agency and coordinated by FENZ.

Figure 2 shows the division of responsibilities in search and rescue.

Search and Rescue Environment

Figure 2. A diagram showing the division of responsibilities in search and rescue

New Zealand Response Teams

New Zealand Response Teams (NZRT) are teams of qualified first responders who support CDEM Groups during and after emergency events.

NZRT volunteers are also trained to work alongside emergency services, to provide surge support during large-scale emergencies.

Capabilities can include USAR support, Mass Casualty support, Light Rescue, Welfare, Cordons, and Flood and Storm Response.

For catastrophic events, NZRT are most likely to support FENZ with USAR tasks in the immediate response phase.

Currently, 16 NZRT are nationally accredited. Their capabilities are listed on the NEMA/Civil Defence website.[4]

Evacuation

Evacuation can be voluntary or mandatory and may occur before, during or after an emergency. If an emergency has occurred, but a state of emergency is not yet in place, FENZ can order mandatory evacuation if life or property is in danger.

In a state of emergency, the NZ Police, National Controller, or CDEM Group Controller can order an evacuation. Companion animals should be accommodated for where possible in all evacuations, to make people more willing to cooperate with orders.

Cordons

NZ Police coordinates movement over land, including traffic control, and controls access to and within an impacted area to assist rescue, medical, fire and other essential services.

NZ Police will need support to establish and maintain cordons. This will require support from other government agencies, private companies and potentially international sources.

Territorial authorities will need to manage the safety of people in and near buildings by cordoning, barricading, or requiring mandatory evacuations.

Emergency Medical Teams

Emergency Medical Teams (EMT) are groups of health professionals that treat patients affected by an emergency or disaster, and work to comply with standards set by the World Health Organization (WHO).[5] About 40 EMT are global classified.[6] They are classified in four types based on their mobility and level of care provided, as illustrated in **Figure 3**.

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4   See this webpage: New Zealand Response Teams (NZ-RTs).

5   See this webpage: World Health Organisation – Emergency Medical Team Initiative

6   See this webpage: WHO – EMT Global Classified Teams

Type 1
Mobile

Type 1
Fixed

Type 2
Inpatient surgical
emergency care

Type 3
Inpatient referral care

Specialised care teams

MOBILITY
AGILITY

COMPLEXITY OF CARE
CAPABILITIES, SERVICES

Figure 3. EMT typology: relationship between mobility/agility and complexity of care, capabilities and services[7]

New Zealand's EMT is the New Zealand Medical Assistance Team (NZMAT), coordinated by the MoH in partnership with other organisations. NZMAT is classified for both Type-1 fixed and Type-1 mobile teams, meaning it can provide services up to 12 hours a day, 7 days a week.[8] NZMAT is coordinated through the National Health Coordination Centre.[9]

Ambulance sector

In response, land and air ambulance providers are responsible for continuing their services and managing any increased demand. The *Ambulance National Major Incident and Emergency Plan* is a detailed operational framework for the ambulance sector.

Hazard management

Rapid building assessment is included in the **Lifeline Utilities and the Built Environment** workstream.

FENZ is the lead agency for hazardous substance incidents. FENZ may coordinate a Science and Technical Advisory Committee.

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7 See page 14 of the Classification and Minimum Standards for Emergency Medical Teams, World Health Organization, 2021.

8 See this website: New Zealand Medical Assistance Team (NZMAT)

9 See Ministry of Health. 2012. New Zealand Health Emergency Medical Assistance Team (NZMAT) Operational Manual. Wellington: Ministry of Health.

3.5
Mass Relief

Overview

This workstream describes the national Welfare arrangements to support response activities. Mass Relief is used in the Handbook to highlight that current welfare doctrine, systems and process are not designed for a catastrophic response.

Current Welfare services focus on assessing and delivering help on an individual basis. In a catastrophic event, this approach will not support the required scale of service and resource delivery. Welfare services will need to be delivered in bulk using a push model on a 'no regrets' basis (Mass Relief).

In this context, a **no regrets basis** describes a proactive approach to providing aid which prefers the risk of over-supplying relief supplies than the risk of undersupplying aid while awaiting specific confirmation of need.

Mass Relief is the immediate provision of food and non-food items, water, sanitation services, medical supplies and medication, and shelter to preserve life and ease the suffering of people and animals impacted by a significant event.

Note:
- Movement and distribution of relief supplies is covered in the **Logistics** workstream.
- International relief and support are covered in the **International Assistance** workstream.

Problem statement

A catastrophic event will result in large portions of the population being unable to support themselves or access basic necessities on a scale never seen in New Zealand.

This situation will:
- far exceed New Zealand's ability to respond using normal welfare service delivery mechanisms
- require efficient large-scale relief, to prevent suffering and avoid further loss of life.

Desired end state

Impacted populations have safe access to basic necessities, and a transition is occurring to deliver welfare that meets the specific needs of the impacted population, as set out in the Welfare Services Arrangements under [section 14 of the National CDEM Plan 2015](#).

Planning factors

Facts

A primary consideration for the delivery of mass relief is the care and protection of people and groups who may be disproportionately affected by disasters. Examples are children, older people, and disabled people.

The nature and design of a mass relief response will depend heavily on the specific impacts of an event. Flexibility in relief provision planning is required.

A significant number of impacted people will need support in the affected area or in the evacuation centres.

A community-led response will be established outside the formal government-led response. The mass relief response must ensure that such community-led response is supported where possible.

Arrangements to coordinate international NGOs who assist in providing mass relief need refining.

Assumptions

The key driver of the need for mass relief is the impacts on the transport and supply systems, with some areas isolated from this supply. These isolated areas are the areas that will most likely require mass relief.

Areas connected to the normal commercial transport and supply system do not require mass relief.

International resources to support the mass relief response take significant time to arrive due to the volume of aid required and the emergency management system's capacity to request, receive and move resources. This delay must be factored into early response planning.

The community-led response activates immediately after the impact. Individuals support each other as far as possible with the resources they have available.

The resources available from the official and community-led response are initially insufficient to meet the needs of impacted populations. The consequences from this are likely life-threatening.

The healthcare system is significantly impacted and operating at a reduced capacity. Access to healthcare services is likely significantly impacted and alternative arrangements are possibly needed to support the health needs of communities.

Many people lose access to critical medications. This loss could impact the status of their ongoing health.

Degradation of the telecommunications and electricity networks may interfere with digital banking and card transactions, preventing the general public from making normal payment for goods (given the generally low levels of cash held in households).

The urgency and scale of response required means available goods are unfamiliar or unsuitable for long-term use by affected communities.

Nationally delivered welfare services are tailored to each area's needs when possible. This applies when:

- CDEM Groups are able to request specific assistance based on known needs

- standard welfare provision arrangements will meet the needs of the population.

Other considerations

Considerations for implementing mass relief

- **Scale of direct human need**: the estimated number of people requiring assistance, the severity of their needs, the number of casualties and the likelihood of large numbers of internally displaced persons.

- **Scale of companion animal needs**: the estimated number of animals requiring assistance – food, water, shelter and veterinary treatment (including euthanasia).

- **Impact on community and on the built environment**: the level of damage to lifeline utilities, the level of impact on livelihoods and communities, and the increased vulnerability of disproportionately impacted populations.

- **Capacity of local government to respond**: the capacity of local government to respond effectively is overwhelmed.

- **Capacity of central government to meet need**: the capacity and capability of the national response is overwhelmed, and support is required from the international community to preserve life effectively and ease suffering.

- **Capacity of the commercial sector to meet need**: the capacity of the commercial sector to transport resources from outside the impacted area, and within the impacted area to help distribute relief stores (such as through supermarkets and local shops).

- **Intelligence reports indicating severe impact**: early impact assessments from reconnaissance and information efforts indicate extreme, widespread impacts that will have severe impacts on communities.

- **Lack of communication channels to impacted areas**: inability to communicate with the regional response, the local response or key community figures indicates that mass relief may need to be planned for and implemented.

- **Isolated communities**: if significant sectors of the population are isolated from their general service networks, consider implementing mass relief.

Considerations for a transition out of a mass relief approach

A mass relief approach focuses on preserving life and easing suffering, but does not fully address the specific needs of impacted populations. To meet these needs effectively, the response must transition to general welfare services arrangements under section 14 of the National CDEM Plan 2015 as soon as possible.

Listed below is a set of considerations that the NCMC can use to determine when to transition from mass relief to general welfare arrangements. Such transition will occur at different times for different areas of the response.

- **Capacity of local government to respond**: a national push approach may no longer be required if local response actors are in a position to procure relief resources and distribute them effectively.

- **Restoration of the Lifeline Utility Network**: a push approach may no longer be required if local infrastructure networks, particularly Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) networks, are functioning effectively.

- **Process for assessing individualised needs**: if the needs of impacted communities can be effectively understood through individualised needs assessment, a PBNA is no longer required. This also signals that a push approach may not be required in the impacted area.

- **Effective functioning of social service providers**: a mass relief approach should be reconsidered if social service providers are in a position to provide enhanced BAU services.

- **Scale of direct human need**: a mass relief approach may no longer be required when it is clear that the scale of need of impacted populations has reduced so much that general BAU mechanisms can cater to that need.

Actions by phase

Table 7 lists actions by phase for the Mass Relief workstream.

Table 7. Key actions by phase for the Mass Relief workstream

	Readiness	Response		
	0	1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**	**Slow onset events**		**Event**
		Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Key actions	**Agencies**: undertake readiness activities as set out in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness. Develop a baseline Population Based Needs Assessment (PBNA) in readiness. Carry out a stocktake of Mass Relief resources available within New Zealand. Carry out a stocktake of Mass Relief resources available with international partners.	Analyse the PBNA completed in readiness for areas likely to be impacted. Advise on the potential prepositioning of resources. Collaborate with PIM on public messaging.	Activate and advise the NWCG. Prepare to activate the aNWCG. Engage regional Welfare stakeholders. Advise on the prepositioning of relief resources. Activate the Visitors Sector Emergency Advisory Group.	

	Recovery				
impact	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
	Immediate response	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**
	Convene the NWCG or aNWCG.

Conduct an initial PBNA.

Review the stocktakes of available relief resources.

Establish a planning cell for the provision of Mass Shelter and Accommodation.

Establish a planning cell for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion (WASH) services.

Establish a planning cell for Food and Non-Food Items (FMCG).

Activate the NWCG Welfare Sub-function coordination groups.

Establish the visitor evacuation planning cell.

Coordinate with Logistics to identify regional staging areas for receiving Mass Relief push.

Ensure MOUs with partner countries are activated, to facilitate receiving international assistance in the relief space.

Confirm the transport and distribution networks with Logistics, to confirm which areas are viable for immediate distribution. | Coordinate with Logistics to start relief push into impacted areas.

Update the PBNA in line with the response planning cycle.

Integrate the national PBNA with the regional Needs Assessment results.

Start providing Mass Shelter services in line with the options analysis.

Coordinate with public health services, to integrate with the Mass Shelter and Accommodation service provision.

Continue the planning cell for Mass Shelter and Accommodation Services, to guide the ongoing provision of services.

Initiate and advise on providing Food and Non-Food Items through FMCG supply chains.

Continue the planning cell for Food and Non-Food Items delivery (FMCG), to guide ongoing provision of food.

Initiate provision of WASH services and continue the planning cell for WASH services, to guide ongoing provision of services.

Integrate Animal Welfare planning arrangements into the relief response, including Animal Rescue. | Continue to update the PBNA, aligned with the Planning Cycle.

Inform and ensure the continued provision of Food and Non-Food Items, Mass Shelter and Accommodation, and WASH services.

Consider and ensure regional-level capacity to transition to individualised needs assessment.

Ensure regional capacity for individual needs assessment.

Plan for transition to the delivery of individualised Welfare services.

Monitor and evaluate the Mass Shelter and Accommodation solutions. | Ensure regions have the capacity and capability for the purposes of the needs assessment.

Transition to the delivery of individualised Welfare services.

Ensure NWCG-responsible agencies can progress the service provision through to recovery, in line with their responsibilities.

Plan for the transition of relief and welfare operations (not covered by NWCG responsible agencies) to the established integrated National Recovery Office. | Transition welfare operations to the established integrated NRO and responsible government agencies. |

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency

Confirm the decision to implement mass relief provisions. Push resources into impacted areas on a 'no regrets' basis.

Direct and activate the National Welfare Coordinating Group (NWCG) (or alternative NWCG), through the National Welfare Manager.

Commission a Population-based Needs Assessment (PBNA) for impacted areas.

Establish planning cells to plan for and coordinate the provision of all mass relief services.

Identify and establish strategic staging locations to receive the mass relief resource push.

Where necessary, requisition domestic mass relief resources from domestic pools to meet needs indicated by the PBNA.

Activate Memorandum of Understandings with partners, to start receiving international mass relief resources (through the International sub-function).

Commission initial action plan for Mass Relief service provision.

Establish contact with CDEM Group Welfare Managers to determine support requirements.

Prepare an AoG factsheet indicating access to relief resources to impacted communities. Request, receive and facilitate movement of mass relief resources.

Activate the Shelter and Accommodation Sub-function (in conjunction with MBIE TAS).

CDEM Groups (Impacted)

Activate the Welfare Coordination Groups (WCG).

Establish contact channels with the NCMC and implement regional catastrophic planning arrangements, where developed.

Ensure regional PBNA results are available.

CDEM Groups (Limited impact or Not impacted)

Activate the Welfare Coordination Groups and be prepared to supply welfare surge support.

Start preparations for providing Welfare Manager surge support into and out of impacted areas.

Establish welfare service coordination mechanisms (activate WCG and relevant sub-functions).

Start preparations to receive and support evacuees from impacted areas.

NWCG/aNWCG responsible agencies (common activity)

Liaise directly with NCMC to start coordinating the delivery of relief services.

Activate all Welfare services Sub-functions as set out in the National CDEM Plan 2015, including section 145.

Activate national catastrophic planning arrangements in areas of responsibility.

Establish contact with support agencies and start coordinating the sub-functions.

NWCG/aNWCG support agencies (common activity)

Ensure enough surge capacity is available to maintain essential services and contribute to providing wider welfare services.

Consider which resources are needed to maintain service-provision activities for an extended period.

Provide personnel, to augment the NCMC's operations (on request).

Health New Zealand and Ministry of Health (Health)

Coordinate with the Mass Shelter and Accommodation response, to integrate health operations (including public health advice and measures) into the relief response.

Coordinate with healthcare providers in the community settings and liaise with the NCMC.

Activate the Psychosocial Support Sub-function.

Coordinate with the Food and Non-Food Items response, to incorporate medication and medical supplies into the relief response.

Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI)

Activate the National Animal Welfare Emergency Management Sub-function, to coordinate the assessment process for animal needs and the provision of assistance to animals (including evacuation and emergency veterinary care).

Activate the Catastrophic Animal Welfare Plan.

Advise the NCMC about the need to request international animal rescue and veterinary teams.

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Activate the Temporary Accommodation Service.

Activate the Shelter and Accommodation Sub-function (alongside NEMA).

Activate the Visitor Sector Emergency Advisory Group.

Activate, or consider activating, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, to support access to international relief supplies (also an action in the **Logistics** workstream).

Ministry of Social Development (MSD)

Activate the Financial Assistance Sub-function, to coordinate the delivery of financial assistance to affected people.

New Zealand Police

Activate the Inquiry Sub-function.

Start reconciliation activities at the earliest possible time.

Oranga Tamariki

Activate the Care and Protection for Children and Young People Sub-function.

Coordinate with the Shelter and Accommodation Sub-function, to ensure the care and protection of children and young people in shelter and accommodation facilities.

Statistics NZ

Be prepared to help develop any PBNA.

Supporting information

Population Based Needs Assessment

> A **Population-based Needs Assessment** (PBNA) is the rapid assessment of the need of a population impacted by a significant emergency event, based on pre-existing data captured during readiness. A PBNA is implemented to inform the composition of a Mass Relief response.

A PBNA entails gathering and analysing population information to estimate the essential needs of an impacted population. The reason for such action is to inform the national response of the resources that must be included in a Mass Relief 'push' operation.

A PBNA aims to determine the type and quantity of goods and services needed to preserve life and ease suffering, to be pushed into an affected area after a significant emergency.

A PBNA focuses on determining the needs of an impacted population in the key Mass Relief service areas. These are:

a. Food and Non-food Items

b. Mass Shelter and Accommodation

c. Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion

The Sphere Handbook 2018 stipulates making calculations for minimum food and water provision from these two baselines:

• Food: 2100 kilo calories per person per day

• Water: 15 litres per person per day

a. Food and Non-food Items

Large quantities of food and non-food items will need to be pushed into locations impacted by the event. This push will be resource-intensive and require a significant logistical effort. The rapid delivery of food to impacted areas will be critical to preserve life and ease suffering.

The provision of food and non-food items aims to:

- ensure access to safe and nutritious food for impacted individuals, communities, and animals

- provide timely, appropriate and sufficient food assistance to meet the basic nutritional needs of affected populations rapidly and at a large scale

- account for the nutritional needs and cultural preferences of affected populations where possible, accounting for local dietary habits, ages and cultural practices

- ensure the safety and hygiene of food throughout the supply chain to prevent foodborne illness and contamination.

As set out in The Sphere Handbook 2018, the national response will aim to provide 2100 kilo calories of food per person per day to impacted populations.

b. Mass Shelter and Accommodation

The numbers of displaced people and animals in the wake of a catastrophic event may be on a scale not yet experienced in New Zealand. Not all catastrophic events will necessarily force displacement, an example being a pandemic. The rapid provision of shelter to those displaced will be vital to protect them from the elements, dangerous conditions and potential harm.

The provision of Mass Shelter and Accommodation aims to:

- provide immediate shelter options to displaced populations

- cater for the specific shelter needs of disproportionately impacted populations

- design mass shelter solutions that are safe and inclusive, and protect vulnerable populations from discrimination, exploitation and abuse

- facilitate community participation in the design of mass shelter solutions, to ensure the long-term wellbeing of impacted communities

- ensure that shelter solutions meet the basic standards of structural soundness, weather resistance, privacy and ventilation

- provide a secure environment in shelter facilities, to protect vulnerable populations, maintain order and facilitate health and wellbeing

- monitor and evaluate the quality and design of shelter facilities to ensure continuous improvement over the course of their required lifecycle

- provide accommodation solutions to those unable to return to their own homes.

c. Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion

Providing a safe drinking water supply and adequate sanitation services is vital to maintain population health and limit the spread of disease after an emergency. This service aims to:

- ensure affected populations have safe access to drinking water

- encourage responsible water conservation and efficient water management practices and advice

- provide hygienic sanitation facilities, including but not limited to toilets for impacted communities

- implement human waste management systems to ensure safe disposal of human waste

- minimise potential environmental and water services contamination

- address, when designing facilities, the needs of disproportionately impacted populations such as women, children, the elderly, and those with disabilities.

Mass Relief National Framework

A Mass Relief National Framework has been developed and will be published on the NEMA website in 2025.

The Framework provides further detail on the four Mass Relief Service Delivery Areas:

- Population-based Needs Assessment

- Food and Non-food Items

- Mass Shelter and Accommodation

- Water Supply, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion

Enablers of the Mass Relief response

Successful delivery and implementation of Mass Relief will rely heavily on other NCMC functions as well as workstreams under this Handbook. As an example, the mass provision of food and non-food items will depend on the Logistics function establishing an emergency supply chain using the Logistics Concept of Operations.

The Mass Relief workstream has significant interdependencies with the following workstreams in this Handbook:

- Intelligence

- Logistics

- International Assistance

- Critical Resources and Capabilities

- Public Information

- Recovery

3.6
Logistics

Overview

This workstream includes the supply chain systems (procurement, supply, transport and distribution) that enable the movement of goods and people within and into New Zealand.

This workstream:

- describes how the national logistics system enables regional and local logistics teams in response

- provides arrangements for supplementing the existing logistics supply chain in an emergency.

The intent is to meet the logistical needs of the response and communities until normal operations of the private sector and government can sustain the population's requirements.

The Logistics and the Mass Relief workstreams are closely linked.

Problem statement

A catastrophic event will prevent standard commercial logistics arrangements within the impacted area due to breaks in the lifeline utilities and transportation system. This breakdown will require making alternative arrangements for sea, air and land movements, including direct government intervention in the prioritisation, coordination and conduct of logistics. A national logistics concept is required to bridge the gaps in the supply chain that the commercial sector cannot navigate alone.

Desired end state

An emergency supply chain is established, able to be sustained, and operational for the movement of people, equipment and supplies. Direct government support is reducing over time as commercial logistics solutions are enabled and re-established.

Planning factors

Facts

The New Zealand supply chain is based on a 'just in time' model, which means that national and regional stockholdings are limited.

Commercial supply chain providers are effective logisticians with the skills and assets to provide efficient logistics solutions.

Many non-requested (or unsolicited) international support and resources will arrive. Local and regional support and resources will also arrive.

Assumptions

The need to evacuate from, and move response personnel, equipment and supplies into, impacted regions exceeds available transport options, requiring government coordination and prioritisation.

New Zealand lacks the assets to transport the required quantity of people, equipment and supplies. The scale of logistics procurement, resource management, transportation and distribution will exceed New Zealand's capability and capacity.

A National Emergency Supply Chain is required, and established in line with **Appendix B** of this Handbook.

The government logistics effort focuses on bridging priority supply chain gaps which the commercial sector cannot navigate alone.

The national effort is primarily focused on moving personnel and goods to and from Regional Assembly Areas, not within regions, unless requested to do so.

The volume of international aid will overwhelm New Zealand's logistics capacity, resulting in an inefficient response.

Response personnel are self-sustaining if deployed to areas with scarce resources and deployed in a way that reduces turnover and transportation needs.

During the initial response phases, access restoration focuses on gaining any access (such as four-wheel drive (4WD) access only). As a result, user restrictions will likely apply and need considering when planning routes.

The logistics approach applies a multimodal approach that uses the best-placed operable marine, air and land transport options.

Other considerations

While establishing the supply chain, responders need to consider that such supply chains may become normal for months or years to come. Therefore, when possible, the response should focus on establishing emergency systems and processes that are sustainable for a long time.

Logistical arrangements are critical to support the immediate response. Yet care is needed to ensure sufficient logistics assets and personnel can continue to supply non-impacted areas.

Hazard phenomena will impact modes of transport differently at various stages of the supply chain. Examples of hazard phenomena are listed below.

- Volcanic ash will affect air transport and road travel through visibility, engine-wear and traction issues. Vehicles and machinery that depend on air filtration will likely be inoperable, as air filters become clogged.

- Tsunami waves, storm swell and storm debris will impact sea transport, coastal airfields, road networks and rail networks.

- Landslides and landslide dams will impact port viability due to potential sedimentation impacting harbour depth.

- Workforce and border control impacts due to mass sickness from a pandemic may close sections of the normal supply chain.

Considerations for drawing back national logistics management

An emergency supply chain led by the NCMC, as set out in section B.2 of Appendix B, should transfer control and management of the national supply chain to commercial arrangements as soon as possible.

The control and management of this supply chain will be resource intensive for central government to sustain, and will impact on economic recovery. It is therefore important to promptly transition to BAU, or adapted, commercial processes for procuring, storing and transporting goods and people.

This transition will likely be phased, with different areas and components of the supply chain transitioning at different times during the response.

Listed below is a set of considerations that the NCMC can use to determine when to transition from national supply chain control to commercial supply chain arrangements.

- **Capacity of transportation routes**: Government interventions to move people and goods may not be required if transportation routes have sufficient capacity to transport the required quantity of goods and people within the required timeframe.

- **Community access to goods**: Government supply chain intervention may not be required if the community can access goods and services using commercial solutions, including being able to pay for required goods.

- **Capacity of commercial transportation companies**: direct NCMC involvement may not be required if commercial companies are able to prioritise the movement of goods and people in line with government priorities.

- **Capacity of local government to respond**: any national control of local or regional network emergency solutions should be transferred to local control if local response agencies are in a position to manage the distribution of goods and transportation of people within their region.

Actions by phase

Table 8 lists actions by phase for the Logistics workstream.

Table 8. Key actions by phase for the Logistics workstream

	Readiness		Response		
	0		1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**		**Slow onset events**		**Event**
			Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Key actions	**Agencies**: undertake readiness activities as set out in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness. **Agencies and CDEM Groups**: identify essential supplies, equipment and supply chains.		Confirm the current pre-event status of logistics operators' (airports, seaports, distribution centres, transportation companies). Inform logistics operators of the elevated threat and potential threat scenarios. Request transport operators provide their capacity and capability to help with the response. Confirm the capability and capacity of key logistics nodes.	Send requests for information to partner agencies to provide details of their logistics requirements. Pre-position all logistics assets. Support the movement of evacuees out of hazard zones. Identify likely vulnerable logistics nodes and modes. Confirm the alternative communications arrangements of logistics operators. Identify logistics and movement options into and out of key locations. Communicate the preferred logistics approach to CDEM regions, based on anticipated impacts.	

			Recovery	
3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Immediate response	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**

impact

3	4	5	6	7
Establish the NCMC Logistics coordination group.	Open routes for key ports and airfields.	Implement the 'pull model' to deliver community support.	Provide long-term logistics support to impacted communities.	Consider long-term supply chain implications from those chains being adapted during the emergency.
Establish the National Air coordination group for managing domestic and international air assets.	Establish transport links for response personnel into impacted areas.	Consolidate the emergency supply chain.	Complete the transition from government to commercial-led transportation processes and systems.	Scope the ongoing resourcing needs, to ensure readiness for the next event.
Assess ports, airfields and transportation routes.	Start moving critical persons and casualties, as set out in the movement prioritisation framework.	Reopen inter-regional links and nodes.	Manage and coordinate the end-to-end procurement, distribution and disposal of essential supplies, equipment and services.	
Control the airspace and maritime environment as needed.	Develop the *National Logistics Plan* for moving goods and people.	Coordinate the prioritised movement of freight and personnel.		
Identify logistics and movement options into and out of key regional locations.	Establish National Assembly Areas.	Move foreign nationals and local visitors out of impacted areas.		
Identify and prioritise essential logistics links and nodes.	Establish RDC sites.	Continue to receive, coordinate and deploy international assistance.		
Request information about critical logistics assets.	Start delivering mass relief (see the **Mass Relief** workstream).	Start to transition government agencies out of actively managing the transport and distribution system.		
Identify the location of Reception and Departure Centres (RDC).	Supply consolidated agency and organisation lists of essential personnel for movement to the NCMC, based on the movement prioritisation table and requirements.			
	Identify critical logistics resources.			
	Activate the Fuel Sector Coordinating Entity (see the **Lifeline Utilities and the Built Environment** workstream).			
	Integrate international ground handling capability for International Assistance.			

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency

Direct the establishment of the NCMC Logistics Coordination Group (see **Figure 6**).

Direct the establishment of the National Air Coordination Group.

Coordinate the National Emergency supply chain through the NCMC Logistics Coordination Group.

Prioritise the reopening of lifeline utilities that will enable the supply chain.

Confirm and communicate resource prioritisation for movement.

All agencies

Forward to the NCMC consolidated, prioritised lists of personnel, supplies and equipment needing transport into and out of impacted areas.

Inform the NCMC about logistics capability and available stockholdings.

Participate in logistics planning and coordination activities, as required.

Airways New Zealand

Participate in the National Air Coordination Group as set out in the Logistics Concept of Operations (see **section B.5** of Appendix B).

Lead air traffic control for controlled airspace as noted in the Logistics Concept of Operations (see **section B.5** of Appendix B).

Provide representation to the NCMC Logistics Coordination Group. **Figure 6** shows the suggested composition of this group.

Civil Aviation Authority

Provide specialist advice about airspace and aircraft regulation as noted in the Logistics Concept of Operations (see **section B.2** of Appendix B).

Civil Defence and Emergency Management Groups (Impacted)

Provide information on regional assembly area locations and capability to establish Assembly Areas.

Provide information on the impacts to the regional transport network.

Civil Defence and Emergency Management Groups (Limited or Not impacted)

Provide information on ability to support National Assembly Areas (NAA) within region.

Commercial Air Operators

Support the movement of people as noted in the Logistics Concept of Operations (see **section B.2** of Appendix B).

Department of Conservation

Indicate staff availability and capability to support national response using all-terrain vehicles and other appropriate off-road transportation assets.

Department of Corrections

Communicate logistical support requirements to the NCMC as well as the potential for the temporary transfer and moving of prisoners.

Fire and Emergency New Zealand

Undertake air asset tasking and rotary-wing tracking as noted in the Logistics Concept of Operations (see **section B.2** of Appendix B).

Hato Hone St John

Manage the National Air Ambulance service as noted in the Logistics Concept of Operations (see **section B.5** of Appendix B).

Health New Zealand and Ministry of Health (Health)

Manage the National Air Ambulance service as noted in the Logistics Concept of Operations (see **section B.5** of Appendix B).

Land Information New Zealand (LINZ)

Ensure *Notices to Mariners* are issues advising changes to the maritime environment.

Maritime NZ

Ensure Navigational Area Warnings are issued advising of risks and dangers in the maritime environment.

Work with the NCMC to identify and manage load and licence issues.

Coordinate, with the NCMC, access to and from ports.

Provide representation to the AoG Logistics Coordination Group. **Figure 6** shows the suggested composition of this group.

Maritime – Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand

Support the deconfliction of search and rescue operations with air operations as noted in the Logistics Concept of Operations (see **section B.2** of Appendix B).

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Support NCMC Logistics as AoG procurement lead.

Activate the Fuel Sector Coordinating Entity (see **Lifeline Utilities and the Built Environment**).

Activate, or consider activating, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to support access to international relief supplies.

Ministry of Transport (Transport Response Team)

Lead the Transport Response Team.

Facilitate the flow of response information related to transport.

Provide a single point of contact for agencies to engage with the transport system.

Provide advice to assist the NCMC procure private sector transport assets.

Provide representation to the NCMC Logistics Coordination Group. **Figure 6** shows the suggested composition of this group.

New Zealand Defence Force

Facilitate military assistance at National Assembly Areas, as requested.

Establish Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) and Aerial Port of Embarkation (APOE) with appropriate Material Handling Equipment, to support intensive, sustained operations.

Coordinate the tasking and loading of all military assets (including international) in line with NCMC priorities.

Make ready available logistics management as well as air, sea and rough-terrain transport capabilities.

Provide representation to the NCMC Logistics Coordination Group. **Figure 6** shows the suggested composition of this group.

Determine the impacts on the state highway network and the resources required to restore to satisfactory operating conditions.

New Zealand Transport Agency Waka Kotahi

Provide representation to the NCMC Logistics Coordination Group. **Figure 6** shows the suggested composition of this group.

Supporting information

National Logistics Concept of Operations

A National Logistics Concept of Operations has been developed and is included in **section B.2** of Appendix B.

The Logistics Concept of Operations provides a framework and basic overview of the 'puzzle pieces' of the logistics system, to be applied to the actual impacts of the specific catastrophe.

This framework and basis overview include:

- an overview of New Zealand's logistics system, with information about capabilities and capacities for moving people and goods

- principles for prioritising movements

- a coordination model for managing aircraft and the airspace during a catastrophe.

3.7
International Assistance

Overview

This workstream describes the arrangements and activities that will support the coordinated entry and exit of international assistance across New Zealand's border after a catastrophic event.

This workstream does not cover the logistics arrangements or onward movement of teams and capabilities within New Zealand. These are documented under the Logistics workstream. Movement and dispersal of relief supplies is covered in the **Logistics** workstream and the **Mass Relief** workstream.

International commercial procurement of resources by responding agencies to support a response is not international assistance. Given this, such procurement is not within the scope of this workstream.

Problem statement

New Zealand's current processes for managing international assistance are not sufficient for the scale of a catastrophe. Without international assistance, significantly more impacts will happen to people and communities due to shortfalls in this country's domestic response capability.

Desired end state

International assistance is sought, approved, transported and received within the time required, and then effectively integrated into the national response.

Planning factors

Fact

The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 and The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 specify the arrangements for International Assistance for New Zealand.

International assistance must be consistent with New Zealand's law and regulations.

New Zealand will use existing lines of communication and links to the international community. Examples are:

- existing lines of communication between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and foreign governments and international organisations

- New Zealand's overseas diplomatic posts

- foreign diplomatic missions resident in and accredited to New Zealand

- the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)

- NGOs.

The National Controller will approve life-saving international assistance such as medical and USAR teams without Cabinet approval. Cabinet must approve all other assistance.[10]

The National Controller with coordinate all International Assistance when it arrives in New Zealand. The National Controller may request other agencies or officials coordinate particular aspects of this assistance.

The International Assistance Working Group (IAWG) is a cluster of organisations that meets to plan for and coordinate international assistance across the 4 Rs: Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery. Membership is based on the description given in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 and The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015.

The *NCMC International Assistance Standard Operating Procedures* list the administrative process for managing offers.

Assumptions

International Assistance will operate in line with arrangements found in the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015, The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015, and NCMC operational documents.

The NCMC International Assistance Sub-function will coordinate all offers and requests.

A defined list of critical resources at the national level exists to inform what needs to be accepted and requested.

New Zealand will ask for and prefer international assistance that is self-sufficient. This is in line with INSARAG guidance, which covers:

- shelter, communications, food, water, and hygiene

- physical and mental wellbeing.

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10 As set out in clause 148(a) of National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan Order 2015. **Note**: The specific name of the Cabinet Committee may change. The current Cabinet Committee is the Foreign Policy and National Security Committee.

International assistance may be needed to help move and coordinate other international assistance. An example is aircraft assisting with moving search and rescue teams.

New Zealand will work within United Nations and International Frameworks, and prefers assistance that operates within these (such as INSARAG classified teams).

Other considerations

Arrangements for this workstream are held by multiple agencies such as MFAT (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade), FENZ, NZ Police, and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). Member agencies of the IAWG are:

- NEMA
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
- Ministry of Health
- Ministry of Primary Industries
- New Zealand Customs Service
- New Zealand Defence Force
- Fire and Emergency New Zealand
- Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
- New Zealand Police
- New Zealand Red Cross.

Failure to coordinate incoming international assistance risks:

- significant and unnecessary burdens on the logistics workstream
- duplication of effort
- potential diplomatic implications.

Unsolicited international assistance (private individuals and charity workers) may arrive without centralised coordination and need to be managed appropriately.

International Assistance needs will continue into recovery. Transition arrangements will need to plan for the ongoing coordination of international assistance after the NCMC deactivates.

This International Assistance workstream is highly interdependent with other workstreams, particularly **Command, Control, Coordination and Communication (C4)** and **Logistics**. It will be a critical enabler of those workstreams while also being highly dependent on their arrangements and outputs.

Actions by phase

Table 9 lists actions by phase for the International Assistance workstream.

Table 9. Key actions by phase for the International Assistance workstream

	Readiness	Response		
	0	1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**	**Slow onset events**		**Event**
		Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Key actions	Develop, maintain and test international assistance arrangements.	Contribute to event-specific planning.	Support NCMC activation. Manage any offers of assistance and advise Control to make decisions.	
	Provide input to the IWAG and other workstreams.		Advise overseas posts of the developing situation and the potential need for assistance.	
	Undertake readiness activities as set out in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness.		Create a discussion in the VOSOCC, to communicate situation information and identify any immediate assistance requirements.	
	Forecast logistics requirements for international assistance, and New Zealand's capability to support assistance in-country.		Confirm the process for international assistance to agencies and CDEM, in line with the SOP.	
	Develop a Reception and Departure Centre (RDC) Capability across New Zealand.		Consider establishing RDC at relevant airports if the need for international assistance is likely.	
	Socialise International Assistance arrangements across New Zealand.		Activate the IAWG to support the International Assistance Sub-function.	

		Recovery		
3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Immediate response	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**

impact

Immediate response	Initiate coordinated response	Sustained response	Transition to recovery	Medium to long-term recovery
Support NCMC activation. (If not already done) confirm process for international assistance to agencies and CDEM, in line with the SOP. Support the National Controller to consider the need for, and then seek approval for, an UNDAC team to enter New Zealand. Add event details to the VOSOCC, to support international coordination. Advise Control to approve international assistance for life safety activities (such as by USAR INSARAG, EMT, and WHO). Advise Control to engage with the ODESC system when deciding on offers of assistance. Establish RDC in any appropriate airports. Establish an international assistance sub-function, to coordinate international offers of assistance and requests for such assistance. Activate the IAWG, to support the International Assistance Sub-function. Ensure all inbound assistance has appropriate regulatory approvals to arrive in New Zealand and start work (such as USAR, and EMT). Work with other functions and Liaison Officers to identify international assistance needs and ensure arrangements are in place for onward movement when such international assistance is in New Zealand.	Manage and keep managing assistance offers and requests. Develop an understanding of the likely ongoing need for international assistance. Coordinate wider government sector international assistance requests (such as from, and for, Veterinary Teams). Identify opportunities to establish new RDC sites. Continue to coordinate inbound and outbound assistance. Update the VOSOCC by adding relevant information and documentation. Advise Control to approve international assistance and consider engaging with the ODESC system when making decisions. Integrate the international assistance activity of the non-Emergency Management sector with the NCMC process.	Continue managing and coordinating the end-to-end process of international assistance. Continue to provide updates and coordinate with the VOSOCC. Support demobilising and returning international assets that are no longer required or which have passed their deployment period. **National Controller**: seek and provide advice on offers of international assistance. Plan for and include the National Recovery Manager with international offers and ongoing requests for assistance.	Continue to manage assistance offers and requests. Assess medium to long-term recovery needs, and identify whether international assistance is needed. Support planning for international assistance coordination during the recovery. Demobilise the NCMC International Assistance Sub-function. Close the VOSOCC event at an appropriate time. Hand over responsibility for coordinating the international assistance from the National Controller to the National Recovery Manager.	Advise the integrated National Recovery Office.

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency

Request and approve offers of medical and USAR International Assistance.

Consider other offers of international assistance related to life safety, consulting with the ODESC system if needed.

Stand up the International Assistance Sub-function and the IAWG.

Decide if assistance from United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) is required and seek approval from Cabinet through ODESC.

Seek information on the status of key airports (such as international airports, and RNZAF Base Ohakea) to ensure any assistance can arrive into New Zealand.

Confirm sites and establish Reception and Departure Centres (RDC) for receiving international assistance.

Ensure arrangements are in place to fast-track approval for assistance for life-safety activities. Such as visa waivers arrangements, and expedited clearance of incoming tools or machinery.

National Controller to make recommendations to Cabinet about all other offers of international assistance. Seeking advice from ODESC members when needed.

Update the Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (VOSOCC) as needed. Coordinate across agencies, to provide updates.

Oversee assigning international assets to the control of domestic agencies.

Task NCMC Operations to confirm the process to agencies/CDEM for how to request international assistance through the NCMC.

Consider requesting deployment of assets overseas to expedite border processes (such as biosecurity) in New Zealand.

Fire and Emergency New Zealand

Request and coordinate USAR support through INSARAG at the direction of the NCMC.

Coordinate and host any support from international fire services, as approved or requested by the NCMC.

Provide advice to the National Controller or Cabinet about accepting specific offers of assistance, or when making requests for assistance.

Identify policy risks and solutions to enable best uses of international assistance.

Health New Zealand and Ministry of Health (Health)

Request, coordinate, and host international Emergency Medical Teams (EMT) through the Emergency Medical Coordination Cell (EMTCC, within the National Health Coordination Centre) with the NCMC.

Provide advice to the National Controller or Cabinet about accepting specific offers of assistance, or when making requests for assistance.

Identify policy risks and solutions to enable best uses of international assistance.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Communicate offers of assistance to the NCMC.

Provide information on foreign nationals. Provide such information through the Diplomatic Corps.

Communicate decisions on international assistance to other nations. Use Third Person Notes to do this.

Coordinate and host any international assistance, as approved or requested by the NCMC.

Provide advice to the National Controller or Cabinet about accepting specific offers of assistance, or when making requests for assistance.

Identify policy options and solutions to enable best uses of international assistance.

Ministry for Primary Industries

Work with the NCMC to request international animal rescue and veterinary teams. Fast-track the importation of veterinary medications.

Fast-track requests for veterinarians from overseas.

Activate QUADS veterinary agreements. The QUADS Alliance includes Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

Coordinate and host any international assistance, as approved or requested by the NCMC.

Provide advice to the National Controller or Cabinet about accepting specific offers of assistance, or when making requests for assistance.

Identify policy risks and solutions to enable best uses of international assistance.

New Zealand Customs Service

Customs is specifically required by the National CDEM Plan Order 2015 to:

- assist MFAT with tracking of, and safety reporting on, foreign nationals in-country

- assist with managing international assistance when directed by NEMA.

Coordinate and host any international assistance as approved or requested by the NCMC.

Provide advice to the National Controller or Cabinet about accepting specific offers of assistance, or when making requests for assistance.

Identify policy risks and solutions, to enable best uses of international assistance.

New Zealand Defence Force

Activate international assistance arrangements with Foreign Military Partners.

Coordinate and host any international military support, as approved or requested by the NCMC.

Provide advice to the National Controller or Cabinet about accepting specific offers of assistance, or when making requests for assistance.

Identify policy risks and solutions, to enable best uses of international assistance.

New Zealand Police

Request and coordinate international policing support, including Disaster Victim Identification (DVI), upon National Controller's approval. ADVIC will provide New Zealand with DVI surge support if required, this is a request made by the Police Commissioner.

Coordinate and host any policing international assistance as approved or requested by the NCMC.

Provide advice to the National Controller or Cabinet about accepting specific offers of assistance, or when making requests for assistance.

Identify policy risks and solutions, to enable best uses of international assistance.

3.8
Lifeline Utilities and the Built Environment

Overview

This workstream includes:

- information on the coordination arrangements for lifeline utilities and the infrastructure of other essential services

- key considerations in the built environment, such as interconnectedness and expected shortages of equipment and expertise.

The restoration of these services is an essential enabler of the overall response.

Problem statement

A catastrophic event will cause extensive and long-lasting infrastructure outages, resulting in prolonged disruption to response and recovery efforts. Lifeline utilities and service disruptions will significantly constrain local operations from providing relief and stabilisation.

Desired end state

Impacts to infrastructure lifeline utilities, and priority built infrastructure are understood, and solutions are in place. Priority restorations are under way and communicated to the public.

Planning factors

Facts

Operation and restoration of lifeline utilities rely on the restoration and availability of other lifeline utilities. Key interdependencies are requirements for roading access, fuel, electricity and telecommunications.

Some key telecommunications, water and electrical distribution lines are co-located with roading and bridges.

Lifeline utilities will operate within Sector Coordinating Entity arrangements.

Most of the Sector Coordinating Entities and Liaison Officers for lifeline utilities are based in Wellington.

New Zealand's main supermarket chains have only a week's worth of food supply available at any one time.[11]

Key infrastructure, such as airports, will need to be assessed for damage and reassessed after secondary hazards. This level of assessment may delay response activities.

Assumptions

Communications within response structures are severely limited, impacting coordination (see the **Command, Control, Coordination and Communication (C4)** workstream).

Stock is insufficient to repair lifeline utility assets in New Zealand, and obtaining stock from overseas (such as heavy equipment, generators, and technical expertise) may be significantly delayed.

At least one major port or airport will function to support the response effort and continued supply to the rest of New Zealand.

Major disruptions to, and demands for, fuel supply, distribution and prioritisation are expected.

Access and transportation operations by air, sea and land (road and rail) are disrupted in the impacted areas while assessments and repairs are made.

Debris blocks transport routes, restricting:

* the movement of equipment, supplies and personnel) in or out of regions

* evacuations and accessibility

* access to key facilities and workplaces (such as airports).

Electricity and gas distribution networks are inoperable or degraded in the impacted area.

Drinking water, wastewater, and stormwater networks are inoperable or degraded in the impacted areas.

Telecommunications are degraded. Cellular services in impacted areas are overloaded or non-operable, and fibre internet experiences outages.

Communication with impacted regions is severely limited and relies on satellite and community radio operators. This limited communication impacts situational awareness, leads to an information vacuum, and may have flow-on impacts to other infrastructure (such as banking transactions).

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11 *Food systems security and disaster recovery*. Policy Briefing. 2023. Produced within the Resilience to Nature's Challenges, one of 11 National Science Challenges (2014–2024), funded through MBIE.

Broadcasting has outage areas that prevent radio and television services, limiting communications to the impacted population.

Many buildings are unsafe, insanitary and unassessed for safety. Critical services are unable to function from, to and within buildings, with people also being displaced from their homes.

Other considerations

The event may damage facilities allocated for response actions, such as Coordination Centres, community hubs or mass shelters, and need inspecting before further use.

Internet use (through fibre and satellite) is expected to increase while the use of broadcast television and radio continues to quickly decrease.

Limited fuel supply will impact on restricted transport, power generation, use of heavy vehicles, and equipment. It will also impact on generators for pumping water and wastewater, and on the operations of treatment plants.

Debris clearance and waste management may generate secondary consequences, including poor sanitation, pests, and outbreaks of disease.

A breakdown in food, fuel, power and communication supply will have flow-on social and environmental impacts.

Delivery of this workstream depends on third parties and the private sector. Yet the event may impact them too by, for instance, reducing their staffing levels and damaging their systems.

Actions by phase

Table 10 lists actions by phase for the Lifeline Utilities and the Built Environment workstream.

Table 10. Key actions by phase for the Lifeline Utilities and the Built Environment workstream

	Readiness		Response		
	0		1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**		**Slow onset events**		**Event**
			Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Key actions	**Agencies**: undertake readiness activities as set out in the workstream tasks and BAU readiness. Ensure essential services (hospitals, fire stations etc) have an uninterrupted utilities supply. **Lifeline utilities**: exercise and improve resilience, and reduce restoration times.		Notify inter-Infrastructure Coordination Group.	**National Lifelines Coordinator**: contact Sector coordinating entities and regional lifeline coordination groups to share information. Pre-position critical repair assets, and key skills (if likely impacts from the event are known).	

	Recovery		
impact	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
	Immediate response	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**

Sector coordinating entities: start coordinated sector planning as soon as possible, to re-establish service in impacted regions (including immediate damage assessment and pre-arranged shutdowns). Start mobilising assets, such as business continuity arrangements. **National Lifelines Coordinator**: contact SCE and regional lifeline coordination groups.	Deliver first reports to the NCMC – impacts, resources, intended initial restoration efforts (collate information on the status and restoration timelines). **Sector coordinating entities**: start planning to re-establish service in impacted regions. Prioritise the lifelines restoration activity, to support the reopening of the emergency supply chain, allocation of lifeline utility assets, provision of emergency relief (such as fuel), and access to isolated areas. Provide temporary solutions for utilities supply to prioritised locations such as hospitals and prisons. Identify and establish locations to dispose of debris, with respect to Regional and Local Disaster Waste Management Plans. Carry out initial risk assessments – potential secondary hazards to networks. Identify and scope critical resources, equipment and personnel required (including from overseas/ international assistance). Provide the public with estimates about both the impacts and restoration timeframes where possible	Maintain a common operating picture and understanding. Continue at a national level to coordinate and prioritise the restoration of lifeline utilities. Continue to provide the public with estimates about both the impacts and restoration timeframes. Coordinate and procure the deployment of international resources, equipment and personnel.	Analyse the impacts and consequences that are occurring to inform project prioritisation. Continue upgrading any temporary repairs.	Make sure large-scale infrastructure projects are under way. Seek solutions that both deliver better resilience and reduce risk.

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency

Activate the lifelines utility coordinator role and initiate the Inter-Infrastructure Coordination Group.

Request Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) to activate the National Fuel Plan.

Direct the survey of affected ports and airports, in line with wide-area- impact assessment and in conjunction with Intelligence.

Prioritise the reopening of lifeline utilities that will enable the supply chain.

National Controller to direct the formation of a coordination group on disaster waste management.

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (Impacted)

Communicate information about any outages, locations and other lifelines issues to the NCMC, as far as possible.

Work with Council to source any surge support for lifeline utilities roles.

Activate lifelines utility roles if possible.

AoG Housing and Social Entities

Establish a working group on Housing, Land and Property issues early.

Broadcasting SCE

Activate the sector coordinating entity role, to coordinate with the NCMC and report on the status of broadcasting infrastructure.

Electricity SCE (Transpower)

Activate the sector coordinating entity role, to coordinate with NCMC and report on the status of generation, transmission, distribution, and retail.

Fuel SCE (MBIE)

Activate the National Fuel Plan and chair the Fuel Sector Coordinating Entity.

Gas SCE (First Gas)

Report on the status of gas networks, and coordinate between the NCMC and gas transmission, distribution, and retailers.

Health New Zealand and Ministry of Health (Health)

Lead the assessment of hospitals and healthcare facilities (Health NZ).

Maintain hospital and health facility services.

Engage with the NCMC for lifeline support and coordination to ensure the ongoing health care delivery.

Ministry for Culture and Heritage

Provide the NCMC, MBIE and Territorial Authorities with guidance on managing heritage and culturally important sites.

Ministry for the Environment

Be prepared to initiate the disaster waste and debris management planning group with impacted councils, for early analysis of waste issues, testing, and communication of risk.

Ministry for Primary Industries

Plan for the deaths of many animals and ensure National Animal Identification and Tracing (NAIT) recording of deceased animals , as part of the disaster waste and debris management planning group (MoE).

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Mobilise and deploy Tier 1 and 2 building assessors to undertake rapid building assessments.

Provide support to the National Controller and the NCMC on building safety matters.

Assist with coordinating the New Zealand Telecommunications Forum (TCF).

Activate the National Fuel Plan and chair the Fuel Sector Coordinating Entity.

Telecommunications SCE (Telecommunications Forum)

Activate the Telecommunications Emergency Forum (TEF).

Transport SCE (Ministry of Transport)

Activate the Transport Response Team to respond to disruptions to the road, rail, sea and air transport systems.

Water SCE

Report on the status of water networks, and coordinate between the NCMC and councils (and Taumata Arowai).

Support suppliers to test drinking water. Issue drinking water notices and advisories. Source water treatment plants.

Supporting information

Sector Coordinating Entities

Sector Coordinating Entities (SCE) coordinate emergency response activities through a single point of contact within each sector. Formal SCE arrangements are established across Lifeline utilities listed under Schedule 1 of the Civil Defence Emergency Management (CDEM) Act 2002.

These utilities are:

- energy (fuel, gas and electricity)[12]

- transport

- water

- telecommunications

- broadcasting.

A review of Schedule 1 of that Act may expand the list of sectors classified as lifeline utilities.

SCEs may:

- be established during readiness

- perform an operational role during response and recovery.

Lifeline utilities provide essential and enabling lifelines services to the community. They plan to continue these services in an emergency, with assistance from CDEM Groups, NEMA, and other relevant government agencies and regulatory bodies.

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12 Fuel, gas and electricity each have separate sector coordinating entities.

Energy sector

Fuel

MBIE, as Chair of the Fuel Sector Coordinating Entity, coordinates with the fuel industry in readiness and response, and by activating the National Fuel Plan. That Plan is a framework for coordination during a response. MBIE also has regulatory oversight of the fuel industry.

Core members of the Fuel SCE include:

- MBIE (Energy Markets Branch and Resource Markets Branch)

- NEMA (National Lifeline Utilities Coordinator)

- Fuel importers

- Mobil Oil New Zealand Ltd

- Z Energy Ltd

- BP Oil New Zealand

- Gull Petroleum New Zealand

- Timaru Oil Services Limited

- fuel retailers and distributors

- Ministry of Transport (as Chair of the Transport Response Team for the response).

Gas

National coordination arrangements for the gas sector are being developed. First Gas Ltd is likely to be the industry body that works alongside industry and government to co-regulate gas.

First Gas Ltd will likely chair the Natural Gas SCE. Other members will include:

- upstream gas producers

- transmission providers

- gas distribution companies

- gas retailers

- the Critical Contingency Operator.

Electricity

Transpower is the state-owned enterprise responsible for electric power transmission in New Zealand. Transpower provides Electricity SCE secretariat capabilities for the electricity sector in response, including coordinating information across the members.

The members of the Electricity SCE are:

- electricity generation companies
- Transpower
- electricity distribution companies (local lines companies)
- electricity retailers – as required.

Transport sector

The Ministry of Transport (MoT) is the Government system lead for transportation and chairs the Transport Resilience and Security Advisory Group (TRSAG). The TRSAG leads the development of emergency arrangements for the transport sector, covering road, rail, sea and air.

The Transport Response Team is the TRSAG's operational element and focuses on all 4 Rs of Emergency Management: Reduction, Readiness, Response, and Recovery. The Team also has the capability, and is activated, to respond to real or perceived threats to the transport system.

Core members of the Transport Response Team are:

- MoT (Chair)
- New Zealand Transport Agency Waka Kotahi
- Civil Aviation Authority (CAA), including Airways New Zealand
- KiwiRail
- NZ Police
- Maritime NZ
- MetService
- Transport Accident Investigation Commission.

Water

Arrangements for the national coordination of the water system are being developed through NEMA, Water NZ and Taumata Arowai, and the Department of Internal Affairs (DIA).

Water NZ is the current chair of the sector coordination entity for water services. SCE members include water service managers and operators as well as Taumata Arowai.

The primary stakeholders will likely be councils, lifeline utilities and MoH.

Telecommunications

The operation and restoration of telecommunication networks is essential for public safety.

The Telecommunications Forum (TCF) is the telecommunications sector's industry body, with a vital role in bringing together the telecommunications industry and key stakeholders. The TCF governs and operates the Telecommunications Emergency Forum (TEF), which activates in an emergency as the SCE.

The TEF has more than 21 members, including all the major fixed line and mobile network operators. Membership is voluntary.

Broadcasting

The Ministry of Culture and Heritage provides a single point of contact and coordinates broadcasting arrangements during an emergency response.

Sectors (not lifelines as noted in the CDEM Act 2002)

Cash and Finance industry

The Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) is the nation's central bank and the steward of the cash system.

The RBNZ is the chair of the Cash Industry SCE. Its members include:

• RBNZ

• Major banks (ANZ, ASB, BNZ, Kiwibank, Westpac NZ)

• Cash-in-Transit service providers (ACM, Armourguard)

• Independent ATM providers (Next Payments, Allpoint)

• Business Equipment Manufacturers (NCR, Glory)

• NZ Banking Association.

Fast-Moving Consumer Goods

Fast-Moving Consumer Goods (FMCG) distribute essential food and non-food items to impacted areas. In any response, supermarkets and distribution hubs provide FMCG to the emergency supply chain.

Waste

Waste and debris management is delivered at a council level. A catastrophic event requires a nationally coordinated effort to support clean-up activities. NEMA, MfE and Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI) will likely support this coordination.

During the immediate response, FENZ and USAR teams may have a role advising about debris clearance, as people (including fatalities) may still be trapped in the debris.

3.9
Management of Deceased

Overview

This workstream describes the national level arrangements and decisions that need to occur to manage mass fatalities.

This workstream does not include actions carried out by emergency services after an emergency. These actions are covered in the **Life Safety** workstream.

Problem statement

A catastrophic event will overwhelm New Zealand's domestic system for managing mass fatalities. The ethical management of fatalities will be a significant challenge.

Desired end state

Correctly identified bodies/tūpāpaku are starting to return to next of kin in line with Coroners Court processes, including the *National Mass Fatality Framework*, and in a way that complies with relevant law and is ethically managed, supported by science. Adopting and complying with INTERPOL's Disaster Victim Identification (DVI) processes and guidance minimise the possibility of any deceased being mistakenly identified.

Planning factors

Facts

A Mass Fatality Incident (MFI) is an incident where the Chief Coroner declares an MFI because local resources are insufficient to deal with the fatalities. An MFI declaration triggers the initiation of the *National Mass Fatality Framework*. This framework describes Coroners Court arrangements and interdependencies with all agencies relating to managing deceased after an MFI.

Examples of resources in the context of MFI include DVI staff, emergency response services, mortuary or body/tūpāpaku storage capacity, transport, receiving health facility capacity and capability, and pathology resource.

Management of the deceased must recognise the legal custody of the bodies of the deceased. Deceased must be managed in line with the relevant law, the direction of the coroner, the Framework and the decision of the Mass Fatality Coordination Group. The Coroners Act 2006 sets out the role, powers and responsibilities of the coroner.

In an MFI, the Coroners Court, the Ministry of Justice (which has the statutory obligation to provide administrative support to the coroners to enable them to fulfil their function) and the Police have lead functions.

Legal custody and control of tūpāpaku and body parts lies initially with the Police. This passes immediately to the coroner when the Police report the death to the coroner. Police then act as agents of the coroner under their direction.

The coroner makes all decisions relating to post-mortem examinations and release of bodies/ tūpāpaku, consulting with the Police and pathologists as required.

Identification of the deceased is part of the coroner's statutory role.[13]

New Zealand follows INTERPOL's Disaster Victim Identification protocols used for identifying victims. The DVI process is internationally recognised as being the most accurate and methodical way to identify victims and avoid mistaken identity.

The return of bodies to next of kin only occurs once a coroner has determined the identity of the person. DVI is a significant task that may continue well into the recovery phase.

Domestic capacity to manage the number of fatalities may need reinforcing through international support, including, but not limited to, transportation of deceased, pathology resourcing and DVI.

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13 See section 4 of the Coroners Act 2006.

Some deceased may need to be managed in the community, in line with guidance issued by the World Health Organization (WHO) Field Manual for First Responders.[14]

The WHO Field Manual for First Responders contains advice for non-specialists to manage the recovery, basic identification and storage of deceased after a disaster. It provides important guidance for burial processes, where necessary, which will allow a coroner to determine the identity of the deceased at a later time. It also makes suggestions about providing support to family members and communicating with the public and the media.

The WHO Field Manual for First Responders should be relied on for the methods and procedures in dealing with deceased, temporary burial, and identification of bodies, as well as communications to affected communities.[15]

Large numbers of fatalities after a natural hazard emergency pose minimal health risks to the public (such as from communicable diseases).[16]

The forensic analysis, coronial identification process and return of bodies to next of kin are significant tasks carried out well into the recovery phase.

Assumptions

Normal response arrangements, including facilities, systems and governance mechanisms are overwhelmed and unworkable during the initial stages of the response.

Mass temporary interment is likely needed to manage a large number of fatalities.

The community will self-activate to conduct body retrieval and storage. This action will worsen if the response is slow and unclear, and the public receives no guidance.

Impacts on lifeline utilities and overwhelmed systems of governance may stall the declaration of an MFI.

New Zealand has limited stores of body bags and body trays, and storage arrangements are not well established.

New Zealand has an ability to manufacture body bags.

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14 World Health Organization. 2018. *Management of Dead Bodies after Disasters: A Field Manual for First Responders*. Second and updated edition; available for purchase from the International Committee of the Red Cross: https://www.icrc.org/en/publication/0880-management-dead-bodies-after-disasters-field-manual-first-responders.The first edition (2006) is freely available from https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0880.pdf

15 As above: see https://www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/external/doc/en/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0880.pdf

16 World Health Organization. 2013. Emergency Risk Management for Health. 'Mass Fatalities/Dead Bodies'. Fact Sheets.

Other considerations

The public will likely expect that:

- family members are able to conduct visual identification of deceased

- bodies can be released to families more quickly than is possible, due to coronial process

- religious and cultural sensitives are respected as reasonably practicable when bodies are retrieved and identified.

The public, emergency services and healthcare providers will need clear communication to understand the role of the coroner, body storage and the identification process. This knowledge will help manage public expectations.

NZ Police will be the single source of truth for number of fatalities. Reporting processes will need to be established early in the response and communicated through the Public Information Management (PIM) Function when verified.

Only coroners will communicate regarding the role of the coroner and Coroners Court processes.

Good public communication to affected communities contributes to a successful victim recovery and identification process. Information should be provided about the processes of recovery, identification, storage, and disposal of deceased. Arrangements for death certification may also need to be explained.

An information centre for relatives of the missing and the deceased should be set up as soon as possible. A list of identified deceased and survivors should be made available, and details of missing individuals recorded by official staff, in line with the DVI process.

Legislative amendments may be required.

The hazard type will have a significant impact on the state of deceased. For instance:

- tsunami and earthquakes create greater separation of body parts, and bodies exposed to water ingress decompose more quickly

- volcanic material can retain high temperatures for a long time following deposition, which can hinder access to bodies buried by volcanic material.

General fatalities unrelated to the event will occur during the response period. These fatalities may require a different process to those managed under a MFI. This will need to be considered to ensure alignment of resources and outcomes.

Actions by phase

Table 11 lists actions by phase for the Management of Deceased workstream.

Table 11. Key actions by phase for the Management of Deceased workstream

	Readiness	Response		
	0	1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**	**Slow onset events**		**Event**
		Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Key actions	**Agencies**: undertake readiness activities as set out in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness. Test the management of deceased-focused plans against specific hazards. Carry out a stocktake of mortuary facilities and transportation providers. Pre-position resources (as appropriate). Prepare public education and readiness, including public health messaging.	**Response Manager and National Controller**: work with the Chief Coroner and NZ Police to identify planning efforts. Prepare public information for distribution. Pre-position resources (as appropriate).	Distribute public information (to the best extent possible). Pre-position resources (as appropriate).	

		Recovery			
	3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
impact	**Immediate response**	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**
	Provide initial scientific modelling of total fatalities to the Mass Fatality Coordination Group and the National Controller. **Chief Coroner**: declare a Mass Fatality Incident (MFI) and establish the Mass Fatality Coordination Group. Carry out uncoordinated body recovery and retrieval. Report official numbers of deceased, ensuring a single source of truth about the impact on people.	Establish and maintain operations to recover a significant number of fatalities over a geographically dispersed area. Hand over from USAR to NZ Police, to coordinate body recovery and retrieval. **NCMC**: liaise with the Mass Fatality Coordination Group. **Coroner**: direct the identification process for the event. Communicate the identification process to the public. Start the DVI process and the coroners' identification hearings. Request international assistance. Identify temporary storage options as well as mortuary and burial sites. Establish transport options and routes to temporary storage. Start procuring resources (such as body bags and storage units). Distribute public information (to the best extent possible).	Position resources to impacted areas. Continue using temporary storage sites (such as the mortuary). Continue the identification process. Integrate international assistance (such as DVI support, and pathologists) into local response teams. Communicate the identification process to the public. Make public information readily available. Return identified bodies to their next of kin domestically for local burial or cremation (once identity is determined by the coroner). Repatriate identified bodies to next of kin internationally (once identity is determined by the coroner). Reconcile the people missing with the identified deceased.	Return identified bodies to their next of kin domestically for local burial or cremation (once identity is determined by the coroner). Repatriate identified bodies to next of kin internationally (once identity is determined by the coroner). Continue communicating the identification process to the public. Make sure public information is readily available.	Return identified bodies to their next of kin domestically for local burial or cremation (once identity is determined by the coroner). Repatriate identified bodies to next of kin internationally (once identity is determined by the coroner). Monitor the departure of all international assistance (resources and personnel). Establish long-term structure for management of unidentified bodies. Decommission temporary burial sites and mortuaries. Carry out a national remembrance service, and establish a memorial.

Actions by agency

Coroners Court (Lead)

The Chief Coroner declares a Mass Fatality Incident (MFI) and invokes and co-leads the New Zealand Mass Fatality Framework with NZ Police.

Assume a statutory role of the coroner in the context of the Framework.

Set up a liaison with NCMC (action in addition to existing framework).[17]

Department of Internal Affairs

Register and notify deaths in accordance with the Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Relationships Registration Act 2021, and maintain an official list of deceased.

Fire and Emergency New Zealand

Be prepared to advise the National Controller and Coroner about body recovery in collapsed structures, and about clearance of debris.

Health New Zealand and Ministry of Health (Health)

Be prepared to work with the Ministry of Justice, NZ Police and MFAT, to source surge capacity from the wider domestic health sector, such as pathologists (action is in addition to the existing framework) (Health NZ).

Advise the Mass Fatality Coordination Group on surge capacity of hospital mortuaries that are operational (if any, as capacity does not currently exist) and work with NZ Police to support establishment of appropriate mortuary facilities.

Advise on implications from following the Burial and Cremation Act 1964, as required with MoH.

Provide public health messaging about managing the deceased, as required (action is in addition to the existing framework).

Collaborate closely with other agencies, including NZ Police, funeral directors and coroners, to assess the risks associated with morgue management.

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17 Actions in addition are actions possibly needed and taken in a catastrophic event, but which are not currently recorded in other plans or frameworks.

NEMA (and Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups)

Confirm with Coroners Court that a Mass Fatality Incident is declared.

Direct NCMC Intelligence to provide scientific modelling on the number and location of any likely deceased to the Chief Coroner and NZ Police to support planning.

Request the Mass Fatality Coordination Group sends prioritised requests for resources and international support to NCMC.

Request CDEM Group Controllers identify suitable burial areas in their region (see section 85 of the CDEM ACT 2002 (if required).

Provide the relevant NCMC liaison (and CDEM liaison if appropriate), to support the Mass Fatality Coordination Group.

Disseminate and amplify existing public messaging, including messaging from the Coroners Court.

New Zealand Police

Receive handover for body recovery from USAR, if applicable.

Inform the Coroner of all fatalities as soon as possible.

Co-lead the New Zealand Mass Fatality Framework, and inform the National Initial Investigation Office of deaths.

Be prepared to work with the Ministry of Justice, MFAT, MoH and NCMC International Assistance to source surge capacity for managing the deceased (action is in addition to the existing framework).

New Zealand Defence Force

Assist the Mass Fatalities Coordination Group with managing the deceased.

When requested, provide forensic odontologists and body handlers to the response.

New Zealand Funeral Disaster Response Team and Logistics Group

Facilitate the transportation of deceased persons to a coronial mortuary.[18]

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18 This action is in the current Mass Fatality Framework and could be widened to other logistical support.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Advise on foreign policy implications.

Facilitate the entry of international surge support.

Act as first point of contact for the foreign diplomatic and consular corps.

Work with the New Zealand Funeral Director's response team to repatriate foreign nationals.

Be prepared to work with the Ministry of Justice, NZ Police and MoH, to source surge capacity for managing the deceased (action is in addition to the existing framework).

Ministry of Justice (Coroners Court)

Arrange facilities and resources to support the role of the coroner and management of the deceased.

Participate in the Mass Fatalities Coordination group and ensure a representative of the Coroners Court contact the National Controller directly with any priority information.

Work with NZ Police and Health (MoH/Health NZ) to establish appropriate mortuary facilities, and additional resources as required.

Be prepared to work with NZ Police, Health (MoH/Health NZ) and MFAT, among other agencies and groups, to source surge capacity for managing the deceased (action in addition to existing framework).

3.10
Public Information

Overview

This workstream describes public information, which aims to provide accurate, relevant, timely and consistent life, health, and safety messages to the public that:

- save and sustain life

- minimise suffering

- support the information needs of the population.

The NCMC Public Information Management (PIM) Function will collaborate across workstreams to ensure accurate and timely information is provided to the public about the Government's response to a catastrophic event.

Coordination of public information in the NCMC will:

- inform the public about what the Government is doing in response, and preserve public trust and confidence in that response

- support PIM in the impacted regions

- enable consistent, accurate and timely messaging

- maintain situational awareness information, including active media and communications channels, key risks, key messages and support requirements for the PIM response in the impacted area.

Problem statement

Demand for public information in a catastrophe will be enormous at all levels of response, at a time when normal channels of communication are disrupted due to infrastructure or personnel impacts. Media interest from within and outside New Zealand will be significant and place increased pressure on the response. This high demand will require novel approaches to distributing public information and public information messaging that is specific to the catastrophe.

Desired end state

Information about the national response is communicated to the public who have trust and confidence in the emergency response. Nuanced messages are developed and communicated to disproportionately impacted populations. Misinformation and disinformation are being monitored and actively managed.

Planning factors

Facts

The Consistent Messages for CDEM[19] resource informs event messaging for all agencies.

National response agencies, including SCE, science and research organisations and CDEM Groups, have a role in public information management.

Radio New Zealand (RNZ) and Television New Zealand (TVNZ) are lifeline utility broadcasters under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002.

The media plays a critical role issuing information to communities.

Access to alternate communications (such as satellite connections) are an imperative for the regional and national PIM response.

Translation and interpreting services are required to service disabled and diverse communities.

Assumptions

The NCMC takes a lead role in coordinating the national PIM response.

Infrastructure impacts reduce the delivery of life safety information through standard media channels.

Current limitations providing accessible information for the whole population (including disabled and culturally and linguistically diverse populations) worsen.

CDEM PIM and PIM capable responders (such as EMAT) on the ground will conduct public information management activities with impacted communities. However, given the scale of the event, resources within the impacted region will be limited, including local PIM being personally impacted and networks that distribute public information being offline.

Deploying PIM into impacted areas is delayed due to lack of staff as well as the deployment processes.

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19 NEMA. 2024. Consistent Messages for CDEM. Webpage.

Other considerations

Expectations of public information management need managing, given the likely outages within telecommunications and media infrastructure during a catastrophic event.

PIM should deploy immediately into the impacted areas (or pre-position during a slow-moving event), to support local public information management that may depend on non-digital means of communication.

Misinformation and disinformation may spread.

Every agency and person is doing their best to communicate accessible life, health, safety information to communities disproportionately impacted by emergency events (such as disabled, rural and Culturally and Linguistically Diverse Communities).

Targeted initiatives are needed to improve outcomes for Māori and communities disproportionately impacted by emergency events.

A single spokesperson or a 'stand-up' media engagement is best practice. Yet communication outages may prevent this.

Actions by phase

Table 12 lists actions by phase for the Public Information Management workstream.

Table 12. Key actions by phase for the Public Information Management workstream

	Readiness	Response		Event
	0	1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**	**Slow onset events**		
		Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	**Event**
Key actions	**Agencies**: undertake readiness activities as set put in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness. **National Public Education Reference Group (NPERG)**: prepare the public of New Zealand (to a catastrophic level). Establish MOUs with all broadcasters. Develop a plan for managing misinformation. Convene a Government agency PIM in the National PIM Coordination Group (NPCG). Create work paths with the DIA translation service and MSD alternate formats, to ensure timely delivery of messages to priority audiences.	Ensure public education campaigns are prominent throughout the media. **NPERG and partner agencies**: share messaging on their channels. Disseminate with Public Education all public readiness messages and what to expect if the threat turns into a reality. Appoint a spokesperson to engage with media, and deliver public readiness messages. Assess which communication channels will be most effective relative to threat. Notify the CDEM and the National PIM network. Engage the DIA translation service, Deaf Aotearoa and MSD to translate messages.	Disseminate public life safety messages and what to expect if the threat turns into a reality. Appoint a person to engage with media, with a focus on clear and concise safety messages. Engage the NPCG. Activate MOU with Broadcast media, to share life safety messages. Pre-deploy PIM staff to regions if appropriate. Engage the CDEM and National PIM network. Translate messages into priority languages and alternate formats, and deliver them using the most appropriate channels.	

	Recovery			
3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
Immediate response	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**

impact

3	4	5	6	7
Deliver public life-safety messages. Use available communication channels to do this. Disseminate evacuation information through all available channels. Official activation of the MOU with Broadcasters, to cut into programming with life safety messages. Disseminate nationally and locally (where possible) all public information specific to the response. **Cross-government response agencies**: use coordinated public messaging through the NPCG. Support local communications with the public (such as deployment of PIM to any affected region, and media deployment to any affected areas). Assess local public information needs by liaising with PIM in the affected CDEM and deployed StratComms. Activate the NPCG.	Ensure the impacted communities and general public understand that the Mass Relief operations are under way. Continue the life safety public information. Make the public aware of the limitations of available communications options. Publish the AoG Welfare Support Factsheet. Continue translations for priority languages and alternate formats with DIA, Deaf Aotearoa and MSD. Establish regular cross-agency national media stand-ups. Establish a credentialling process to manage international media interest (online and in-person). Activate Government information and support services. Monitor and manage misinformation and disinformation. Disseminate messaging to manage spontaneous volunteers and donations.	Continue support, through the deployed PIM, to the affected CDEM Group or Groups. **NCMC**: support the local response by sharing local messaging and providing science-based advice and messaging. Continue with nuanced and varied communication as the affected areas in New Zealand move out of different states of disruption at different times. **Agencies**: continue the cross-agency message coordination as well as surge support to the NCMC PIM function. Continue to operate the event helpline, website, or both. Update the AoG Factsheet regularly, and publish it on the website. Continue translations for the AoG Welfare Support Factsheet – and publish these translations online.	Share messaging on recovery actions in impacted areas. Deliver collaborative and proactive messaging to ensure public confidence and engagement in the recovery. **NCMC PIM and CDEM PIM**: support the National Recovery Manager and any ongoing communications.	Support the integrated National Recovery Office in consistent communications across government. Ensure messaging is consistent across integrated National Recovery Office, CDEM Group and local recovery offices. **Recovery Communications**: ensure a feedback process is in place to help with community engagement in the recovery.

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA)

Establish and support the NCMC media centre to prepare for an influx of international media requests.

Request DPMC to activate the AoG Strategic Communications network.

Activate the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with media about life safety messaging.

Coordinate national-level media engagement (including 'stand-up').

Distribute key messages to the AoG Communications Network.

Establish and manage ministerial communications.

NCMC PIM work with relevant liaison functions to ensure they both do their best to communicate life, health and safety information through Māori community networks.

All agencies

Disseminate information about the response within their area of responsibility, such as public safety messages, information needs and information requests.

Civil Defence Emergency Management (All)

Communicate public safety messages to the public using any means possible.

Deaf Aotearoa

Provide specialist support to the NCMC PIM response in support of Deaf communities.

Department of Internal Affairs

Activate translation services.

Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet

Activate the AoG Strategic Communications network.

Media partners (including Radio New Zealand)

Broadcast life safety messages (as directed in the MOU).

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Be prepared to work with MSD to activate a dedicated 0800 Government Helpline for the event.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade

Support international media as they enter New Zealand.

Ministry of Social Development

Be prepared to work with MBIE, or relevant agency to activate a dedicated 0800 Government Helpline for the event.

3.11 Critical Resources and Capabilities

Overview

This workstream describes the 'what' of critical resources and capabilities. However, their procurement and implementation in the response will be through the Logistics workstream or other workstreams.

Critical resources and capabilities are the personnel, equipment and supplies required to achieve key operational objectives and outcomes but which will be scarce and in high demand. These resources and capabilities will require national procurement, prioritisation and coordination to achieve response priorities.

The resources and capabilities procured for the response may be held nationally, embedded regionally, or be a combination of both.

The term 'resources and capabilities' covers: People, Equipment, Supplies and Training.

Interdependencies

The effective deployment of resources and capabilities to the impacted areas relies on the logistical supply chain.

An inability to source these resources or deploy them into the impacted regions will undermine the response effort.

Problem statement

A catastrophic event will worsen the scarcity of domestic response resources. Critical resources will be in high demand. This will require a streamlined process for identifying, requesting, procuring and deploying critical resources and capabilities.

Desired end state

A process is operating that identifies, prioritises, sources and assigns critical resources and capabilities to impacted regions. Direct government support is reducing as commercial suppliers resume meeting the need.

Planning factors

Fact

The National Controller determines the Critical Resources, with support from NCMC functions and support agencies. NCMC functions will have significant input into the National Controller's decision-making.

New Zealand lacks a central understanding of what resources or capabilities are available at the national level for use in a catastrophic event.

The NCMC has the power of requisition under section 90 of the CDEM Act 2002.

The NCMC communicates which critical resources will come under national control.

Some nationally controlled assets are assigned regionally or locally, based on national prioritisation, for local command.

Military capabilities are routinely used in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief operations due to their ability to access/operate in harsh environments.

Assumptions

Maintenance, global events or national security priorities may reduce the availability of specialist NZDF equipment. However, the NZDF can facilitate the integration of international military support to provide the necessary response effect.

Concurrent international events may mean international resources and capabilities are limited or not available.

The provision of equipment and capabilities includes the personnel to operate and maintain the equipment, unless stated.

The Government procurement process (normal, emergency, or both) will be followed.

Critical resources need to be securely held to ensure they are available for the response.

Other considerations

Critical resource use may impact local and national economies and have environmental impacts which require consideration.

Consider early deployment of staff overseas (especially Customs, Biosecurity, and NCMC) to inspect resources before the border, to help streamline the integration process.

Actions by phase

Table 13 lists actions by phase for the Critical Resources and Capabilities workstream.

Table 13. Key actions by phase for the Critical Resources and Capabilities workstream

| | Readiness | Response | | |
	0	1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**	**Slow onset events**		**Event**
		Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Key actions	Conduct a National Stocktake of critical resources and capabilities. Identify international providers and reconfirm or establish support agreements. **MFAT**: consider triggers (and mechanisms) for an automatic push of specific resources from certain countries. Develop MOUs with identified priority resources, for immediate actions.	**NEMA**: develop a prioritised national workforce plan for initial phases of response. Warn and pre-activate MOUs for critical resources for pre-event impact (as required). **Agencies**: self-identify likely resource needs for response actions upon impact.	**MBIE** (as lead for government procurement): enable the procurement process. This requires coordination with the Logistics workstream.	

	Recovery				
impact	**3** **Immediate response**	**4** **Initiate coordinated response**	**5** **Sustained response**	**6** **Transition to recovery**	**7** **Medium to long-term recovery**
	Logistics: start to procure response critical resources. Develop a prioritised resource plan based on a combined national impact assessment, to manage the deployment of resources and personnel. Activate MOUs for critical immediate resources. **All agencies**: provide the NCMC with consolidated and prioritised personnel, equipment, and supply requests, including forecasts. Consolidate information from CDEM Groups and agency Liaison Officers about the location of critical resources to use in the emergency response.	Make resources available to responding agencies either directly (by allocation) or indirectly (to fulfil requests, with central control retained by the NCMC). Ensure national and regional assembly areas are supporting the deployment of critical resources. Prioritise, coordinate, and manage the use of critical resources and personnel in line with the response objectives and priorities. Identify domestic shortages for international requests and procurement. Establish and follow a system for clearly tracking and managing critical resources.	**NCMC**: use commercial and BAU systems at all levels. Work to plug gaps that cannot be met by commercial providers, or which require central prioritisation or coordination. Manage offers of assistance for critical resources (in coordination with International Assistance). Regularly review and reallocate resources as appropriate to the changing needs of the response and the availability of commercial providers. **MBIE – Logistics**: procure critical resources for response activities. **NCMC**: deploy resources to support response activities.	Consider the sustainable nature of critical resource use, local economic impacts, and environmental impacts. Continue to identify and source key skills and resources shortages for the recovery.	Resupply critical resources and stockpiles.

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency

Request procurement specialists from Public Service Commission Workforce Mobility Hub to support NCMC Logistics Working Coordination Group, to make the acquisition of domestic and international resources effective, efficient and coordinated.

Ensure a register of critical resources and capabilities and how they will be managed is communicated to NCMC.

Identify the response specific list of critical resources and capabilities.

Communicate to partner agencies and commercial partners the critical resources and capabilities and any national restrictions upon them.

Procure identified critical resources through the NCMC Logistics function.

All agencies

Provide the NCMC with consolidated and prioritised personnel, equipment and supply requests, including forecasts.

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Provide support to the NCMC about both contracting and procuring domestic and international resources, as system lead for procurement and property.

Civil Defence Emergency Management groups (Impacted)

Provide the NCMC with consolidated and prioritised personnel, equipment and supply requests, including forecasts.

Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups (Limited or Not impacted)

If able, be prepared to provide personnel and equipment to assist affected CDEM Groups. Be prepared to assist NCMC with local procurement and coordination of equipment and supplies, and onward movement to impacted areas.

Critical Resources and Capabilities by Workstream

Table 14 provides an initial list of critical resources and capabilities following a workshop at the All of Government Forum on 4 July 2024. This list will expand through agency consultation in future version of this Handbook.

Table 14. Initial list of critical resources and capabilities as at December 2024

Workstream	Resource or capability	Possible source
Command, Control, Coordination and Communication (C4)	Coordination Centre personnel	Emergency Management Assistance Team (EMAT) Public Service Commission CDEM Groups (Limited Impact) and their Territorial Authorities
	Coordination facilities	
	Mobile communications for use by the Coordination Centre	NEMA Commercial providers FENZ NZDF and coalition partners
Intelligence	Satellite imagery	LINZ
	Aerial imagery	NZDF (Reconnaissance) LINZ (Photography) FENZ (Drones) Possibly commercial operators
	Weather radars and their ability to provide forecast data	MetService
	Light aircraft (rotary and fixed-wing)	Commercial and private aircraft operators
	Data storage and computing	Commercial operators Datacom
	Science experts	Volcanic Advisory Panel Aotearoa Earthquake Science Advisory Panel Tsunami Experts Panel

Workstream	Resource or capability	Possible source
Life Safety	Rescue-capable helicopters Casualty transport aircraft	Westpac Rescue Air Ambulance Service
	Timber for USAR operations	Commercial timber stores, and hardware stores
	Blood	NZ Blood service
	Hazardous substances and chemicals	FENZ and commercial providers
Logistics	Transport helicopters	Commercial and private helicopter operators NZDF and coalition partners
	Fixed-wing aircraft (non-cargo)	Commercial fixed-wing operators NZDF and coalition partners
	Short take-off and landing aircraft	Commercial fixed-wing operators NZDF and coalition partners
	Off-road capable vehicles (4WD, all-terrain and rough terrain)	NZDF and coalition partners Department of Conservation
	Barges	Seaport authorities through Maritime New Zealand
	Hydrographic survey vessels	NIWA NZDF and coalition partners Commercial operators
	Tugs	Seaport authorities through Maritime New Zealand
	Port (air and sea) inspectors	Maritime New Zealand CAA Commercial operators

Workstream	Resource or capability	Possible source
Mass Relief	Food items	FMCG NZDF and coalition partners Commercial and private operators Non-commercial
	Water – source of tankers and access to waterways	NZDF and coalition partners Commercial and private operators
	Water purification (tablets, drops, straws or water bottles)	Commercial and private operators
	Hygiene kits	NZ Red Cross
	Mass shelter and accommodation (tarpaulins and tents)	NZ Red Cross
	Sanitation equipment (port-a-loos, toilets, and sewage clearance)	Territorial authorities
	Emergency veterinary care (including care for large animals)	MPI Private Veterinarians
	Accommodation resources (port-a-cabins)	See Mass Relief Framework
International Assistance	Border clearance staff (including approvals)	Border Agencies
	Reception and Departure Centre staff and equipment	Border agencies Inbound USAR teams Health (MoH/Health NZ) MFAT NCMC CDEM Groups

Workstream	Resource or capability	Possible source
Lifeline Utilities and the Built Environment	Earthmoving equipment	FENZ agreement with earthmoving commercial providers
	Demolition equipment and crew	FENZ agreement with demolition commercial providers
	Route repair, and maintenance equipment and crew	NZTA Local Roading Authorities
	Building inspectors and building engineers	MBIE
	Electricity pylons and network technicians	Transpower Commercial electrical operators
	Generators	NEMA Generator MOU Commercial providers
	Fuel	MBIE Fuel Plan SCE
	Water purification, distribution, desalination and storage equipment	NZDF and coalition partners Commercial providers
	Temporary fencing	Commercial providers
	Mobile Cellphone on Wheels repeater towers	Telecommunications Emergency Forum
	Telecommunications network engineers	Telecommunications Emergency Forum
	Telecommunications equipment	Telecommunications Emergency Forum
	Temporary bridges	NZTA NZDF and coalition partners
	Sites for debris disposal	Local councils
Public Information	Staff trained in public communications	CDEM groups Government surge staff Commercial providers

Workstream	Resource or capability	Possible source
Management of Deceased	Forensic pathologists	Health (MoH/Health NZ)
	Disaster victim identification personnel	NZ Police
	Police photographers	NZ Police
	Body bags	Mass Fatalities Working Group
	Body recovery specialists	FENZ USAR NZ Police
Recovery	Recovery emergency management	CDEM Groups International Emergency Managers

3.12
Recovery

Overview

This workstream describes recovery. Planning for recovery occurs in readiness and response, which helps ensure measures are in place to minimise the consequences of emergencies on communities.

Problem statement

A catastrophic event will require extensive resourcing, including financial, to:

- support medium to long-term recovery across the social, natural, built and economic environments

- ensure the cultural and physical wellbeing of individuals and communities.

Decisions made during the response will have implications for recovery. The complex nature of recovery may exacerbate existing issues such as:

- social inequality

- disruptions to trade and industry

- environmental degradation

- decreased housing supply.

Desired end state

An integrated National Recovery Office (NRO) has been established to coordinate recovery activities across government, and enable the holistic regeneration and enhancement of communities.

Planning factors

Facts

Recovery will happen over the long term.

New Zealand has an extremely limited pool of recovery specialists and no previous experience managing an event of this complexity and magnitude.

Assumptions

The integrated NRO will manage the recovery. CDEM Group and local recovery offices will deliver the recovery.

The roles and responsibilities of key government agencies, non-government agencies, the private sector, iwi and other key stakeholders involved in the recovery are determined before the transition to recovery occurs.

Other considerations

Recovery is based on four environments: Built, Social, Economic and Natural. However, other environments may become a focus or priority area depending on what is impacted (such as cultural, and rural).

Actions by phase

Table 15 lists actions by phase for the Recovery workstream.

Table 15. Key actions by phase for the Recovery workstream

	Readiness		Response		
	0		1	2	
Phase	**Operational readiness**		**Slow onset events**		**Event**
			Elevated threat	**Credible threat**	
Key actions	Define correct policy settings to enable the recovery. Clarify funding, governance, workforce, finance and partnership (including CDEM Groups) arrangements for enabling the recovery. **Agencies**: undertake readiness activities as set out in the Handbook workstream tasks and BAU readiness.		Notify the National Recovery Coordination Group (NRCG).	Activate the NRCG. Start initial scoping for the integrated National Recovery Office (NRO).	

	Recovery				
	3	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**
impact	**Immediate response**	**Initiate coordinated response**	**Sustained response**	**Transition to recovery**	**Medium to long-term recovery**
	Activate the NRCG (if not done so during the Credible Threat phase).	Start scoping for surge support. Carry out situational awareness, to inform recovery actions.	Stand up the integrated NRO, with initial staffing and to prepare for the transition. Plan for and include the National Recovery Manager in any international offers and requests for assistance.	Ensure the integrated NRO is fully active and recruiting further staff. Transfer coordination and management to the National Recovery Manager and the integrated National Recovery Office. Ensure the National Transition Period is in place if required.	The integrated National Recovery Office is established and continues to work with agencies, including CDEM Group and local recovery offices, to ensure recovery is being coordinated and delivered across all environments.

Recovery Funnel

The 'Proposed Scalable Recovery Model', otherwise known as the 'Recovery Funnel', illustrates that NEMA should form the core capability of any bespoke arrangements no matter the scale of the recovery. The model **matches the scale of the emergency with the relevant workforce, capacity, resources and governance structures**, using existing expertise within NEMA, and then surge support, secondments and reservists from central and local government, followed by new hires.

With the increasing scale, severity and complexity of an emergency, the broadening of the funnel represents the increased resources and international support required to staff a recovery.

Figure 4 Illustrates the recovery model, showing five indicative scales of increasing severity and complexity.

Figure 4. Recovery model showing scales of increasing severity and complexity

Actions by agency

National Emergency Management Agency (through either the National Recovery Manager or the Director)

National Recovery Manager to stand-up the National Recovery Coordination Group (NRCG).

National Recovery Manager and NCMC Policy to scope and submit a Cabinet paper requesting the funding and establishment of an integrated National Recovery Office (NRO).

Establish an integrated National Recovery Office (NRO) or a national agency, to manage and coordinate the central government's interests in the recovery.

National Recovery Manager to perform the functions listed in section 156 of the CDEM Plan.

CDEM Groups (Impacted)

Establish recover offices to deliver the recovery on the ground.

CDEM Groups (Limited or Not impacted)

Be prepared to support recovery offices of any impacted Group.

Department of Internal Affairs

Ensure a local government lens is used across both the recovery work programmes and decisions of central government.

Strengthen engagement and provide support to councils to help them meet their statutory functions under the Local Government Act 2002.

Consider community support functions and capacity to provide support after the catastrophic event.

Health New Zealand and Ministry of Health (Health)

Lead and coordinate recovery of the operational health sector at all levels.

Enable equitable healthcare services to impacted and isolated areas, and maintain healthcare services for the rest of New Zealand.

Lead operational arrangements for health recovery, such as public health measures, psychosocial support and workforce capability.

Coordinate the provision of psychosocial support at the national level.

Ministry for Primary Industries

Administer the Primary Sector Recovery Policy.

Lead the recovery of the primary sector. Lead the coordination of and advice about animal welfare.

Ministry for the Environment

Provide advice related to the application of legislation, and the environmental implications of the response measures.

Administer several key parts of the recovery framework, including the Resource Management Act 1991 (RMA), Waste Minimisation Act 2008 (WMA), and national planning instruments.

Provide advice on future land-use planning and adaptation.

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Coordinate the recovery of business and industry.

Temporary Accommodation Service

Coordinate temporary accommodation for households displaced from their primary place of residence.

New Zealand Claims Resolution Service

Establish the service to provide independent and ongoing support to homeowners to resolve their residential insurance issues.

Immigration NZ

Facilitate the immigration component for the arrival of a response workforce into New Zealand.

Building Emergency Management

Lead the management of compromised building sites (including notifications, and approved designations), and provide technical advice on building stock recovery.

Ministry of Education

Coordinate on-the-ground support, engagement and response related to the needs of schools and the communities they serve.

Ministry of Housing and Urban Development

Understand the immediate and long-term impact of incidents on the housing system.

Provide advice about the impact of incidents on the housing market and system, and advice about recovery approaches for housing.

Support contracted housing providers, and Iwi and Māori organisations, to support clients and displaced residents to find suitable accommodation if the event has made their usual accommodation temporarily uninhabitable.

Ministry of Social Development

Support the coordinated delivery of welfare services through participation in NWCG.

Ministry of Transport

Provide policy advice on strategic coordination, legislation and financing of transport recovery activities (in the role as Sector Coordinating Entity for the Transport Sector).

Natural Hazard Commission (Toka Tū Ake)

Continue to collect the Natural Hazard Cover levy under the National Hazards Insurance Act 2023, while managing and administering the Natural Hazard Fund to meet valid insurance claims.

Lodge, validate, assess and settle NHCover claims in accordance with the appropriate operating model (via Natural Disaster Response Model partners) and recovery strategy.

Support the delivery of government policy and initiatives as required.

New Zealand Transport Agency Waka Kotahi

Support the integrated National Recovery Office (NRO) as Operational transport lead for state highways (and some other roads).

Te Puni Kōkiri

Work with other agencies to facilitate and coordinate recovery support to Māori.

Engage with iwi, hapū, whānau and Māori communities to ensure their recovery needs are met.

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Appendix A
Intelligence Support Plan

A catastrophic event requires a multi-agency, whole-of-community intelligence response, to successfully align and coordinate information to support the response, maintain shared situational awareness, and support recovery efforts.

The Intelligence Support Plan in this Appendix A is based on the *Intelligence Support to Major Events* (ISME) framework generated by New Zealand Police.

A.1
Purpose

The Intelligence Support Plan (ISP) provides structure around the intelligence response and will be further developed to include:

- purpose and priorities

- details about the scale of the response (including the number and length of shifts as well as any national and regional locations)

- the Information Collection Plan (ICP)

- required outputs (Intelligence products)

- the timing of the Intelligence Summary (INTSUM)

- the escalation and de-escalation process, Intelligence management structures and Intelligence workflows

- administrative details such as the platform being used, email addresses and key points of contact (including their contact details).

A.2
NCMC Joint Intelligence Group (JIG)

The primary function of the NCMC JIG is to enable decision-maker advantage by providing value-add, timely and actionable Intelligence during a major event.

A JIG is an Intelligence capability established at the national level by a lead agency, in consultation with other participating agencies.

In a catastrophic event, when NEMA is the lead agency, and the National Controller will direct the establishment of the NCMC JIG once NCMC is activated.

Figure 5 is a flowchart showing the structure of the JIG within the NCMC, as well as Partner Agency NCCs.

Figure 5. Structure of the NCMC JIG within the NCMC, with Partner Agency NCCs also listed

Note: : Differences to the ISME JIG structure. NEMA's Intelligence function currently conducts Strategic Intelligence as well as Registry Functions internally. The NCMC Logistics Function manages the Logistics Function for internal resources. Once an NCMC response is activated, the Intelligence Manager confirms the roles and structure of the NCMC JIG.

Agency involvement

The nature and scale of the catastrophic event will:

• determine which agencies are involved and the extent of their involvement in the NCMC JIG

• influence whether involvement is virtual or physical.

Involvement is primarily in the form of analytical support. Partner agencies are also involved as they provide information and intelligence.

The Intelligence Manager (ISME JIG Coordinator equivalent) is responsible for:

- identifying and negotiating partner agency involvement

- ensuring such involvement is captured and articulated in the ISP.

Interagency individuals assigned to the NCMC JIG must:

- be experienced

- have the trust and confidence of their agency

- be able to influence within their own agency.

Any agency supporting the NCMC response is responsible for ensuring their participating members:

- understand the contribution their agency is required to provide to the JIG

- can access required information, Intelligence and resources

- understand the parameters around sharing information.

Where partner agency resourcing is stretched, their support to the NCMC JIG may be specialist staff who can support specific roles within the NCMC JIG (such as Data Analysts, Geospatial or Collections).

A.3
Information Collection Plan

The Information Collection Plan (ICP) provides the baseline for collecting information from when the catastrophic event starts. A refined, event-specific ICP is produced as the core component of the Intelligence Support Plan (ISP).

As shown in **Table 16**, the ICP sets out the Information Requirements, which make up the Controller Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) and the Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR).

The ICP is what the NCMC JIG will implement through the Collections Sub-function, which will ensure that critical information needs are being met through various sources and agencies (SandA).

Table 16. Example of the Information Collection Plan

Intelligence priorities	Intelligence requirements	
1. What is the impact on the population?	1.1	Fatalities
	1.2	Injuries
	1.3	Missing
	1.4	Displaced people
	1.5	Welfare needs of impacted communities
	1.6	Impact to cultural and social taonga

| Essential Elements of Information | Sources and Agencies | |
	Responsible	Accountable
Number of fatalities	NZ Police	NZ Police
Location of fatalities	NZ Police	Office of the Coroner
Status of fatalities (DVI process, including reconciliation of the deceased)	NZ Police	Office of the Coroner
Number of people injured	Health NZ	Ministry of Health
Classification of injuries	Health NZ	Ministry of Health
Number of people missing	NZ Police / RCCNZ	NZ Police
Number of displaced people	CDEM Group	NEMA
Location of displaced persons	CDEM Group	NEMA
Type of displaced (such as international visitors and people living in New Zealand)	CDEM Groups	NEMA
Status of emergency shelter sites (location, resourcing, needs, risks)	CDEM Group	NEMA
Status of registration, and needs assessment	CDEM Groups (Welfare Manager)	NEMA (National Welfare Manager)
Status of taonga and cultural heritage sites in affected areas, and any potential risks or damage to these assets	Local Authorities / Iwi	Ministry of Culture and Heritage

Intelligence priorities	Intelligence requirements	
2. What is the impact on infrastructure?	2.1	Status of telecommunications infrastructure
	2.2	Status of electricity infrastructure
	2.3	Status of water infrastructure
	2.4	Status of roading and transportation infrastructure
	2.5	Assessment of damages and impacts on buildings
	2.5	Status of the Health system
	2.6	Assessment of damage and status of other Critical Infrastructure

Essential Elements of Information	Sources and Agencies	
	Responsible	Accountable
Current status of mobile networks (including cell sites, exchanges, transmission links and overall outage)	TEF	NCMC Lifelines Utilities Coordinator
Current status of fixed line communication networks	TEF	NCMC Lifelines Utilities Coordinator
Current status of the national grid	Electricity SCE	NCMC Lifeline Utilities Coordinator
Status of the distribution network (as detailed as available)	Electricity SCE	NCMC Lifeline Utilities Coordinator
Status of electricity generators	Electricity SCE	NCMC Lifeline Utilities Coordinator
Current status of water supply, including any water shortages or contamination	Water SCE	NCMC Lifelines Utilities Coordinator
Current status of stormwater and wastewater systems	Water SCE	NCMC Lifelines Utilities Coordinator
Accessibility to regions (by sea, air and land		Ministry of Transport
Status of roading infrastructure, including roads and bridges	NZTA	Ministry of Transport
Status of other transportation infrastructure, including airports and seaports	CAA and Maritime NZ	Ministry of Transport
Status of transportation assets, including availability of vehicles, equipment, and fuel	Agencies with transportation assets	
Extent of damage to buildings, including residential and commercial properties	Local Council	MBIE
Extent of damage to roads and other transportation infrastructure	Local Roading Authority	Regional Council
Extent of damage to other critical infrastructure, such as hospitals and emergency services		
Status on Health infrastructure (hospitals, primary care facilities, GP offices, pharmacies, aged care facilities)	Health NZ	Ministry of Health
Status of hospital and specialty services (emergency department, acute care)	Health NZ	Ministry of Health
Impact to clinical frontline (workforce)	Health NZ	Ministry of Health
Impact to vulnerable patient groups	Health NZ	Ministry of Health
Extent of damage and operational status of waste management systems	Regional Councils	MfE
Extent of damage and operational status of supermarkets	FMCG SCE	
Extent of damage and operational status of hazard protection systems	Regional Councils	

Intelligence priorities	Intelligence requirements	
	2.6	Assessment of damage and status of other Critical Infrastructure
3. What is the impact on the emergency management system?	3.1	Civil Defence Emergency Management Groups
	3.2	Partner Response Agencies
	3.3	Governance
	3.4	Status of Māori and other communities in affected areas, including their cultural practices, leadership, social networks, access to resources, and engagement with the emergency response and recovery efforts

Essential Elements of Information	Sources and Agencies	
	Responsible	Accountable
Status of Cash industry in impacted areas	Cash Industry SCE	
Status of Coordination Centres (such as activation, and staffing levels	CDEM Groups	NEMA
Dissemination of Warnings	CDEM Groups	NEMA
Evacuations (ordered or supported)	CDEM Groups	NEMA
Declarations of Emergency, and Transition to Recovery	CDEM Groups	NEMA
Use of CDEM Act Powers	CDEM Groups	NEMA
Status of governance structure (such as activated, and briefed)	CDEM Groups	NEMA
Status of NCC activation	All	
Status of regional/local facilities/personnel activation	Agencies with any regional, district or local offices	
Status of agency response actions	All	
ODESC System Activation (ODESC, Watch Group)	DPMC	NCMC Governance (Director Emergency Management)
Status of community networks and support systems, including any gaps or needs for additional support		Te Puni Kōkiri
Status of marae facilities and resources, including their capacity to accommodate and support affected community members		Te Puni Kōkiri
Status of iwi and hapū leadership engagement and involvement in the emergency response efforts		Te Puni Kōkiri
Status of communication and engagement strategies with Māori communities, including the effectiveness and inclusiveness of messaging and outreach efforts		Te Puni Kōkiri
Status of resources and support available for Māori communities, including any tailored services or initiatives to address specific needs or challenges faced by Māori in the emergency response and recovery process		Te Puni Kōkiri

Intelligence priorities	Intelligence requirements	
4. What is the hazard and forecasted/ emerging hazards or risks (including environmental and economic)?	4.1	Hazard data – severity and location of natural hazard impact in affected areas (such as inundation, silt deposition, ground shaking, liquefaction, and extent of any fire)
	4.2	Hazard forecasts and potential impacts on ongoing response and recovery efforts
	4.3	Weather status
	4.4	Public health situation, including any outbreaks of disease, contamination of water supply, and sanitation issues
	4.4	Public health situation, including any outbreaks of disease, contamination of water supply, and sanitation issues.
	4.5	Environmental damage, including that which presents a health risk, or impacts ecosystems or taonga
	4.6	Other emerging concurrent or cascading hazards or risks
	4.7	Economic impacts

Essential Elements of Information	Sources and Agencies	
	Responsible	Accountable
Known or estimated severity and location	Hazard-specific Science Advisory Panel, and Crown Research Institute (such as GNS and MetService)	NCMC Science and technical advisor
Modelled severity and location	Hazard-specific Science Advisory Panel and Crown Research Institute (such as GNS and MetService)	NCMC Science and technical advisor
Current conditions and forecasts for affected areas	Hazard-specific Science Advisory Panel and Crown Research Institute (such as GNS and MetService)	NCMC Science and technical advisor
Timing and trajectory of any potential events that could impact response and recovery efforts		
Information on any patterns or systems that may increase the likelihood of future events in the affected areas		
Detailed weather forecasts for impacted areas, to inform ongoing risk to response efforts	MetService	
Status of public health risks and safety concerns, including water quality, food safety, and disease outbreaks	National Public Health Service	MoH / Health New Zealand
Capacity of local health services to respond to these risks	National Public Health Service	MoH / Health New Zealand
Status of environmental impacts of the emergency, and any efforts to mitigate or address these impacts through kaitiakitanga responsibilities		
Report monitoring of any risk escalation of another hazard	Agencies with responsibilities as a lead agency	
Report economic indicators about risks to economic activity	RBNZ, CDEM groups, or both	

Sources and Agencies

This section highlights key national sources to conduct a wide-area assessment when intelligence from impacted areas is not possible.

International Charter for Space and Major Disasters

NEMA will active the International Charter for Space and Major Disasters (called the "charter") as the 'Authorised User' within New Zealand. Land Information New Zealand will be the 'Project Manager' and will coordinate the Areas of Interest, data requirements and products. (Areas of Interests for a catastrophic event will likely be the priority topic for any ISR/Collection prioritisation meeting).   LINZ will also coordinate the hosting of Value-Add products and manage access if restricted access is required.

Aerial reconnaissance

The NZDF leads the aerial reconnaissance aspect. The process from task request through to imagery delivery can take more than 12 hours depending on asset availability, flight time and loiter time (time conducting the Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance (ISR) tasking). Aerial reconnaissance will be requested to support initial satellite imagery, and provide the basis for detailed assessment areas of focus.

Scientific modelling

Scientific modelling harnesses the collective capability of New Zealand's science and research organisations through the NCMC's science and technical advisors. These advisors can provide estimative intelligence in various forms, such as casualty modelling, hazard forecast analysis, and habitability modelling. This type of intelligence supports early decision-making about requesting and accepting international offers of assistance such as USAR or EMT (see the **Life Safety** workstream).

A.4
Reporting Framework

An initial reporting cycle must be established immediately after the NCMC JIG is activated. This critical cycle ensures information is shared across the system to meet the expected outputs from the National Controller. This information needs to meet the requirements of being timely and accurate to enable decision-making.

Reports and returns

When a catastrophic event will occur is unknown. Even so, this indicative cycle of reporting is expected:

- National Situation Report (SITREP) at about 1100hrs each day

- National Intelligence Summary (INTSUM) at about 1700hrs each day

- other expected Intelligence products (such as Ministerial Dashboards, bespoke Intelligence to support to Planning, or current intelligence needs) will be dealt with as required.

Information management

Emi is the primary information management tool available within Emergency Management. Emi is a Microsoft Teams application.

An event-specific site is established when the NCMC or aNCMC is activated.

Administration

Email correspondence to the relevant addresses as set put in each agency's SOPs and processes.

Key contact
The primary contact for activities and actions related to NCMC Intelligence is
intelligence@ncmc.govt.nz.

Appendix B
Logistics Concept of Operations

Development of the Logistics workstream in 2024 has focused on the movement of personnel and goods. Future iterations of this Handbook will include arrangements for procuring, warehousing and tracking goods.

B.1
Command and Control

National level

The NCMC will coordinate and direct the movement of people and resources through a centralised supply chain, to ensure that the correct resources are moved directly to affected regions.

The NCMC Logistics Function will coordinate the national logistics response, as illustrated in **Figure 6**. The Logistics Function will lead an NCMC Logistics Coordination Group with members from critical national agencies and commercial transportation partners. The boxes in **Figure 6** indicate a role and responsibility rather than a physical presence.

NCMC Logistics Coordination Group

Figure 6. Suggested composition of the NCMC Logistics Coordination Group and link to the National Air Coordination Group

National agencies (under the coordination of the NCMC) are responsible for moving resources and people into impacted regions.

Resources and people are moved between the National Assembly Area (NAA) and Regional Assembly Areas (RAA) using available nationally assigned assets and commercial providers coordinated by the NCMC.

Regional partners (also under the coordination of the Group Emergency Coordination Centre (ECC)) are then responsible for moving assets and people within isolated regions, requesting the support of nationally controlled assets as required.

It is critical for an effective response that the supply chain makes the best use of scarce transport assets.

The NCMC will work with agencies and organisations involved in the supply chain through the NCMC Logistics Coordination Hub, to identify the routes with the greatest capacity for high-priority resources to be moved into impacted regions.

As the response develops, direct involvement from the government will reduce as commercial entities become capable of meeting the needs of communities and response agencies. The severity of impacts will likely result in the NCMC being required to support and facilitate the supply chain in the initial stages of a response.

Regional level

The Group ECC is responsible for logistics within regions, moving items and people from Regional Assembly Areas to community distribution points. Regions will request the support of national capabilities for identified logistics deficiencies.

Local level

Local councils have the responsibility to staff, equip and operate community points of distribution. Local and regional civil defence will coordinate a network of points of distribution to move required commodities to all affected populations.

If local authorities are unable to operate points of distribution, then requests for assistance should be made to the appropriate Regional CDEM Group.

B.2
Concept of Operations: Emergency Supply Chain and People Movement

Overview

The national effort will focus on moving goods and people from the relevant source (international or domestic) to Regional Assembly Areas (RAA). Items and people may be moved through an established National Assembly Area (NAA) if required, or direct to RAA if possible.

Goods

The NCMC will employ a 'push/pull' model of resource movement based on response priorities. Initially, critical response assets, goods and personnel will be pushed into impacted regions to establish an initial supply and meet immediate needs. This will be based on population-based needs assessments and initial reconnaissance. See the **Mass Relief** workstream for more detail. Once operational control in the regions is established and individualised needs assessments can occur, the 'push' concept will transition to a 'pull' concept.

Damage to the transportation infrastructure (air, sea and road) will significantly affect the movement of resources into and within the impacted area. The national logistics approach will apply a multimodal approach, using the best-placed operable seaports, airports and (if possible) road links.

The national focus will be on ensuring efficient use of available national assets and commercial providers, while ensuring regional and local logistical transportation requirements are enabled.

Resources will require prioritisation for movement, due to the severity of impacts on the transport system reducing transportation options. Resource and people movement priorities will change during the course of the response due to evolving requirements. **Section B.4** of this Appendix focuses on prioritising resources for movement by providing prioritisation principles to guide decision-makers.

Figure 7 illustrates the concept of operations for moving goods.

People

Personnel will need to be able to move into and out of the impacted region, and the movement requirements of the injured, the vulnerable, tourists and evacuees out of impacted areas will exceed the transportation modes and assets available.

Similar to moving goods, multiple modes will be used to move people, with a focus on efficient use of nationally coordinated assets while also supporting regional and local transportation requirements.

Figure 8 illustrates the concept of operations for movement of people.

Emergency Supply Chain

Impacted Region

Regional Assembly Area

Port

Airport

Community distribution points

Community Members

Local road/air community delivery solutions.

Local road/air community delivery solutions.

Local road/air community delivery solutions.

Power
Telecommunications
Money
Local Roads

Local air/4WD/ATV community delivery solutions.

Power
Staff
Facility

Local Distribution Centre

National Assembly Area

Airport

National Assembly Area

Receiving Port

National Assembly Area

National Assembly Area

Port

Airport

Distribution Centre (major)

National Assembly Area

Export

Supply
- Domestic suppliers
- Agency Resources
- International Assistance
- International Suppliers

Infrastructure Breaks

Sea

Road

Rail

Air

Emergency transportation solutions

Figure 7. Movement Concept of Operations for Goods

Emergency People Movement

Figure 8. Movement Concept of Operations for People

Legend:
- Response Personnel
- Impacted People

B.3
National Supply Chain Overview

Overview

To enable rapid planning for establishing an emergency supply chain, this section describes Assembly Areas and the basic attributes of the key national logistics nodes by mode – air, sea and land. These nodes are the most likely locations for establishing any National Assembly Areas and conduits to enable the supply of regions.

More detailed information is held securely in the NCMC for use in a national emergency.

Assembly Areas

Overview

Assembly Areas are used to receive, organise, store and transport resources. They allow a coordination centre to deal with large volumes of resources.

Assembly Areas can be established nationally and regionally. As the response progresses, National and Regional Assembly Areas may open and close to make best use of the assets available.

National

National Assembly Areas (NAA) are nodes in the emergency supply chain where nationally controlled assets, goods, equipment and nationally tasked personnel are managed.

The decision to establish a NAA should be in line with the overriding principle that the response should use BAU processes wherever possible. For logistics arrangements, this means using the commercial supply chain.

Command and control
The National Crisis Management Centre will maintain control of the movement of assets and management of goods and persons at NAAs.

If required, CDEM or other personnel may be tasked to staff the NAA. Regardless of who is staffing it, the NAA will remain nationally controlled and work to national direction and priorities.

The NCMC Logistics Coordination Group will be the primary link between NAAs and the National Crisis Management Centre.

Aspects to consider when establishing NAAs

The NCMC will identify and confirm NAAs after an assessment is made about the preferred primary supply routes. Preferred routes are those that allow the most capacity and the highest priority resources to be moved into impacted regions.

An NAA will be activated in a location where it can maximise the use of available commercial supply chains nodes (road, rail, air and sea) to transition into the NCMC emergency supply chain, increasing the economy of effort for moving personnel, equipment and supplies to the RAA.

Multiple NAAs can be activated if the geographical support dependency of RAA require it.

NAAs are resource intensive and should only be established if commercial arrangements cannot meet the needs of the national response or a need exists for the NCMC to directly own the receipt, transfer and loading onsite of goods, equipment or people.

Alternative options for meeting the needs of the response require consideration. For example, a NAA may not be needed if a commercial distribution centre meets the needs of the response by loading transport in line with NCMC priorities and having NCMC liaisons.

Aspects to consider when deciding locations

Considerations about deciding locations include:

- the national transport infrastructure's ability to move freight and people to and from that location

- the ability of the region or region to stage assets and people

- if the NAA, or adjacent port or airport, has sufficient capabilities and capacity to meet the needs of the response (such as warehousing)

- if the NAA has access to suitable support (such as specialist staffing, aircraft maintenance equipment and crew)

- if the NAA has an internal or external ability to sustain NAA staff (such as catering, accommodation and personal transport).

Reception Departure Centres will be established to register and direct incoming international assistance. If possible, co-locating the RDC with a NAA may provide logistical efficiencies in moving international teams to required locations.

Proximity and available transport links to RAA within the impacted area are important. If possible, adjacent NAA and RAA within a single compound (for example, airport, commercial distribution centre) may enable efficiencies.

Pre-existing arrangements or agreements with potential NAA locations will enable quicker establishment.

See the Logistics in CDEM DGL 17/15 for a further description of potential Assembly Area Requirements.

Most likely locations for National Assembly Areas
The most likely locations are:

- Auckland (air or sea)

- Tauranga (sea)

- Napier (sea)

- New Plymouth (sea)

- Palmerston North (Manawatū – Inland Port – linked to Napier, New Plymouth, or Wellington ports)

- Wellington (air or sea)

- Christchurch (air or sea)

- Dunedin (air or sea)

Regional

Regional Assembly Areas are within the impacted regions. CDEM Groups will identify these RAA if not already identified. RAA will be assessed to find out whether they are suitable for supporting the delivery of people, supplies and equipment. The CDEM Groups will then confirm any RAA assessed as suitable.

Air

Overview

New Zealand has limited air transportation capabilities, proportional to our nation's size and population density.

The NCMC will use the most appropriate airport for logistics operations based on the actual event needs and impacts to critical transportation infrastructure.

Damage to aviation infrastructure will need assessing after a catastrophe and, if required, be repaired as a priority to enable air logistics. Examples of such infrastructure are runways, taxiways, navigational aids, runway and taxiway lighting, passenger terminals and freight terminals.

Tier 1 and regional airports

International and larger domestic airports are referred to as Tier 1 airports. International airports also include large domestic terminals.

Table 17 identifies which airports are international and Tier 1 airports, and critical information for aviation planning such as primary runway length, runway width, pavement strength and other special considerations.

Tier 1 airports accommodate planes that seat 90 or more people (jets), and have Aviation Security screening for passengers and cargo. These airports have a secure area between the landside and airside.

During the response, screening and security measures are expected to be maintained to meet the obligations of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). While such measures could potentially be changed in an emergency, they do not automatically happen.

Regional airports are smaller than Tier 1 airports and only accommodate planes with fewer than 90 seats. They have no screening processes.

Table 17. Airport Information

Airport	Type	Primary runway length (metres)	Primary runway width (metres)	Pavement Concession Number (runway strength)	Special considerations
Auckland	Tier 1 (international and domestic)	3535m	45m	120	
Christchurch	Tier 1 (international and domestic)	3288m	45m	72	RNZAF Air Movements Christchurch are co-located at Christchurch International Airport.
Queenstown	Tier 1 (international and domestic)	1889m	45m	47	Only certain pilots are certified to fly in, and operations can only take place during daylight hours.
Wellington	Tier 1 (international and domestic)	1815m	45m	64	RNZAF Air Movements Rongotai Wellington are co-located at Wellington Airport.
Dunedin	Tier 1 (domestic)	1900m	46m	60	Flood zone
Invercargill	Tier 1 (domestic)	2280m	45m	40	
Whenuapai	Military	2031m	45m	65	
Ohakea	Military	2440m	45m	73	
Marlborough	Regional and Military	1425m	45m	43*	RNZAF Base Woodbourne is co-located.
Gisborne	Regional	1310m	45m	20	Tsunami zone
Hamilton	Regional	2059m	45m	45	
Kaitaia	Regional	1402m	30m	15	
Kerikeri	Regional	1190m	30m	18	
Hawke's Bay (Napier)	Regional	1750m	45m	68	Tsunami zone
New Plymouth	Regional	1310m	45m	57	

Airport	Type	Primary runway length (metres)	Primary runway width (metres)	Pavement Concession Number (runway strength)	Special considerations
North Shore	Regional	791m	9m		
Palmerston North	Regional	1092m	45m	50	
Paraparaumu	Regional	1187m	45m	17	
Rotorua	Regional	1843m	30m	45	
Taupō	Regional	1386m	30m	20	
Tauranga	Regional	1825m	45m	35	
Whakatāne	Regional	1280m	30m	17	
Whanganui	Regional	1372m	45m	12	
Whangārei	Regional	1097m	30m		
Whitianga	Regional	1446m	50m		
Hokitika	Regional	1152m	30m	20	
Nelson	Regional	1347m	45m	18	
Picton	Regional	750m	12m		
Tākaka	Regional	832m	12m		
Timaru	Regional	1280m	45m	35	
Wānaka	Regional	1200m	30m	12	
Westport	Regional	1280m	30m	25	
Chatham Islands	Regional	1850m	45m	42	

Source of airport information

The primary source of airport information is the [Aeronautical Information Publication New Zealand](). This online source of information is updated continually. If possible, first find information in this source. Additional information not included in that publication is sourced directly and securely held in the NCMC.

Aerodromes

Smaller airports and airfields are usually limited to general aviation and rotary-wing aircraft. Larger aircraft will be unable to use these airports due to runway, taxiway and parking restrictions. However, these airports may provide additional locations for relocation and evacuation operations, landings by fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft, and the staging of resources.

Military air bases

The NZDF will control all military aircraft operations (domestic and international defence forces), including hosting, loading and aircraft tasking.

Air transportation providers

Commercial operators will retain full control of their aircraft operations. The NCMC will liaise with these operators to ensure movements are appropriately prioritised. Where appropriate, commercial operators will be included in the National Air Coordination Group.

A list of commercial domestic air transport providers is noted below.

- **Air New Zealand** – Air New Zealand is New Zealand's largest commercial airline. It operates at Auckland, Gisborne, Hamilton, Kerikeri, Napier, New Plymouth, Palmerston North, Rotorua, Taupō, Tauranga, Wellington, Whāngarei, Blenheim, Christchurch, Dunedin, Hokitika, Invercargill, Nelson, Queenstown and Timaru airports.

- **Jetstar** – Jetstar operates from Auckland, Queenstown, Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin, and Hamilton.

- **Sounds Air** – Sounds Air operates at Wellington, Picton, Nelson, Blenheim, Paraparaumu, Westport, Taupō, Christchurch and Wanaka Airports.

- **Air Chathams** – Air Chathams operates at Auckland, Whakatāne, Whanganui, Kāpiti Coast, Chatham Islands, Pitt Island, Norfolk Island, Wellington and Christchurch airports.

- **Barrier Air** – Barrier Air operates in the north of the North Island, including Auckland, Whitianga, Kaitaia, Great Barrier Island, Tauranga and Kerikeri airports.

- Further smaller flight operators including scenic, adventure and agricultural operators: see [List of certificated organisations | aviation.govt.nz]()

- National air freight companies: see [List of Part 109 regulated air cargo agents | aviation.govt.nz]()

Marine

Overview

Sea transport will be a critical component of the national logistics system. It alone can carry the required volume of supplies and resources needed to support the population in isolated areas, and to enable response and recovery operations.

All major ports in New Zealand will support the response, including continuing supply to non-affected areas.

Maritime asset loading and tasking for national operations will be coordinated at designated National Assembly Areas.

The key coordination agency for marine response is Maritime New Zealand.

Ports

The hazard event may directly affect ports in the impacted regions. These ports will be unable to operate at full capacity and may require additional support to assess and inspect their infrastructure as well as continue operations.

Harbour clearing, seismic assessment and harbour risk assessments are needed to enable maritime movements.

Ports outside the impacted region may also need to receive ships they do not usually manage. This will lead to ships using alternate mooring methods. Possible methods are Mediterranean mooring ('end-on' mooring for roll-on-roll-off ships) and the need for additional tugs. Such alternatives will likely slow operations in these ports and decrease their overall capacity.

Table 18 lists key ports in New Zealand and critical information for logistics planning. Examples of such information are channel depth, number of berths, maximum vessel length and roll-on-roll-off (RORO) capability.

Table 18. Port Information

	Channel depth	Berths	Maximum vessel length	RORO capable	Special considerations
Northport (Marsden Point)	13m	3	295m		
Ports of Auckland	12.5m	17	320m		Can handle deeper and longer vessels with Harbourmaster's consent
Port of Tauranga	14.5m	15	No limit	Yes – with limitations	
Eastland Port (Gisborne)	10.2m	2	200m		
Napier Port	12m	5 wharves	296m	Yes – with limitations	
Port Taranaki	13.5m	9	300m	Yes – with limitations	
CentrePort (Wellington, Seaview, and Burnham)	11.2m		No limit	Yes	
Port Marlborough	13.5m	2 wharves	350m	Yes	Vessels over 200m require pre-approval
Port Nelson	7.6m	4	270m		
Lyttelton Port	13.3m	9	362m	Yes – with limitations	
PrimePort (Timaru)	11.1m	5	286.5m		
Port Otago (Port Chalmers, Dunedin)	13.5m	3			
Greymouth	4m				
Westport					
South Port (Bluff)	7.2m	10	225m		

Maritime assets (including vessels) for transportation

New Zealand's marine transportation sector relies heavily on international commercial vessels. The sector has an extremely limited number of commercial RORO and shipping assets registered to New Zealand that could be requested to support a major response. Therefore, most large-scale shipping requirements for a response will need brokering through the commercial sector.

The key vessels required for a national response are noted below.

RORO ferries

RORO ferries are required as they can transport large numbers of people and vehicles, and do not require shore-based cranes. Yet they are limited in their ability to effectively move, load and offload passengers and vehicles at ports other than Wellington and Picton. Examples of RORO ferries are the Interislander and Strait Shipping vessels as well as HMNZS *Canterbury*.

Rail enabled ferries

Some ferries that handle rail traffic and may be available to support the response and should be used as appropriate to support the response effort. An example is the Interislander-owned DEV *Aratere*.

Geared ships

Geared ships are cargo ships equipped with their own cranes. The NCMC will coordinate any geared ships through a shipping agent or agreed support agency. Alongside coastal shipping providers, international geared ships, chartered by commercial entities for transporting primary produce, often visit New Zealand. Geared ships will require additional coordination time before becoming part of the national logistics system.

Landing craft

Landing craft, such as barges, are shallow draft vessels that can transfer loads across shallow harbours. The NCMC will coordinate the national barge support.

Specialist military ships

Vessels of the Royal New Zealand Navy and international navy vessels will be critical to the response. Many of these ships are multi-purpose. How they are used will depend on the response required.

Sea transportation providers

Marine transportation providers include:

- coastal shipping companies

- boats and barge operators

- Cook Strait ferries (a continuation of the State Highway Network)

- other domestic ferries

- water taxis

- NZDF sea transportation capability.

Domestic and international shipping brokers will be key partners to connect the national response to commercial shipping capability.

Land

Overview

Land transportation includes road and rail. Most people movements and about 93% of New Zealand's freight is transported by road.[20] About 6% of freight tonnage is transported by rail.[21]

Suppliers have existing relationships with transportation companies. In the first instance, suppliers will use normal commercial arrangements to transport goods to required locations. If breaks in the national supply chain hinder complete transportation, nationally controlled assets will ensure transport of goods to National Assembly Areas or transport to Regional Assembly Areas for onward movement.

New Zealand Transport Agency Waka Kotahi is the key coordinating agency for land transport in such a response.

Rail transport providers

KiwiRail provides bulk freight and some passenger services that are primarily focused on tourism. Wellington and Auckland have urban and suburban passenger rail networks and Dunedin Railways runs scenic train trips.

Road transport providers

About 30,000 trucks are used for commercial freight in New Zealand. While several national and international commercial road logistics companies exist, many heavy vehicles are also owned and operated by other businesses, including tradespeople, contractors, manufacturers and utilities.

Most road freight operators are members of an association such as the National Road Carriers Association (includes some rail, sea and air members), Transporting NZ, and New Zealand Heavy Haulage Association (oversized loads). Suppliers generally have arrangements with logistics providers and can work with the industry to identify transport options where possible. To enable this, the national response needs to communicate what goods need moving, the destination (such as an Assembly Area) for those goods, and the status of the road network.

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20 Ministry of Transport. 2023. Aotearoa New Zealand Freight and Supply Chain Strategy. Wellington: MoT.

21 Ministry of Transport 2019. National Freight Demand Study 2017/18. Final Report. Prepared by Richard Paling Consulting, Auckland.

When moving people, public transport providers and private coach and bus operators should be considered. Public buses are available in Northland, Auckland, Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Gisborne, Hawke's Bay, Taranaki, Manawatū-Whanganui, Wellington, Nelson, Marlborough, Canterbury, Otago and Invercargill. New Zealand also has InterCity (a national bus provider), private coach providers, and many smaller regional and specialist providers.

The NZDF's fleet of operational vehicles is capable of undertaking operations in a range of complex and diverse environments. Personnel from the NZDF will be located in the NCMC to provide advice on the availability and suitability of specific capabilities.

Multi-modal providers

International and domestic multi-modal logistics providers exist and should be considered.

B.4
Prioritising Resources for Movement

Overview

Due to limited transportation assets and high demands for moving personnel and goods into a disaster zone, and affected individuals out of it, the NCMC will need to prioritise and make decisions about who and what should be moved first.

Principles

The prioritisation principles noted in this section are for use by the National Controller and NCMC Operations when prioritising operational resources.

The NCMC Logistics Coordination Group can also use these principles to enable effective response planning. Further, other agencies are encouraged to consider their movement requests in light of the priorities.

The specifics of the event will determine what resources specifically meet these principles.

Resource prioritisation for movement principles:

1. **Equity and needs-based**: Resources should be allocated based on assessed needs and distributed equitably to ensure fairness and to address the most urgent requirements. Equitable distribution must consider the variable vulnerability of communities.

2. **Flexibility and adaptability**: Prioritisation will change by operational phase, in line with the National Controller's intent. Complex event requirements, concurrent events or increased situational awareness may require rapid adjustments of prioritisation decisions.

3. **Nationally directed**: Agencies, CDEM Groups and NGOs will communicate their movement needs to the NCMC so that NCMC Operations can prioritise those needs in line with the Controller's direction.

4. **Coordinated deployment**: Personnel must have the right equipment and supplies to perform their roles before being deployed. Deployed personnel must be self-sustaining or confirmation must be obtained that the receiving area can provide necessary support. Everything needed for the task which is not already in position should be moved together or arrive at the same time.

5. **Alignment of asset and task**: Movement specialists will implement the movement decisions to ensure the right asset is used for the right task.

6. **Local capacity**: Consider the capabilities and needs of local organisations and communities to receive and use the personnel and goods moved.

7. **Sustainability**: Consider both short-term and long-term needs. While immediate relief is crucial, planning for recovery is essential to ensure sustainable support and resilience.

8. **Public perception**: Emergency relief prioritisation decisions should consider the public's perception and immediate concerns.

Prioritisation Table

Table 19 provides examples of resource prioritisation for movement. Such prioritisation may achieve the National Controller's intent. The intent is to provide an initial indication of possible movement prioritisation to enable the National Controller and the NCMC Operations Function to make their decisions efficiently.

> The Prioritisation Table is **indicative only and may change in line with the National Controller's direction** given the actual event requirements and the operational phase.

By listing the critical movement requirements in readiness, the NCMC will be able to:

- consider the movement of response items that agencies and organisations have not yet requested

- look towards future potential requests

- ensure all relevant agencies and organisations are included in movement planning.

The NCMC Logistics Coordination Group is responsible for assigning deconflicting priorities in line with any movement classification direction from the National Controller and NCMC Operations Manager. The NCMC Logistics Coordination Group will formulate and implement a movement plan for maximum efficiency of all available modes against the stipulated priorities.

More detailed agency movement requirements are included in a secure NCMC spreadsheet, created after agency consultation in 2024. NCMC Operations and the NCMC Logistics Planning Coordination Group will use this spreadsheet in an event. This spreadsheet is held securely in the NCMC and iteratively updated.

Table 19. Movement Prioritisation

Note: This table is designed to support efficient decision-making. The listed items and personnel are indicative only and subject to change as the National Controller directs, to meet the actual event requirements and the operational phase.

Priority	Classification	In (*example*)	Out (*example*)
A	Immediate needs required to save lives and mitigate immediate human suffering. Such needs include search and rescue, water and sanitation, food and nutrition, shelter, health, security and safety for affected populations.	Immediate life-saving personnel, equipment and supplies, (such as USAR, medical supplies and equipment, EMT, and field hospitals) Specialist personnel, equipment and supplies to enable the reopening of critical infrastructure Rapid building assessors Specialist reconnaissance personnel Critical response personnel Clinical surge staff Food and non-food items for the community Generators Fuel and fuel delivery systems Reconnaissance equipment Response centre enabling goods (such as emergency lighting) Communications equipment Personal protective equipment (PPE) Transport assets, including barges, helicopters, and tugs	Patient evacuation, including vulnerable people from the community Deceased Equipment requiring maintenance Empty transport assets for re-loading
B	Needs required to enable a scalable response in support of regional and local areas. Such needs include specialist surge staffing for critical infrastructure, agencies or functions to undertake enduring mitigation of human suffering.	Emergency response personnel Agency critical function staff WASH plant and equipment Very Important People (VIPs), including international Scientists Security staff Consular staff Veterinarians, and veterinarian medicines Priority commercial needs Timber and building materials Security and traffic management equipment Refrigeration equipment Earthmoving equipment Food and non-food items for the community Temporary bridges	All response personnel, equipment and supplies Diplomatic Corps Tourists and visitors (including non-resident New Zealanders) Relocation of Government (if required) VIPs, including international

Priority	Classification	In (*example*)	Out (*example*)
C	Longer-term needs required to restore normalcy, including rehabilitation, reconstruction and development	Building inspectors Demolition and deconstruction personnel, construction personnel, equipment and supplies Media Hazchem equipment Incident kits for mass fatalities	Commercial goods for national distribution, and for global distribution Resident members of the public Unneeded response equipment Back-hauling of reusable packaging and stores

B.5
Air Coordination

Air Transportation

Air support will be critical to enabling the initial response. Aircraft can mobilise quickly and some rotary-wing (helicopter) aircraft can access isolated areas. Air movements will initially focus on rotary-wing movements and reconnaissance flights until impacted airports and aerodromes are cleared for use, enabling transportation of fixed-wing aircraft.

Coordination

The National Air Coordination Group, within the NCMC Operations Function, will lead the national coordination of air movements (see **Figure 9**). The primary function of the National Air Coordination Group is coordination and oversight of national air operations and activities.

Agencies and organisations, with representatives in the Group, will provide input in line with their functions, as described in **Table 20**. This includes coordinating military and civilian aircraft tasking and the deconfliction of NCMC Response efforts, incident rescue operations (through the RCCNZ) and air ambulance services.

The immediate focus of the air response will be search and rescue to undertake life-saving activities. The Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand will lead and coordinate these activities.

Helicopters will be a scarce resource and critical for all response levels. The Air Coordination Group must coordinate and deconflict nationally controlled assets to enable all levels of response.

National Air Coordination Group

Figure 9 Basic organisation of the National Air Coordination Group

Table 20. Functional role of named agencies and organisations in National Air Coordination Group

Agency or organisation	Key role		Functional description
NCMC		All of Government	Operations Function – Chair of the Group. Coordination of national taskings
		Coordination	Logistics Function – link to NCMC Logistics Coordination Group
CAA	Airspace management	Airspace and aircraft regulation	Provide specialist advice on air asset loading restrictions and potential aviation waivers if required. Link to airports across the country. Advise on the issuance of Notice to Air Missions (NOTAM) if required.
Airways		Airspace management	Control air traffic over the affected airspace. Issue NOTAM, on behalf of CAA, advising of restrictions to air movement within affected areas. If the CAA cannot be contacted for advice, then General Manager, Air Traffic Services will hold delegations to restrict airspace and ensure the issuance of NOTAMs.
NZDF	National air asset taskings	Tasking of air assets, including their ground operations	Coordinate military air transport and helicopter operations, and deconflict with civilian aircraft movements. Undertake rotary-asset ground operations at NAAs, at the NCMC's request.
FENZ		Tracking of air assets, including rotary-wing	Coordinate, track and task rotary assets[22] and some fixed-wing assets through the ARENA Airdesk. ARENA is the national system for supporting the use of aircraft for fire response. Has the capability to manage restricted airspace. Work with the NCMC to establish rapid agreement for helicopter pilots to undertake emergency taskings.
Maritime NZ (RCCNZ)		Deconfliction of aircraft involved in search and rescue	Is responsible for Category Two Search and Rescue operations, including beacons. This responsibility includes the direct tasking of air assets. During a sustained response, provide advice to air logistics coordination group for deconfliction of aircraft or airspace.
Hato Hone St John		Air Ambulance Service	Manage the National Air Ambulance Operations Centre, tasking and coordination of medical air transportation. Link to the National Air Coordination Group, to deconflict asset or airspace requirements.

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22 This applies to Tier 2 machines only, and does not include air ambulances.

Agency or organisation	Key role	Functional description
Air New Zealand	Commercial fixed-wing aircraft	Support national response efforts through intelligence, provision of capability and availability (when operationally possible), passenger and cargo movements, aviation sector expertise (including using international connections).
Other commercial air operators	Commercial air assets	Support national logistics requirements if invited to send a representative to the air coordination group, to enable efficient incorporation of commercial capabilities.
Airport authorities	Airport facility management	Manage airport facilities and critical repairs. Manage domestic and international flights using normal procedures, including scheduling, passenger handling and cargo handling.
Ministry of Transport	Transportation sector coordination	Lead the Transport Response Team. Allow for the provision of non-scheduled international flights to New Zealand.
Health NZ	Operational Health leadership	Provide information about the capacity of the health system and air transport needs.
NZ Police	Search and Rescue Category One lead, and SAR Category Two support	Coordinate Category One SAR, and lead deconfliction of SAR air requirements. Support the RCCNZ in all Category Two Search and Rescue operations.

Coordination by phase

The requirements for air coordination will change over the event operational phases as critical infrastructure is repaired and coordination requirements adjust. Agencies or organisations indicated in the organisation structure in **Figure 9** are the key agencies required for air coordination in a catastrophic event. They are not necessarily required for the duration of the stand-up of the National Air Coordination Group, and some roles may be undertaken remotely if appropriate.

Air National Assembly Areas

Air asset loading and operational tasking for nationally controlled air operations will be coordinated at designated National Assembly Areas for both fixed-wing aircraft and rotary-wing (helicopters). These Assembly Areas will be at separate locations, for airspace management and air loading purposes.

Airfields can only operate if they have enough ground operating staff, air traffic controllers and other critical operations roles to enable safe loading and air operations.

Critical restrictions

Aviation fuel will be in short supply during a catastrophe and internet connectivity may not be available to enable refuelling for air assets within impacted regions. Aircraft undertaking national taskings should carry enough fuel to fly into the region, carry out tasking and return to a refuel point.

No agreement is in place before an event for Emergency Management support by commercial rotary assets (helicopters) at a national level. Current agreements are restricted to wildfire emergency requirements.

CAA rules state that non-commercial aviation cannot be used 'for hire or reward'.

Responses at the regional or local level will need to incorporate (unplanned and as needed) volunteer aircraft on a cost share or volunteer basis.

Appendix C
International Assistance

International Assistance Phases

Figure 10 is a flowchart that lists the phases of international assistance using the processes in The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015, the NCMC Doctrine, the USAR deployment cycle and this Handbook. Part of phase 3 involves communicating with the NCMC.

Phase 1: Identify needs and approvals
- Identify requirements for international assistance
- National Controller approval to request/accept international assistance
- Request assistance via appropriate channels (VOSOCC)

Phase 2: Offers and Requests
- Match domestic needs and offers recieved with NCMC Functions and International Assistance Working Group
- Accept/decline offers in coordination with MFAT
- Make appropriate requests and track

Phase 3: Arrivals (Mobilisation)
- Coordination activation of RDC (staging, border agencies, and airports)
- Deployment of resources
- Consider hosting arrangements for assistance

Phase 4: In-country Operations
- Movement from staging/assembly to base of operations (landside logistics)
- Host Agency / NCMC tracks deployed teams' movement and supports
- Liaise with partner agencies and CDEM Groups

Phase 5: Departure (Demobilisation)
- NCMC coordinates departure of teams
- Process teams through RDC / Border
- Official Record Management
- AAR and lessons
- International recognition of assistance

Figure 10. Five phases of international assistance

Integration of New Zealand's strategic crisis response system with the On-Site Coordination System (OSOCC) of INSRARAG

Figure 11 is a flowchart that shows how global disaster response systems integrate with New Zealand's emergency management and strategic crisis response system in an event when both are activated. It shows where different entities connect and the interactions between them.

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│                            Cabinet                                 │
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│  Official's Committee for Domestic and External Security           │
│  Coordination (ODESC)                                              │
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│ │         National Crisis Management Centre (NCMC)             │ │
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│ │ │      Local Emergency Management Agency (LEMA)            │ │ │
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  │        │   NCMC International Function   │                   │
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  │        │ │          VOSOCC            │ │                   │
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│ │ Host Agency National     │     │    International Airport     │ │
  │ Coordination Centre      │     │ ┌────────────────────────┐   │
│ │ or Equivalent            │     │ │ Reception and Departure│   │ │
  │                          │     │ │      Centre (RDC)      │   │
│ └──────────────────────────┘     │ └────────────────────────┘   │ │
  ┌──────────────────────────┐     └──────────────────────────────┘
│ │ International Assistance  │                                     │
  │ Team                      │
│ └──────────────────────────┘                                     │
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
Figure 11. Structure of how global disaster response systems integrate with New Zealand's emergency management and strategic crisis response system

Guidance for the National Controller when making decisions

This section provides some considerations and guidance for the National Controller when considering offers of international assistance. As guidance only, the considerations may not apply in all situations.

Before the National Controller approves international assistance, they should seek guidance from the International Assistance Sub-function, ODESC agencies and any other stakeholders they consider relevant.

The actions taken by the National Controller and the International Assistance Sub-function must remain consistent with New Zealand laws and regulations. Agencies are expected to communicate this to their hosting agencies.

All information in the NCC and the NCMC is discoverable. Such information can be requested under the Official Information Act 1982 but is subject to the Privacy Act 2020.

Purpose

Is this assistance for immediate life-saving activities?[23] If the answer is no, then Cabinet will need to approve the assistance. If the answer is yes, then the National Controller may give approval. It is recommended that the National Controller seeks advice on the suitability and any other considerations.

Is the reason for the request for assistance clear?

Is the need underpinning such a request defined and clear?

Is the reason for accepting the offer clear?

Are domestic sources unable to meet the need?

Are the timelines unacceptable?

Suitability

Will accepting an offer of international assistance meet the domestic need?

Are any bilateral agreements or other pre-existing arrangements in place that make it easier to accept a specific offer?

Are the international personnel suitably qualified and experienced to work in the current domestic conditions?

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23 Only medical and urban search and rescue resources are in this category.

Are the international personnel appropriately accredited:

- Are USAR personnel INSARAG classified to a level to suit the needs?

- Are EMT classified by the WHO to a level that meets the needs?

- What other accreditation may all international personnel need?

- Is that other accreditation suitable? An example is a medical licence.

Are the international personnel self-sufficient?

What support will the international personnel need in-country? Examples are water, fuel, translators, and accommodation.

Is the international equipment interoperable with domestic equipment?

Is the international equipment new? Biosecurity clearance will be easier if the equipment is factory new.

Other conditions and considerations

Are any conditions associated with the offer? If yes, are they acceptable?

Do any hazard-specific plans recommend prioritising different types of international assistance? Some hazard-specific plans may recommend movement prioritisation of teams. For example, the Wellington Earthquake National Initial Response Plan recommends USAR over EMT. It will be important to understand the needs of the situation, plans, and the implications of a course of action before deciding. IAWG member agencies can assist with this.

Supporting information

Overview of international assistance

The National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 and The Guide to the National Civil Defence Emergency Management Plan 2015 specify that New Zealand work within the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) framework.

The National NCC or NCMC Operations International Sub-function coordinates international assistance for New Zealand. The Sub-function is based in the NCMC and led by MFAT or by NEMA with MFAT's close support.

Offers of assistance can come through a range of channels (such as through MFAT), or directly to Ministers or agency chief executives. The NCMC must be kept informed about all offers of international assistance and coordinate the responses to offers. This centralisation will allow for consistent and coherent advice to Cabinet or for the National Controller to make decisions about life safety assistance.

Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre

The NCMC International Function uses the Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre (VOSOCC) to coordinate international disaster assistance. The VOSOCC is a web portal that serves as the primary notice or bulletin board for the international community to coordinate international assistance.

The VOSOCC is part of the Global Disaster Alert and Coordination System and is the first point of reference for international emergency responders. It allows information exchange with the international community early in an emergency. Examples of information shared include:

- baseline country information

- entry points

- logistical support requirements

- initial assessment information.

New Zealand supports the use of the VOSOCC as an important information-sharing and management tool. New Zealand has a range of stakeholders with an interest in, and which are registered for, the VOSOCC. These include local, regional, national stakeholders as well as NGOs and other agencies.

Authority to update the VOSOCC during a response is limited to NCMC Staff, the UNDAC team (if present) and USAR team leaders.

Within the NCMC environment, the Operations Function (International Assistance Sub-function) manages and runs the VOSOCC. If the International Assistance Function is established as a separate function, it takes over managing and running the VOSOCC. The International Assistance Sub-function may task other agencies, such as FENZ, Health or MFAT with updating or assisting with the updating of the VOSOCC. Operational processes are documented in the NCMC Standard Operating Procedures for International Assistance.

In-country coordination varies by type of assistance and the hosting agency, and should be done through New Zealand coordination systems such as Emi. Some teams may use customised software, but this should be done in addition to the use of NCMC systems to maintain situational awareness.

Reception and Departure Centres

RDC operate according to internationally recognised principles and systems set out in the International Search and Rescue Group (INSARAG). They are considered part of the United Nations' On-Site Coordination Centre (OSOCC).

RDC are established at ports of entry to a nation so that they can be the central coordination hub for international relief teams arriving at the border. They can:

• facilitate their arrival at the border

• help with registration and then deployment

• manage incoming relief resources.

Figure 12 provides a high-level process overview of travelling to and arriving at an airport RDC. NEMA, as the LEMA is responsible for the overall coordination of International Assistance in New Zealand. In reality, LEMA does this coordination in conjunction with partner agencies, particularly:

• Fire and Emergency New Zealand (as operational focal point for INSARAG)

• Ministry of Health (as the focal point for health).

RDC will operate as a joint effort between these agencies and will likely include members of border agencies.

RDC will operate differently at each site (airports and ports) due to the resources available and arrangements made with port operators and border agencies.

RDC remain under the control of the NCMC due to NEMA's role as LEMA and as the responsible entity for coordinating international assistance. The National Controller may delegate some aspects of running the RDC to other agencies based on available resources and skillsets.

NEMA currently has an RDC cache in Auckland that contains equipment required to set up an RDC. Work is under way to expand capability at the locations listed below. These will be dispersed across the country to ensure an RDC can rapidly be established at relevant points of entry. FENZ also has basic mobile RDC caches available.

Table 21 shows the locations of proposed and current RDC caches.

Table 21. Locations of RDC caches

Location	CDEM Region / Group	Reason
Auckland (current)	AEM Group Office in Auckland	Primary International Airport Proximity to: • Whenuapai • Ports of Auckland • Hamilton • USAR base
Palmerston North (proposed)	Manawatū-Whanganui Group Office in Palmerston North	International Airport and RNZAF Proximity to: • Ohakea • Taranaki Port • Napier Port • USAR base
Wellington (proposed)	WREMO Group Office in Wellington	International Airport Proximity to: • South Island (air bridge) • USAR base
Christchurch (proposed)	Canterbury Group Office in Christchurch	International Airport Proximity to: • USAR base • Road or air deployable across the middle and upper South Island
Queenstown (proposed)	Emergency Management Otago Group Office in Dunedin	International Airport

Operational information for response staff is in the *RDC Standard Operating Procedures* and in site-specific arrangements.

RDC Critical Tasks Matrix

Figure 12 shows critical taskings when establishing an RDC at a site. This is based on a domestic establishment, using New Zealand personnel. If a New Zealand agency cannot establish an RDC, then the first arriving USAR team will establish and operate the RDC in line with INSARAG doctrine.

Arrangements for each RDC will be made between the NCMC international functions (including FENZ, Health, MFAT and others), other functions, CDEM and any other stakeholders. Personnel will likely be sourced from agencies and organisations with the appropriate footprint, skills and availability unique to each region.

Figure 12. Critical taskings when establishing an RDC at a site using New Zealand personnel

Functions of border agencies

This section lists the functions of border sector agencies when enabling international assistance to enter New Zealand. These functions are based on business-as-usual responsibilities set out by the border executive group.

When coordinating assistance, the National Controller may want to seek advice from these agencies on their area of specialty or seek their input to resolve emerging issues. Some IAWG members are included in the list, but not all. The International Assistance Sub-function may wish to request liaisons from these or other agencies when resolving issues.

New Zealand Customs Service

Manage border risk and enable entry of assistance through:

- assessment, inspection and clearance of travellers, goods and craft

- trade assistance

- revenue collection

- disruption of illicit and illegal goods and both domestic and transnational organised crime.

Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment

Ensure international assistance is able to arrive.

Verify international assistance has the right to enter New Zealand.

Disrupt people smuggling and trafficking.

Ministry for Primary Industries

Ensure that international assistance can clear biosecurity through:

- assessment, inspection and clearance of travellers, goods and craft for biosecurity protection

- approval and oversight of transitional and containment facilities

- pre-border and domestic biosecurity systems.

Ministry of Health

Ensure international assistance clears appropriate regulatory processes through:

- surveillance of, and response to, health threats at the border

- health clearance for arriving craft

- operationalisation of the United Nations' International Health Regulations (2005) Third Edition.

New Zealand Foreign Affairs and Trade

Assist with offers and requests of assistance through:

- consular communication

- support for border settings.

Ministry of Transport

While not an international function member the Ministry of Transport can provide advice in BAU. MoT may be able to assist with resolving issues during response by providing policy advice, Crown entity governance, system leadership on:

- Civil Aviation Authority aviation safety and security

- Maritime New Zealand regulatory activity

- links to airlines and the aviation sector.

Appendix D
List of Acronyms and Initialisms

A

aNCMC	Alternative National Crisis Management Centre
aNWCG	Alternative National Welfare Coordination Group
AoG	All of Government
APOD	Aerial Port of Debarkation
APOE	Aerial Port of Embarkation
AREC	Amateur Radio Emergency Communications
ATV	All-terrain vehicles

B

BAU	Business as Usual
BCP	Business Continuity Plan

C

CAA	Civil Aviation Authority
CatPlan	Catastrophic Planning
CCIR	Controller Critical Information Requirements
CDEM	Civil Defence Emergency Management
CEG	Coordinating Executive Committee
C4	Command, Control, Coordination and Communication
CID	Council for International Development
CIMS	Coordinated Incident Management System
CIR	Critical Information Requirements [the same as Intelligence Requirements and Essential Elements of Information]
ConOps	Concept of Operations
CONPLAN	Contingency Plan

D

DIA	Department of Internal Affairs
DoC	Department of Conservation
DPMC	Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
DVI	Disaster Victim Identification

E

ECC	Emergency Coordination Centre
EM	Emergency Management
EMA	Emergency Mobile Alert
EMAT	Emergency Management Assistance Team
EMT	Emergency Medical Team
EOC	Emergency Operations Centre

F

FENZ	Fire and Emergency New Zealand
FMCG	Fast-Moving Consumer Goods

G

GNS	Geological and Nuclear Sciences

H

HADR	Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response
HAZMAT	Hazardous Materials
HQJFNZ	Headquarters Joint Forces New Zealand

I

IAWG	International Assistance Working Group
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
ICNZ	Insurance Council New Zealand
ICP	Information Collection Plan
IMT	Incident Management Team
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
INSARAG	International Search and Rescue Advisory Group
ISP	Intelligence Support Plan
INTELLO	Intelligence Liaison Officer
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance

J

JC	Joint Committee
JIG	Joint Intelligence Group
JIGICC	JIG Intelligence Collections Coordinator

L

LandSAR	Land Search and Rescue
LEMA	Local Emergency Management Authority
LINZ	Land Information New Zealand
LO	Liaison Officer
LUC	Lifeline Utility Coordinator

M

MBIE	Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment
MBIE BEM	MBIE – Building Emergency Management
MBIE INZ	MBIE – Immigration New Zealand
MBIE TAS	MBIE – Temporary Accommodation Services
MetService	New Zealand Meteorological Service
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
MfE	Ministry for the Environment
MFI	Mass Fatality Incident
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoT	Ministry of Transport
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPI	Ministry for Primary Industries
MSD	Ministry of Social Development

N

NAA	National Assembly Area
NAIT	National Animal Identification and Tracing
NCC	National Coordination Centre
NCCC	National Command and Control Centre
NCMC	National Crisis Management Centre
NDRS	National Disaster Resilience Strategy
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NHC	Natural Hazards Commission
NIWA	National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research
NOTAM	Notice to Air Mission
NPCG	National PIM Coordination Group

NPERG	National Public Education Reference Group
NRCG	National Recovery Coordination Group
NRO	National Recovery Office
NWCG	National Welfare Coordination Group
NZDF	New Zealand Defence Force
NZMAT	New Zealand Medical Assistance Team
NZRC	New Zealand Red Cross
NZRT	New Zealand Response Team
NZTA	New Zealand Transport Agency Waka Kotahi

O

ODESC	The Officials Committee for Domestic and External Security Coordination
OT	Oranga Tamariki

P

PBNA	Population-based Needs Assessment
PID	Personal Identifiable Data
PIM	Public Information Management
PIMCG	Public Information Management Coordination Group
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
POC	Point of Contact
PSR	Protective Security Requirements

Q

QSD	Quadrilateral Security Dialogue

Catastrophic Event Handbook

R

RAA	Regional Assembly Areas
RBNZ	Reserve Bank of New Zealand
RCCNZ	Rescue Coordination Centre New Zealand
RDC	Reception Departure Centre
RMA	Resource Management Act 1991
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force
RORO	Roll-on-roll-off

S

SAFER	South Island Alpine Fault Earthquake Response
SandA	Sources and agencies
SAR	Search and Rescue
SCE	Sector Coordinating Entities
SIR	Specific Information Requirements
SITREP	Situation Report
SONE	State of National Emergency
SNTP	State of National Transition Period
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures

T

TCF	Telecommunications Forum
TEF	Telecommunications Emergency Forum
TEMCG	Transport Emergency Management Coordination Group
TRSAG	Transport Resilience and Security Advisory Group

U

UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNOCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
USAR	Urban Search and Rescue

V

VOSOCC	Virtual On-Site Operations Coordination Centre

W

WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion
WCG	Welfare Coordination Group
WHO	World Health Organisation
WMA	Waste Minimisation Act 2008

Appendix E
Glossary

Term	Meaning in the context of this Handbook
Agencies	Bodies including: • government agencies such as public service departments, non-public service departments Crown entities and offices of Parliament • non-government agencies • auxiliary to government • lifeline utilities.
Assembly Areas	Areas used to receive, organise, store and transport resources. They allow a coordination centre to deal with large volumes of resources.
CDEM Groups (Impacted)	Regional Emergency Management Group that has communicated it is severely impacted and unable to function or has not been able to communicate and is therefore assumed severely impacted.
CDEM Groups (Limited Impact)	Regional Emergency Management Group that has reported impacts which require a manageable coordinated response from CDEM.
CDEM Groups (Not Impacted)	Regional Emergency Management Group that has activated and communicated that it has no impacts requiring CDEM coordination.
Command	The authority within a team, unit or organisation. Includes the internal ownership, administrative responsibility and detailed supervision of personnel, tasks and resources. Command cannot be exercised across teams, units or organisations unless specifically agreed.
Control	Authority that sets objectives and directs tasks across teams, units and organisations within their capability and capacity. Control may be over another team, unit or organisation's resources, but does not include interference with that team, unit or organisation's command authority or how its tasks are conducted. Control authority is established through legislation, by formal delegation or by mutual agreement.
Controller Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)	Combined list of PIR and Notifiable incidents that are prioritised for the overall information requirements to allow decision-making. Defined by the National Controller, CCIR focus on at-risk areas.
Coordination	Brings together response elements and resources to ensure a unified and effective response.

Term	Meaning in the context of this Handbook
Emergency	Situation that results from any happening, whether natural or otherwise, including, for example: • explosion • earthquake, eruption, tsunami, land movement • flood, storm, tornado, cyclone • serious fire • leakage or spillage of any dangerous gas or substance • technological failure • infestation, plague, epidemic • failure of, or disruption to, an emergency service or a lifeline utility • actual or imminent attack or warlike action. The situation must cause or may cause loss of life, injury, illness or distress, or endanger the safety of the public or property in any part of New Zealand. Emergency services cannot deal with the situation, or the situation requires a significant and coordinated response.
Emergency Management System	Rules, organisations and practices that support emergency management outcomes.
Emergency services	The New Zealand Police, Fire and Emergency New Zealand, Taumata Arowai, and providers of health and disability services.
Essential Elements of Information	A detailed subset of a PIR, that provides granular understanding of a specific situation.
Lifeline Utilities	Entities listed in Part A and Part B of Schedule 1 of the CDEM Act 2002. Lifeline utilities provide essential and enabling infrastructure and services that support commercial and domestic activity. Lifeline utilities deliver services. Examples are: • water supply, wastewater and stormwater collection • electricity, gas, and petroleum distribution • telecommunications and broadcasting • transportation networks, including roads, railways, airports and ports.
Mass Relief	Immediate provision of food, water, sanitation services, medical supplies and medication, and shelter to preserve life and ease the suffering of people and animals impacted by a significant event.
National Assembly Areas (NAAs)	Nodes in the emergency supply chain where nationally controlled assets, goods, equipment and nationally tasked personnel are managed.
Notifiable Incident	Time-sensitive event or condition that requires immediate attention from a senior decision-maker.

Term	Meaning in the context of this Handbook
Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR)	Information requirements related to the operational environment and which provide insight into factors and situations linked to key areas of decision-making. PIR are often broken down into detailed subsets called Essential Elements of Information.
Readiness	State of developing operational systems and capabilities before an emergency happens, including: • making arrangements with emergency services, lifeline utilities, and other agencies • developing self-help and response arrangements for the general public.
Recovery	Coordinated efforts and processes used to result in the immediate, medium-term, and long-term holistic regeneration and enhancement of a community after an emergency.
Response	Actions taken immediately before, during or directly after an emergency to save human and animal lives and property, and to help communities begin to recover.
(Shared) Situational Awareness	**Situational awareness**: understanding and appreciation of the complexities of an incident, including an understanding of the environment, the situation, likely developments, and implications. **Shared situational awareness**: Shared situational awareness is achieved when the right level of intelligence is shared by and between all involved in an emergency to enable informed decision-making and consolidated planning. Maintaining situational awareness requires a continuous cycle of collecting, processing, and analysing information as the event and the response to that event progresses.
Sources and Agencies (SandA)	Collective term for organisations and entities (agencies) or an individual or group (source) that can provide information, data or both to the intelligence process.
Wide-area impact assessment (sometimes called an 'initial situation overview')	Assessment usually conducted within eight hours after an emergency occurs. May be conducted: • on the ground (including a drive-by or walk-by depending on accessibility and safety) • by aerial reconnaissance (including drone footage) • by water • by a combination of methods.